18th- and 19th-century philosophy

Schlegel’s philosophical thought is characterized by opposition to the thought of Fichte. Schlegel constructs an anti-foundationalist philosophy against Fichte’s foundationalist philosophy which claims to reach inevitable conclusions from a first principle. He develops a conception of philosophy that has no definite starting point and no absolute first principle. In this approach, each principle supports and validates the others. Much like poetry, philosophy starts from the middle. Schlegel argues that the principles are not one but many and that they mutually establish themselves in interaction. He emphasizes that everything, including all principles, is in a constant state of change and transformation. This highlights the awareness of the impossibility of ultimately reaching the Absolute. The Absolute will shape all our efforts, even though it will never be attainable. Nevertheless, the effort to reach the Absolute will not be abandoned and philosophy, which acquires a literary/poetic character, will become the center of this effort. Schlegel's use of literary forms can thus be seen as a challenge. Aiming to erode the ways of philosophizing of his contemporaries, notably Fichte, Schlegel intends to establish a philosophy that gives life the respect it deserves. This new kind of philosophy will not remain a purely intellectual activity, but will be the central element in the effort to transform life and restore its lost enchantment.

Theoretical Philosophy, 1755–1770 Critique of Pure Reason Theoretical Philosophy After 1781 Practical Philosophy Critique of the Power of Judgment Religion and Rational Theology Anthropology, History, and Education Natural Science Lectures on Logic Lectures on Metaphysics Lectures on Ethics Lectures on Anthropology Lectures and Drafts on Political Philosophy Opus postumum Notes and Fragments Correspondence

This chapter explores the role of epic in the emergence of nationalism by
examining the intersection of Germanic myth and the Hebrew Bible. During the latter half of the eighteenth century, there was a growing fascination in and appreciation for the ancient customs of ‘natural peoples’. Among this esteemed group, which included nations like the Celts and Germans, the Hebrews were prominently featured, showcasing a culture in which the epic held great significance. It was during this period that biblical interpreters started to interpret Hebrew poetry as a means of creative expression, providing insights into the worldview of ancient humanity.

In imperial Transylvania, the Hungarian professors of philosophy served as models for the Romanian proponents of philosophy. Due to the official catholic hostility to Kant, Márton Istvan promoted the philosophy of Krug, of which he edited and translated a compendium into Latin. Krug was not a genuine Kantian, but an eclectic post-Kantian, influenced by Reinhold, Fichte, and Schelling. His metaphilosophy influenced a whole generation of Hungarian thinkers, most of them eclectics, who forged along its lines a broad concept of "critical philosophy", of which Kantianism was supposed to be just a species among others. "Critical philosophy" became the name of a new brand of eclecticism, integrating commonsensism, the main theses of the old ontotheological metaphysics, and elements of Kantian doctrine in diverse proportions. The Transylvanian Romanian teachers of philosophy imitated the example of their Hungarian models, went to Krug's texts, either in Latin or in German, translated them to the purpose of using them in their lectures, and sometimes published their translations. The first centre of diffusion of Krug's critical philosophy was the Blaj Gymnasium, at the end of the 1820s. Krug's philosophy reached Bucharest in the 1840s, through a graduate of Cluj Piarist Lyceum, and eventually Jassy, through a former Blaj teacher, in the second half of the 1850s, where it was taught until the end of the 1870s. Despite this relatively wide diffusion, Krug's critical philosophy was far from having on Romanians the same kind of impact it had on Hungarians. It left virtually no traces on the Romanian culture, with the exception of a political manifesto by Simeon Bărnuț (1842) and, most importantly, it was ineffective in generating interest in Kant's philosophy. Thus it cannot be said, as the accepted narrative holds, that the diffusion of Krug's works in Romanian marks a moment of the reception of Kant in Romania.

Eric Matthews. p. cm.-(The Cambridge edition of the works of Immanuel Kant) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-521-34447-6 1. Judgement (Logic)-Early works to 1800. 2. Judgement (Aesthetics)-Early works to 1800. 4. Teleology-Early works to 1800.

, marele medic și om de știință, fondatorul psihologiei analitice, a fost întrebat, în cadrul unui interviu ce i se lua la bătrânețe, dacă a fost credincios în tinerețile lui. A răspuns că a fost chiar un credincios practicant-fiu de preot fiind, era de așteptat răspunsul acesta. Următoarea întrebare a fost "Dar acum credeți?" Răspunsul lui, dat cu un zâmbet cald, a fost: "Acum nu mai trebuie să cred, acum știu!…" De ce a răspuns așa? Pentru că studiile sale de o viață întreagă asupra psihologiei oamenilor i-au arătat că în afară de conștient, de minte adică, omul se mai conduce în

