17th Century & Early Modern Philosophy

Resumo: Durante o século XVII francês, os libertinos emergiram tecendo uma série de questionamentos a respeito da cultura, da sociedade, da política, do cosmos e da religião. Buscando pela autonomia de pensamento e de corpo, colocaram tudo em questão, ironizando e tecendo críticas, particularmente, dirigidas contra os dogmas da fé cristã. Cyrano de Bergerac e Charles Dassoucy são escritores que podem ser destacados na paisagem de indagações da época, ao elaborarem questionamentos concernentes a religião em suas narrativas literárias, Viagem à Lua e Viagem ao Sol (1657 e 1662) e Les Pensées e Les Aventures (1676 e 1677), respectivamente. A partir do estudo dos escritos, objetiva-se apresentar a crítica libertina em matéria de religião, indicando como as obras revelam representações sobre a possibilidade de descrença em um contexto que foi descrito historicamente como repleto de indivíduos que buscavam acreditar. Dessa forma, verifica-se como os agentes estavam perpassando por uma reflexão interior, que almejava se ver livre do monopólio de autoridade religiosa para elaborar as suas próprias ideias e compreensões de mundo, mais positivas e menos culpabilizantes sobre o ser humano.

This draft critically examines the traditional arguments for the existence of God and the ethical implications of divine silence, aiming to contribute to contemporary discussions in philosophy of religion. Drawing from personal faith experiences within a predominantly non-religious Japanese cultural context, the author explores the epistemological limitations of deductive reasoning in theological discourse, the ethical challenges posed by God's lack of clear response,

EARLY MODERN EUROPE WAS enthralled by China and its main protago-nist from the late sixteenth century onwards, Confucius. This ancient sage was the subject of books and pamphlets, his likeness was depicted in print and on porcelain and his teachings were discussed in the pages of newspapers and journals throughout Europe. In 1740, the French writer Jean Baptise Boyer, marquis d’Argens, even dedicated his Lettres chinoises to the soul of this long departed Chinese savant: ‘Manes du plus grand homme qu’ait produit l’Univers, souffrez que je vous donne un témoignage du profond respect que j’ai pour votre mémoire’.

Separated in time by a millennium and in space by thousands of miles, D’Argens's dedication seems counter-intuitive. Dedications were usually aimed at remunerated (or prospectively remunerated or otherwise beneficial) patronage, and D’Argens could hardly have expected the soul of Confucius to grant him any earthly rewards in exchange for a flattering inscription. Yet there was more to be gained here than direct financial compensation. By ‘teaching the public what my feelings are for the greatest man the universe has produced’, D’Argens's dedication appealed in both sentiment and subject to the ever-growing number of early modern readers clamouring for knowledge about China. One result of this inquisitiveness has already been noted in Petiver's particular interest in and naming of specimens sent from China; D’Argens responded to the eagerness for knowledge of China with an epistolary novel: a genre that had only recently come into being.

As the Western humanities have increasingly focused on global per-spectives in the last couple of decades, scholars have emphasised the interconnectedness between cultures in Asia and Europe. A wide range of topics have been covered, often with a focus on the interactions facilitating the transmission of goods such as porcelain, lacquerware, silks and spices as well as shared knowledge about medicine, philosophy, writing systems and how this dissemination of goods and knowledge impacted upon the respective societies into which they were introduced.

The role of the Jesuits in the early European study of China and Con-fucius has been emphasised by, among others, David Mungello, who considers these premodern interactions as a form of ‘proto-sinology’.

L'articolo esamina il tema della guerra nei libretti di Giovan Francesco Busenello (1598-1659), in particolare nel contesto de "Il viaggio di Enea all'Inferno".  Busenello, membro dell'Accademia degli Incogniti nella Venezia del XVII secolo, utilizza il motivo bellico per riflettere sulla contemporaneità e sul declino della Serenissima.  La guerra èPresentata da Busenello con una duplice valenza: da un lato critica la guerra moderna che invalida l'onore cavalleresco, dall'altro celebra le vittorie di Venezia e il suo ruolo di dominatrice dei mari e custode della libertà.  L'analisi si concentra su due scene specifiche del libretto "Il viaggio di Enea all'Inferno" per illustrare questa duplice visione della guerra e i suoi caratteri sociali.

discutirá el material teológico-natural añadido a la Optice de 1706. Al hacerlo, se señalarán ejemplos de su relación con las afirmaciones hechas en el Escolio General de los Principia, se demostrará cómo éste está iluminado por las afirmaciones más explícitas hechas en un borrador a la Cuestión 23 (31), y se explorarán conexiones entre las declaraciones públicas de las Cuestiones y material más explícito sobre teología natural en los manuscritos privados de Newton. Luego se mostrará que, así como en el Escolio General, el material añadido a las ediciones posteriores de la Óptica también incluye claves sobre su teología antitrinitaria herética. Finalmente, se sugerirán formas en que los compromisos de Newton con la teología natural, y un poderoso Dios unitario del dominio, ayudaron a sustentar su filosofía natural. En suma, este artículo sostiene que la teología natural de Newton y su teología herética se relacionan con la filosofía natural de la Óptica de maneras que son mucho más fundamentales que un delgado barniz de retórica. Este artículo se basa no sólo en un análisis de los textos publicados, sino también de los borradores relacionados con la Óptica y otros paralelos textuales en los escritos inéditos de Newton. Estos manuscritos privados ayudarán a abrir una ventana en el sentido que buscaban los textos públicos de Newton.

Sir William Temple, who introduced the term sharawadgi, the Sino-Japanese principle of naturalist asymmetry which was the catalyst for Romanticism, vis-a-vis the Jesuit 'encyclopaedia of Chinese thought titled "Confucius Sinarum Philosophus"' which by contrast translated 'Tao' in 'the mechanical sense of a straight piece of wood used as a ruler' rather than 'the organic...sense of a path following natural contours through a forest'.

In my paper, I attempt to show how the Hadotian metaphilosophical perspective of philosophy as a way of life (PWL for short) implies another conception of what true, philosophical knowledge is: a conception that one should understand through Hadot's reading of what is Sophia for ancient philosophy. To do so, I present my account of PWL according to Hadot as a way of understanding philosophy in which the way of life comes first and the discourse comes second and which is practiced fundamentally through the spiritual exercises of attention to the present moment and cosmic consciousness. Through this exposition, I show that the PWL conception of knowledge is one in which to know is to be that which is known. I then connect this discussion to contemporary philosophical debate and critique of our current society by Byung-Chul Han and Ailton Krenak, pointing out how the PWL conception of knowledge is relevant to that debate and, thus, crucial for the reflection on alternatives to the way we live today, led by demands of productivity and utility.

The paper discusses G. W. Leibniz's understanding of the conscious phenomena of the soul. Initially, it characterizes a conscious perception considering the notions of 'perspective', 'distinction', 'attention', and 'force' (section 1). From this characterization, it argues that it is possible to state two distinct notions of 'consciousness': consciousness as 'knowledge of a particular mental state' and consciousness as 'knowledge of oneself' (self-consciousness) (section 2). The paper states the identification the notions of 'aperception' and 'reflection' with that second sort of consciousness. Finally, it is suggested that non-human animals have conscious perceptions in the first sense of the term 'consciousness', despite they do not have consciousness of themselves. They do not have aperception (section 3).

How are fields of historiographical specialisation constructed? How can we perceive and trace the intersection between institutional problems and the epistemological implications of disciplines at a time when they are marking out their ruptures? These are the issues that Michel de Certeau considered in 1970 in order to ‘deterritorialise’ theology from the broad hegemonic ocean represented at that time by historiography and, in particular, social history. To do this, Certeau has regularly used a material tactic of re-employing texts (especially the rewriting of articles into book chapters) and a precursory epistemological toolkit from the human sciences.

Like Plato, Aristotle, Epicurus and most other ancient philosophers, Spinoza sets for philosophy a very elevated goal, namely to guide human beings to the realization of their highest good, or as Spinoza also puts it, the ultimate human perfection. Though Spinoza follows the ancients in calling this goal happiness (felicitus), he also follows thinkers of the medieval Jewish and Christian traditions in naming it salvation (salus), joy (gaudio), blessedness (beatitudo), acquiescence of spirit (animi acquiescentia), glory (gloria), and love (amore). Finally, in an expression that gives the ultimate good a modern political significance as well as one pertaining to the life of the individual person, Spinoza calls it freedom (libertas). One of the keys to grasping Spinoza's conception of the highest good is to see how these various strains (ancient, medieval, and modern) enter into a combination in his work that is radical in its significance, and that brings down upon him, not only t...

That Spinoza was an early champion of tolerating a measure of religious diversity and political dissent is widely recognized. Interpretive scholarship and histories of early modern political thought continue to reassess the scope and warrants for toleration in Spinoza's ethical and political thought, as well as the originality and influence of his views. Interpretive discussions have also recognized the importance of Spinoza's concern, especially in his ethical works, with affective motivations for intolerance, especially the constellation of fear, hope, ambition (ambitio), and hatred. I aim to push this second interpretive trajectory further by examining the mystifying, if counterintuitive, connection that Spinoza consistently makes, between envy (invidia) and superstition as motivations for intolerance, primarily in the Ethics. Spinoza's concern with envy has not had a significant place in discussions of the affective grounds of intolerance. 1 I note, however, that Spinoza's references to envy are consistently embedded in the context of claims about the way that superstition amplifies hatred, and in contexts that concern the motivations for blame and punishment, and so ipso facto, toleration. Examining these references bring to light Spinoza's nuanced rethinking of a longstanding moral psychology of envy (invidia). Spinoza draws upon this background, which already recognized envy as a "last step" toward "hatred of the

RESUMO: Em 1630 Descartes declarou que os seus estudos estavam voltados para o estabelecimento dos fundamentos do conhecimento. Várias questões discutidas nas cartas são significativas, mas uma em particular é de grande importância para a compreensão da sua filosofia, a saber, a afirmação do fundamento metafísico das verdades eternas. ABSTRACT: In 1630, Descartes declared that his studies were focused on the establishment of the foundations of knowledge. Several issues discussed in the letters are significant, but one in particular is of great importance for the understanding of his philosophy, namely, the affirmation of the metaphysical foundation of eternal truths.

El ensayo explora las tensiones entre técnicca y naturaleza en la Crítica de la facultad de juzgar, enfatizando el caracter crítico-reflexivo desde el cual "pensar" el ordenamiento teleológico de la naturaleza más allá de su comprensión mecánica y mecanicista.

The volume outlines Miklós Bethlen’s (1642-1716) philosophical thought as it was developed in the Preface of his extant Autobiography (written between 1708-1710). Reflecting on the Cartesian argument for consciousness in using language, Bethlen endorses his contrasting conviction on the low-level consciousness evident in public speech performances. A tendentiously mechanical interpretation of performative speech acts renders the psychological phenomena of honour, shame, ambition, disgust and even esteem as crucial constituents of social reality. To describe these elements, Bethlen introduces the Pufendorfian terminology of ‘moral or civic qualities’ in an essentially modified sense. However, Bethlen’s modern vision of society could not eliminate his dilemmas of the underlying anthropology at the crossroads of theodicy and original sin.

In the colleges of the Principality of Transylvania, far away from the centres of Cartesian philosophy in the Low Countries, France, England and even Germany, certain intellectuals were engaged in passionate and lively discussions about Cartesian metaphysics. The current volume presents a vindication of Descartes's philosophy from 1685.

Lucretius innovates upon prior Epicurean philosophers by making the discussion of atomic movement in his didactic epic not just a complement to his exegesis of Epicurean philosophy, but in developing new scientific explanations for Epicurean doctrine through the principles of atomic motion. I claim that Lucretian tranquility is a kinetic phenomenon, an approach which provides new insight on the psychological and the ethical elements of his philosophy, and allows his On the Nature of Things to be brought into a fuller conversation with current scholarship on Epicurean psychology and ethics. I examine how atomic movement is emulated on the individual/psychological and societal/ethical level through metaphor and allegory. The leaky vessel and the honeyed cup refer to the link between atomic turbulence and the psychological realm: representing emotional imbalance and its opposite. Meanwhile, allegories of Venus and Mars represent the unifying and disruptive effects of atomic movement in interpersonal relationships and society. Finally, I propose that Lucretius' plague account enshrines mutual aid and self-sacrifice without violating the principles of Epicurean egoism, establishing ethical behavior as an essential component of tranquility.

Until the end of 1653, Vermeer was mapping the south region of the Americas, starting in Brazil and creating fort views and nautical maps. After 1654, when he became a member of the Guild of Saint Luke, and took along a pupil as he painted a few historical portraits in Nieuw Amsterdam, accompanied by his apprentice, Quiringh Gerritsz. van Brekelenkam. This can be concluded from the same individuals depicted and their clothing origins. Details, such as a alligator's appearing twice, are not typically Dutch. Other features include polka dot jugs and French-style bonnets. Crafts, as described in the records by historians. The same period of the Deluge (Swedish invasion of Poland 1655) and the attack on the Swedish in 1655 by the Dutch in Nieuw Sweden. One painting is probably by Vermeer and the other by QvB, from the year 1655... This is the period when Vermeer created his paintings in Nieuw Amsterdam with the connection to Tienhoven. However, he was also a captain and cartographer. Brekelenkam did not copy Vermeers Paintings, he used to make his own.

In Meditation I of Meditations on First Philosophy, René Descartes introduces the “evil genius” hypothesis—a thought experiment in which a supremely powerful and cunning deceiver systematically manipulates his perceptions and reasoning. Descartes does not suggest that such a being exists; rather, he uses it as a methodological tool to push doubt to its furthest limit. By doing so, he hopes to discard all uncertain beliefs and uncover a foundation for knowledge that is immune to even the most radical skepticism.

In this paper, I will argue that the evil genius argument plays a crucial role in Descartes’ project of epistemic foundationalism, despite significant criticisms regarding its coherence and philosophical usefulness. First, I will reconstruct Descartes’ argument and explain how it builds upon earlier stages of doubt, such as sensory deception and the dream argument. Next, I will analyze major criticisms of the evil genius hypothesis—especially concerns about the self-defeating nature of doubting reason and the overly demanding standard of certainty. Then, I will defend the usefulness of the evil genius device as a clarifying methodological step rather than a final skeptical stance. Finally, I will suggest that the enduring relevance of Descartes’ thought experiment lies in its capacity to engage with contemporary questions about trust, deception, and information in the digital age.

Al proyectar esta investigación, pues, nuestro objetivo inicial era explicar y explicarnos por qué ciertos pasajes de Pierre Bayle, un autor al que apenas empezábamos a leer, despertaban el recuerdo casi inmediato de Philo, el personaje escéptico de los Dialogues, al cual habíamos aprendido a interpretar como “vocero” de las ideas de David Hume. El resultado es éste, considerablemente engrosado a medida que íbamos haciéndonos cargo, y cediendo al atractivo, del pensamiento que descubríamos. Ya se nos había advertido. Una aproximación preliminar a las obras de Bayle suele generar cierto reparo: por su volumen, por su índole laberíntica, por su “dialéctica binaria”, como dirá André Robinet. Pero una vez metidos en ellas, se corre el riesgo de quedar gustosamente atrapado por las redes de datos eruditos, detalles biográficos y pacientes argumentos que segrega su autor. Sucede en forma especial con el Dictionnaire, un “drama con héroes y villanos”, en expresión de Richard Popkin, por el cual desfilan todas las preocupaciones intelectuales del siglo XVII. Este encuentro, unido a la conciencia de estar mostrando un filósofo escasamente conocido en lengua española, hizo que el análisis de la “herramienta”, por decirlo así, terminara por abarcar casi el setenta por ciento del recorrido. Esperamos que las páginas que siguen logren transmitir algo del interés que nos fue llevando a tal modificación.
Organizamos el estudio en dos partes. La primera, de seis capítulos, está íntegramente dedicada a Pierre Bayle. La segunda, de tres capítulos, se ocupa del influjo que el autor del Dictionnaire pudo tener en los escritos de David Hume. Nuestra guía será siempre el problema del mal en cuanto objeción racional a la creencia en el Dios cristiano. Los capítulos de la primera parte se ordenan de la siguiente manera. El primero, llamado “La realidad del mal”, procura sacar a luz las raíces existenciales que tienen las reflexiones de Pierre Bayle, reflexiones que con frecuencia han sido descriptas como meros juegos dialécticos de una mente despreocupada. Para combatir esa interpretación, reconstruimos mínimamente algunos de los acontecimientos familiares y políticos por los que transita Pierre Bayle y el modo cómo dichos acontecimientos se refleja en sus páginas. Desde ellos, nos parece, se entiende mejor el rechazo exasperado que exhiben estas páginas frente a las “soluciones” de una teología racionalista que pretende confortar, e incluso corregir, el sufrimiento desde una especulación abstracta. Continuando con esta idea, tratamos también de incorporar otros elementos que Bayle recibe de la tradición calvinista en la que fue educado y que lo apoyan en su visión de la naturaleza y la historia, dominada por la experiencia del dolor y del pecado.
Presentado este fondo religioso de las ideas de Bayle, imprescindible para serle fiel a un hombre y a un siglo en el que, como ha dicho, Yvon Belaval, hasta los mismos libertinos se explican por la religión,  el segundo capítulo (“El mal frente a Dios”) se encarga básicamente de seguir los cambios que registra nuestro autor en su evaluación de la respuesta que da Malebranche al problema del mal. Veremos así la adhesión que manifiesta inicialmente a la teoría malebranchiana de las leyes generales, las debilidades que progresivamente va descubriendo en esa teoría con la ayuda de Antoine Arnauld, y su crítica última y definitiva a la misma a partir de una relación entre los atributos divinos de bondad y sabiduría que considera racionalmente inaceptable y religiosamente no cristiana. En este capítulo también nos ocupamos, por último, de la vinculación -o la falta de vinculación- entre Bayle y Malebranche a propósito de la crítica a la concepción clásica del mal como “privatio boni”.
El capítulo tercero está concentrado en lo que se conoce como “las objeciones maniqueas”, es decir, las objeciones que Bayle elabora en el Dictionnaire y en obras posteriores para sacar a luz las debilidades de las teorías contemporáneas en sus justificaciones de los males morales y físicos. Su crítica tiene por objetivo último subrayar que el monismo teológico no ofrece solución para esos males, al menos si pretende dar cuenta de ellos y salvar al mismo tiempo todos los atributos divinos; de ahí el nombre de las objeciones, propuestas desde la perspectiva de un supuesto defensor de la hipótesis dualista. Nos ocupamos en forma sucesiva de las objeciones al origen del pecado, de las objeciones a la eternidad del Infierno y de las objeciones a los males físicos. En el desarrollo de este capítulo comenzará a vislumbrarse, además, cuál es la gran respuesta de Bayle frente al problema del mal: una respuesta específicamente anti-teológica, fundada en una fe que cree sin razones en un Dios incomprensible y porque así lo manda Su autoridad revelada.
En el cuarto capítulo, titulado “Las enseñanzas de la derrota”, se comienza por situar con más precisión el contexto de las objeciones maniqueas y el objetivo que las mismas persiguen. Para Bayle, esas objeciones son insolubles en tanto se pretenda resolverlas dentro de los límites de una disputa filosófica y con las reglas que una disputa filosófica exige. Tratamos de demostrar, así, que los argumentos que ofrece Leibniz en 1710 con los Essais de Théodicée no cumplen con aquellas reglas y, por lo tanto, no pueden considerarse como una refutación de Bayle. Esta cuestión nos sirve para adentrarnos en el examen del elemento más espinoso en la teoría bayleana: el giro mediante el cual se intenta transformar la derrota racional frente a los maniqueos en homenaje de máxima piedad a Dios, en “el triunfo de la fe”. Para descifrarlo, es preciso examinar primero qué conceptos de razón y de fe supone Bayle, y a partir de allí por qué concluye que la relación entre una y otra no puede ser sino de enfrentamiento directo. El resultado, como hemos sugerido, es un fideísmo “ciego”; doctrina no enteramente extraña a la tradición reformada, pero que este caso parece hacer demasiadas concesiones a la razón para resultar sostenible.
El capítulo quinto, que hemos titulado “Contra los teólogos” en un pequeño homenaje a Sexto Empírico, intenta comprender la crítica de Bayle a las teodiceas de su tiempo como parte de una crítica más amplia a la totalidad del proyecto teológico. A partir del artículo más famoso del Dictionnaire, el dedicado a Pirrón de Elis, se reconstruyen los argumentos escépticos que apoyan esa crítica a la “ciencia divina” y las conclusiones extremas que Bayle deriva de la misma. De esta manera, se puede observar que el papel que cumplían antes las objeciones maniqueas frente a las “pruebas” de la existencia de un Dios omnipotente y bondadoso, lo cumple también la “objeción estratonista” frente al argumento del designio. Son objeciones escépticas cuya función es socavar los fundamentos racionales de la creencias religiosas. No para destruir éstas, según Bayle, sino para enseñar a la ambición explicativa de los teólogos la distancia infranqueable que existe entre creer y conocer. El ejemplo de poeta Simónides nos mostrará, al final del capítulo, una especie de teología negativa que representaría para Bayle la versión ilustrada de la “verdadera fe”.
El capítulo sexto, el último de esta primera parte, se detiene en dos aspectos distintos, aunque vinculados entre sí. Las dos primeras secciones procuran analizar la teoría de la creencia religiosa que propone Bayle, una vez que se han descartado los presuntos fundamentos racionales de la misma. Esa teoría tiene una base netamente psicológica, dado que el autor del Dictionnaire hace intervenir en ella un conjunto de factores heterogéneos –desde la costumbre a la gracia- que sólo resultan homologables en cuanto son no racionales y en cuanto son no voluntarios. La creencia religiosa resulta, pues, un efecto cuyas causas son variadas, y en última instancia indiscernibles. “Sólo Dios es capaz de escrutar los corazones”, dice Bayle; las dos últimas secciones del capítulo intentan aprovechar las extraordinarias consecuencias políticas de este principio. Primero examinamos cómo el dato (inatacable e indefendible) de la pertenencia a un credo religioso le sirve a nuestro autor para derivar una justificación original del carácter inviolable de la conciencia y de la necesaria tolerancia entre las diferentes confesiones. Conectamos estas ideas, después, con una de sus tesis más conocidas, la que defiende la posibilidad de una sociedad de ateos.
La segunda parte, como quedó dicho, está consagrada al posible influjo de las ideas de Bayle en el pensamiento de Hume. Consta de tres capítulos y lleva por título general “El mal y la ‘hipótesis religiosa’ según David Hume”. El primero de estos capítulos, el séptimo en la totalidad del trabajo, titulado “Hume, lector de Pierre Bayle”, hace un  breve repaso de la influencia ya detectada a propósito del Treatise on Human Nature y se detiene después en una notas de lectura del filósofo escocés conocidas como “early memoranda”. No se tiene certeza de la época a que corresponden, pero, en cualquier caso, estas notas tienen un gran valor para nuestro proyecto, puesto que permiten demostrar que Hume pudo haber tomado de los escritos de Bayle varias ideas que cumplen un papel importante dentro de su crítica a la teología natural. En los “early memoranda” se destacan dos preocupaciones fundamentales: la hipótesis estratonista y el problema del mal. Estas cuestiones, algunos años después, serán parte esencial en el desarrollo de los Dialogues.
El octavo capítulo, bajo el título de “Los Diálogos sobre religión natural”, se dedica al examen de las primeras once partes de esa obra de Hume. Nuestro objetivo, como se comprenderá, no es ofrecer, ni mucho menos, un análisis exhaustivo. Apoyándonos en interpretaciones reconocidas, seguimos únicamente las intervenciones de Philo, el personaje escéptico. Partimos del supuesto de que Philo, como los otros participantes del diálogo, puede no ser el representante de...

hace unos cuantos años, allá por 1977. Yo había ingresado para formar parte del personal de la biblioteca y, más o menos contemporáneamente, Margarita se hizo cargo de Filosofía Moderna, que había quedado sin profesor responsable. En ese momento yo estaba precisamente cursando el tercer año de la carrera y, por esa razón, me correspondía inscribirme en Filosofía Moderna. No obstante, ya había trabado conocimiento con ella un poco antes, ya que, como mi tarea en el Departamento era la de inventariar todo su patrimonio bibliográfico, que era considerable, Margarita aprovechaba mi conocimiento de primera mano de la ubicación de los libros para solicitarme la búsqueda de títulos no tan fáciles de hallar, porque no todo el patrimonio bibliográfico del departamento había pasado por el proceso de catalogación y mucho menos las revistas. Así fue como comencé a conocer no sólo a la académica, sino también a la persona, con todo el despliegue de ingenio, cordialidad y gentileza, con toques de fina ironía, de que hacía gala Margarita. Son inolvidables sus ingeniosas y chispeantes conversaciones con otros docentes del Departamento, como Emilio Estiú, Mario Presas y Ezequiel de Olaso, para nombrar algunos. No obstante, las cosas podían salirse un poco de control si en la charla se inmiscuía repentinamente Carlos Adam, el bibliotecario "en jefe" del

This paper challenges forms of utopian thinking grounded in feeling, belief, or pure practice. Drawing on dialectical philosophy and critical theory, it argues that genuine critique must begin with actuality, not possibility. A revolutionary sense of reality is what keeps emancipation from collapsing into fiction, charity, or riot. Yet the answer is not to abandon utopia, but to rethink it. What matters is not utopia’s content—which is always easy to imagine—but its form, which alone makes thought transformative.

This volume has its genesis in a conference on Enlightenment Epicureanism held at Magdalen College, Oxford, on 17 June 2006. We are grateful to the Faculty of History at the University of Oxford, to the Royal Historical Society and to the Voltaire Foundation for their support of the conference. The conference would never have taken place without the help of Christopher Brooke and Laurence Brockliss at Magdalen and Perry Gauci at Lincoln College. Nicholas Cronk at the Voltaire Foundation was particularly generous with his advice. John Robertson was of invaluable assistance leading up to the day of the conference, and offered salient and insightful comments in the concluding session. The articles have been read and reviewed by scholars who have been very generous with their time. Along with anonymous readers, we would particularly like to thank

That something may be ‘present’ or ‘located’ at or in every place is a view that many thinkers, past and present, have held. Typically omnipresence is thought to be a divine attribute, but the question as to how some thing can be omnipresent has not been historically confined to the status of a divine being. This book offers an insight into historical accounts of omnipresence and its developments in Ancient, Medieval, Modern, and Contemporary thought. It further widens the study of omnipresence by including less widely studied strand of thought on this topic from mystical, process theological, feminist theological, and phenomenological perspectives. Additionally, whilst the study of omnipresence has typically focused on Christian thinkers, the volume broadens the range of voices on this attribute further, through including Jewish, Islamic, Buddhist, Sanskrit, and Donghak accounts. The volume also includes chapters outlying different views of location, of interest for but also beyond our understanding of omnipresence. Overall, the Handbook provides an introduction to the main facets of omnipresence, both historical and contemporary, and opens up new avenues for research that are yet to be fully explored.

One of the most underdeveloped aspects in the interpretation of Spinoza’s political thought is his understanding of the law. This shortcoming relates to Spinoza’s reputation as an anti-juridical thinker, given the equation he establishes between right and power (jus sive potentia), which excludes the possibility of a transcendental grounding of a normative sphere of rights and obligations. This in turn explains the seeming absence of a systematic reflection on the nature of the law in Spinoza’s works—at least, that is, one that is in line with the natural law tradition, whether in its classical or in its modern configuration. Indeed, as established in recent literature, Spinoza’s equation between right and power entails not so much a complete deflation of the juridical sphere, but rather an alternative, immanent and materialist, conceptualization of the essence of the law. Nevertheless, the nature of this alternative conceptualization remains somewhat elusive given the difficulty of placing it within the dilemma between normativism and voluntarism that has seemingly defined the juridical landscape of modernity. Only seemingly, however, for when trying to place Spinoza’s conception of the law within the history of its modern conceptualization, interpreters have until now ignored the existence of a third alternative tradition within modern and contemporary philosophy of law: that of legal institutionalism, according to which the essence of the law is captured neither by norms nor by decisions but by institutions as the primary means for the socio-juridical organization of collective existence and action. The primary purpose of this thesis is to show that Spinoza’s alternative, i.e., immanent and materialist, conception of the law is best served by placing it within this institutionalist tradition. In this sense, the central claim of this thesis is that Spinoza’s study of politics hinges directly on a conception of the essence of the law as the complex and dynamic process through which a multiplicity of human beings effectively and continuously come to adopt a common ratio vivendi or practice of living. As captured by the formula jura seu instituta, and as required by his metaphysics and his affect-centered theory of action, Spinoza conceives the law as institution: both in the sense that the law is essentially an instituent process and that such process is primarily carried out through institutions.

The. paper analyzes Jean-Marie Beyssade's method in his work on Kant.  Beyssade distinguished two kinds of"exactitude in reading a philosopher of the past.  One is the philological exactness: being exact in one's account of a philosophical text as it stands, considering its proper historical context.  The other kind of exactitude is the philosophical exactitude: reading a philosopher of the past in light of one's own contemporary concerns, and discerning how that philosopher, beyond her own philosophical context and concepts, contributed to a contemporary debate which she may not have had in mind.  Beyssade argues that Kant, in his reading of Descartes, had the second kind of exactitude, albeit sometimes to tthe detriment of the first.  The paper argues that Beyssade himself, who gave a superlative example of the first kind of exactitude (philological exactitude) also exercized the second, sometimes to the detriment of the first.  Two examples are given: Beyssade on Kant on Cogito.  Beyssade on Kant's view of the French revolution.

In this article I ask who is the subject of political action in the modern reception of Leibniz's metaphysics. A review of contemporary philosophers' works based on Leibniz shows that they consistently bypass the question of such a subject. Evading the question of the subject has implications for various versions of neomonadology, so this paper clarifies the problematic nature of understanding the subject by analogy with Leibniz's monads. The analysis of Leibniz's texts helps to point out the special role of the body (matter), which entails raising the problem of individual bodies' ontological status. To solve this problem, I propose an analysis of the concept of "substantial bond" (vinculum substantiale) and its role in Leibniz's system. An analysis of the substantial bond shows that it is impossible to construct a coherent theory of the subject (and, in particular, the subject of political action) on the basis of monadology. To develop and consolidate this thesis, in the final part of the article I examine the work of Agamben, which reveals the implicit aporia inherent in the monadology project.

This presentation takes into consideration some case studies in which the reception of Lorenzo Valla, Marsilio Ficino, Giovanni Pico, Mario Nizolio, Giordano Bruno, and Tommaso Campanella was relevant for structuring the new Central European tradition of metaphysics (the so-called Schulmetaphysik).
Spinoza, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel studied Protestant Reformed handbooks on metaphysics. Through Italian Renaissance authors, some Neoplatonic elements (especially from Plotinus, Proclus, and the Liber de causis) emerge like a Karst phenomenon within German Protestant (Aristotelian-based) metaphysics and theology. This phenomenon is analyzed by examining the tension between monism and pluralism of substances, immanentism and creationism, priority of God on being and priority of being on God, supertranscendental and transcendental concepts.

St. Thomas Aquinas’s relationship with astrology has been an historical topic that has already been explored within a historiographical context. There is a growing body of literature in Portuguese literature, some of it that evinces interference with tradition, or that places Aquinas-based astrology in unique contexts (Avelar de Carvalho, 2014). Nevertheless, with some exceptions, the focus has not been on this dimension of Aquinas’s writings, or on how astrology influenced Thomas’s reception and authority even centuries after his death. All in all, a better understanding could be reached on how Aquinas’s astrological thought compares to Arabic intellectualism and astrology, and how his proto-Olympian understanding of the heavens fits into this tradition.

In the article I discuss that in encyclopedic works, from the Roman beginnings of encyclopedic discourse, there are noticeable textual traces that refer to the experiences and affective conditions of their empirical authors, and that the zoe of the empirical encyclopedist sometimes shines through from behind the bios theoretikos of the encyclopedic self. Moreover, the author's decision to create an encyclopedic work is sometimes caused by a real or discursively assumed catastrophe as its justification.

In this paper, we want to tackle the Molyneux question thoroughly, by addressing it in terms of both ordinary perception and pictorial perception: if a congenitally blind person recovered sight, could she recognize visually the 3D shapes she already recognized tactilely, both when such shapes are given to her directly and when they are given to her pictorially, i.e., as depicted shapes? We want to claim that empirical evidence suggests that the question can be positively answered in both cases. For in the first case, such evidence shows that perception of 3D shapes is supramodal; namely, it can be equivalently achieved in different sense modalities, notably touch and vision, independently of the sensory input such shapes are accessed. While in the second case, such evidence shows that one can satisfy both in vision and in touch the condition for depicted shapes, which are typically not where the perceiver is, to be grasped by that perceiver in a picture's subject, i.e., what the picture presents. This condition states that the picture's vehicle, i.e., the typically 2D physical basis of a picture, is enriched by adding to its properties the 3D grouping properties that allow for a figure/ground segmentation to be performed in that vehicle's elements.

Nel XVIII secolo, negare l'efficacia delle emozioni e delle fantasie della donna incinta sulla conformazione del feto doveva apparire azzardato. Aveva provato a farlo, con un libello pubblicato a Londra nel 1727, un medico ugonotto fuggito alcuni decenni prima dalla Francia, suscitando però deboli consensi e ben più vivaci contestazioni. J.A. Blondel, come si chiamava quel medico, era certo che né le macchie sulla pelle (nèi, angiomi o, popolarmente, "voglie") talvolta riscontrate sul neonato, né le deformità congenite, dalle più lievi come il labbro leporino fino alle più orribili mostruosità, dovevano in alcun modo essere addebitate agli sbalzi d'umore, agl'improvvisi spaventi o ai capricci che affliggevano la madre durante la gravidanza [BLONDEL, 1727 e 1729]. Efficace nel confutare la presunta relazione tra malformazioni neonatali e la facoltà "immaginativa", egli non seppe tuttavia proporre, in maniera altrettanto convincente, una spiegazione alternativa e il suo intervento fu presto dimenticato ; ancora nella seconda metà del secolo, quella straordinaria facoltà nota a tutti e condivisa tanto nelle accademie scientifiche quanto tra la gente comune veniva invocata da Voltaire, Buffon e dai redattori dell'Encyclopédie , con buona pace del medico ugonotto e dei suoi rari epigoni. L'"immaginazionismo", contro cui polemizzava Blondel, viene da molto lontano: una delle sue più remote attestazioni si può trovare nel Genesi [XXX,[35][36][37][38][39][40][41][42][43], dove si racconta come il patriarca Giacobbe sapesse condizionare il colore dei capretti, prima della loro nascita, ponendo rami striati di fronte agli occhi delle capre gravide [ANGELINI, 1994b: 3-10]. Pare che l'episodio biblico abbia ispirato numerosi spunti di meditazione religiosaricorrenti sia nella Patristica cristiana sia nei commenti alla Torà [ibidem] -e

Universitesi ev sahipliğinde gerçekleştirilecek olan "5. Lisansüstü Öğrenci Kongresi (TUBLOK'202l) "nde sözlü olarak sunulmak üzere kabul edildiğini bildirmekten memnuniyet duyuyoruz. Kongremiz Trakya Üniversiteler Birliği tarafından uzaktan katılımla (çevrim-içi) düzenlenmektedir. Kongrede sunulmak üzere kabul edilen bildiri özetleri, Bildiri Özetleri Kitabı'nda yayınlanacaktır . Tam metin bildiriler ise, yazarın isteği doğrultusunda, kongre web sayfasında belirtilen Trakya Ün iversiteler Birliği'ne Bağlı Üniversitelerimizin Ulusal/Uluslararası Dergilerine, dergi kurallarını sağlamak kaydıyla makale olarak gönderilebilir. Makale, ilgili dergiye doğrudan yazar tarafından gönderilmelidir. Makaleniz, Kongre organizasyonu tarafından dergiye gönderilmemektedir.

This talk centers around a set of problems that are characterized by the fact that they all concern a given effect on the application of law caused by the existence of machines that can make the kind of independent and informed decisions that legal theory traditionally has considered only possible to make by a human author. More specifically, I will focus on one such problem, a specific kind of application problem caused by AI and I will try to show how its treatment in legal doctrine could be benefitted from the addition of a new perspective. I call the problem in question the problem of responsibility attribution as it centers around who is to be held responsible for violations of laws that hinge upon subjective prerequisites such as proportionality deliberations, value judgments, intent etc., in cases where the actor has been a machine. 

My suggestion is that we should turn to Spinoza's  understanding of the purpose of law to find a new way to deal with this problem and it  emerges from the reflection that the most commonly used method today for approaching the problem tends to turn this practical problem into an even harder philosophical problem for legal doctrine to solve: namely the problem of law’s essence and the nature of the legal subject. If there is way for us to avoid the solution to the practical problem to depend on the solution to such a hard philosophical question – a question that legal philosophy as of yet has not come up with a satisfying answer to – I think that path is worth exploring.

1. The practical legal problems caused by AI and the (legal) theoretical problem that a currently dominating way of dealing with one of these leads to. 2. An alternative approach to solving the particular practical problem in question that does not require an investigation of the nature of the legal subject. 3. The virtues of the alternative approach from the perspective of legal theory and practice.

DE L ENCYCLOPÉDIE A L4 RÉVOLUTION DÉCEMBRE 2011 REMERCIEMENTS Mes prenuers remerciements vont à M. Marc André Bernier qui, dans les dix dernières années, a su me transmettre sa passion pour la recherche et son amour pour les lettres. Il m'a apporté un soutien inestimable durant ce parcours, autant par sa vaste érudition que par sa générosité sans borne et sa grande humanité. Je tiens également à témoigner toute ma reconnaissance à M. Didier Masseau : grâce à ses travaux et à ses conseils avisés, il a grandement contribué à donner à cette recherche le souffle qui l'anime maintenant. M. Masseau a toujours insisté pour que mes travaux se démarquent des autres et sortent des sentiers battus. Pour sa connaissance inestimable de l'esprit de la Compagnie de Jésus et pour nos entretiens toujours aussi plaisants que stimulants, un grand merci à mon ami Yves Bourassa. Enfin, je ne saurais trop exprimer ma gratitude envers Myrta Tremblay, l'amour de ma vie, pour le soutien indéfectible qu'elle m'a apporté à chaque minute de la rédaction de cette thèse. Je te remercie du fond coeur. La (( Secte )) et la (( Grande Église )) IV 191 220 221 225 227 230 237 11-Fondements sensibles de la morale: les inquiétudes de l'âme et les « délices de la religion» La Profession de foi du vicaire savoyard, ou la lumière chez Rousseau La « lumière )) et les « lumières )) Constmction de l'individu moral dans le Discours sur l'inégalité et la Profession de foi du vicaire Savoyard La conversation intime comme remède aux cifJres de l'inquiétude Les « Délices de la religion )) CONCLUSION Bibliographie v 1 Les marges des Lumières françaises (1750-1789), actes du colloque organisé par le Groupe de recherches histoire des représentations, 6-7 décembre 2001 (

retrouvons d'abord des aristocrates qui, après avoir adopté pendant un temps l'esprit du siècle, sont revenus à des valeurs plus proches de la tradition. D'autres défendent cette tradition pour des motifs plus intéressés. En effet, ce qui semble être chez eux une position idéologique bien assise répond davantage à un calcul stratégique: le marquis de Caraccioli, par exemple, inonde le marché pendant dix ans de nombreux traités dans lesquels il défend avec la même flamme que les religieux les intérêts de la foi outragée. On notera que cette position ne l'empêche nullement de rédiger d'autres ouvrages qui sacrifient à l'esprit du siècle 7 • Bref, ses écrits à caractère religieux ne relevaient assurément pas d'un acte de foi, mais avaient plutôt pour but de lui assurer la protection d'un grand personnage, « le Dauphin par exemple, protecteur inconditionnel des dévots 8 ». Si l'on considère toutes les embûches que dut souffrir le mouvement philosophique dans la seconde moitié du XVIIr siècle -on n'a qu'à songer aux Encyclopédistes, qui furent contraints de poursuivre leur entreprise dans la clandestinité à partir de 1759 -, il ne semblera pas vain de s'intéresser aux hommes à l'origine de ces persécutions. Afin d'interroger le courant des anti-Lumières, nous nous attarderons donc à la période s'étendant de 1750 à 1763, alors que la guerre contre ce que Voltaire appelait l' « Infâme» fut la plus violente. Les hommes d'Église se sont opposés à la circulation des idées irréligieuses et, en général, à toutes celles s'éloignant tant soit peu de l'orthodoxie; il est également un grand nombre d'écrivains qui, même s'ils vivaient dans un milieu mondain, véhiculaient toutefois une idéologie plus conservatrice. C'est à deux de ces oeuvres que nous consacrerons les pages qui suivent: d'abord Le Mémoire sur les Cacouacs (1757) de l'avocat Jacob-Nicolas Moreau, ainsi que l'incontournable pièce de théâtre Les Philosophes (1760), de Charles Palissot de Montenoy. Remarquons auparavant que le fait de s'attarder aux ouvrages antiphilosophiques peut avoir une importance capitale, comme le montre un exemple fameux, celui du marquis de Sade. Comme la critique universitaire l'a depuis longtemps reconnu, Sade retranscrit dans ses romans des passages entiers de l'oeuvre du baron d'Holbach, philosophe matérialiste et athée représentatif de l'esprit du temps. Bien connu et bien documenté, ce fait n'a rien de surprenant; mais Sade emprunte aussi à l'abbé Nicolas-Sylvestre Bergier, dont 7 Didier Masseau, ouvr. cité, p. 36. 8 Idem.

This study investigated the asymmetric impact of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) on economic complexity in Nigeria from 1992 to 2022, with a focus on both linear and nonlinear relationships. The study revealed that, in the short run, FDI positively influences economic complexity, with significant immediate effects. In the long run, the benefits of FDI appear to be contingent on other macroeconomic factors such as trade openness and human capital development. In exploring the nonlinear dynamics, the Non-Linear ARDL model uncovered that positive FDI shocks initially stimulate economic complexity, but these effects are dampened by short-run volatility, leading to significant negative impacts in subsequent periods. Conversely, negative FDI shocks result in an immediate downturn in economic complexity, followed by a recovery and improvement in later periods. This highlights the asymmetric nature of FDI's influence on the economy. The study also examined the role of human capital, and found out that it has a significant negative impact on economic complexity in both the short and long runs. This may be due to a lag in realizing the benefits of human capital investments or misalignment with economic needs. These findings reveal the importance of not only attracting and sustaining FDI but also implementing complementary policies that enhance human capital, promote trade openness, and strengthen governance in order to foster sustainable economic complexity and growth in Nigeria.