Memoirs of a Woman of Pleasure has proven a challenge to classify. Cases for this novel's literary value-that is, as anything beyond a device for sexual stimulation-have had to address accusations of a paucity of character development, an inelegant style, a lack of social insight, and, in particular, a limited emotional range at a time when so many other writers were exploring human sentiment in unprecedented ways. As Leo Braudy pointed out in 1970, not long after Memoirs first became widely available, the story of Fanny Hill on the one hand has "too much erotic content for the literary historian to treat it with much seriousness," but on the other cannot be dismissed as entirely a "pornotopia." 1 Since Braudy's important essay, Memoirs has become a legitimate object of study, partly as a result of a broader transformation in literary studies to include a wide range of texts previously dismissed as marginal, such as travel narratives, crime stories, pirate tales, and periodical writing, among others. Scholarly attention to women, gender, and the history of sexuality has also prompted new interest in the adventures of the period's most famous literary prostitute. Yet the problem that Braudy originally identified remains part of the discussion, and in this essay I am going to suggest that it can be productively addressed by suspending the search for moral analysis of sexual ECL432_08Rosenthal_1pp.indd 76 1/9/19 10:27 AM

Intellectual history and the history of political thought are siblings, perhaps even twins. They have similar origins and use similar materials. They attract many of the same friends and make some of the same enemies. Yet like most siblings, they have different temperaments and ambitions. This essay explores the family resemblances and draws out the contrasts by examining two major works by one of the most prominent political theorists of the past half-century, Alan Ryan, who has recently published two big books that intellectual historians will find rewarding and provocative.

What is the common image of Fichte within the French speaking studies and what can we learn about it? By analyzing the concepts of culture and counter-culture, the author reconstructs an image of Fichte's thought that shows its breadth and its practical priorities. This image focuses on four pragmatic themes: the social responsibility of the intellectual, action that privileges collective over individual gain, the pedagogical aspect of an auto-generated self and the construction of institutional triggers that could multiply the places in which the common good can be expressed.

Standing at the juncture of rationalist aesthetics and Kantian subjectivism is Moses Mendelssohn (1729-1786). Mendelssohn was a metaphysician in the Leibnizian-Wolffian tradition and a foremost defender of rationalist ideals. Despite his firm commitment to the rationalist tradition, Mendelssohn is often identified as a transitional figure in aesthetics. Many characterize him as a proto-Kantian who moved toward a subjectivist aesthetic and anticipated Kant’s three faculty theory (which establishes the autonomy of art from reason through the assertion of a separate subjective faculty of feeling). Frederick Beiser rejects this view in his excellent study of rationalist aesthetics, Diotima’s Children. In this work he argues that Mendelssohn was a genuine rationalist who never departed from rationalist ideals in his aesthetic thought. In this paper I support Beiser’s case by arguing for the continuity of Mendelssohn’s aesthetic thought with rationalist principles. I argue that Mendelssoh...

La presente these articule les deux categories fondamentales de la philosophie de la religion : le « moi » et le « divin », ce en dialogue avec deux interlocuteurs privilegies, Fichte et Nabert, chez lesquels cette double thematique fut exploitee de maniere originale et geniale. Fichte pense le « moi » comme le centre de l'interiorite et de la vie consciente de l'homme qui est une activite incessante vers l'unite de soi. Nabert, quant a lui, part du concept fichtien du « moi » pour elaborer la categorie du « divin » ; celui-ci apparait alors comme une demande de la conscience en sa structure fondamentale : elle le recoit alors qu'il s'affirme a meme le« moi». L'examen conjoint de de ces deux pensees apporte, nous cherchons a le montrer, une contribution majeure a la philosophie de la religion contemporaine : elle permet en effet a celle-ci d'avancer dans les reponses aux nombreux defis qu'il lui appartient de relever, soit : la redecouverte de certain...

Full draft available here: https://hal.science/hal-04547542/document.
This article focuses on Novalis' understanding of the "I-nature" relationship demonstrating that he anticipates some aspects developed by later environmental and ecological philosophies. After an introductory part on Novalis' criticism against Fichte's conception of the Self, the article investigates the crucial role played by Spinoza for the reassessment of natural sciences (physiology in particular) in Novalis' philosophy and, as a consequence, for the conception of a "metaphysics of Having". This particular metaphysics implies that subjects and objects interpenetrate each other, and that this relationship precedes their respective identities. In the last part, the article sketches a parallel with the current philosophical debate on ecology.

History without literature and philosophy is chronicle; literature without history and philosophy is amusement; philosophy without history and literature is empty" (190). It is through a consideration of the imbrication of history, literature, and philosophy that Richard Eldridge situates his discussion of the possibility of freedom afforded the human subject in relation to both modern social institutions, as well as the idealized institutions conceivable in the Kantian imaginary. More precisely, Eldridge's text responds to the question "[h]ow are we [to] … best develop and pursue historically a moral image of the world?" (43). The two-sided nature of Eldridge's question as both development and pursuit accounts for his turning to two philosophers that Eldridge himself admits are strikingly different: Immanuel Kant and Walter Benjamin. Beginning with Kant, on whom he has written and published extensively, Eldridge broaches the question of the development of a moral image by asking what the role of ideals are in the conceiving of history (2). The answer that Eldridge develops is based in part on the distinction that Robert B. Louden makes between Kant's 'pure' and 'impure ethics' (79). This distinction foregrounds that ideals, in the form of the Kantian a priori, only tell half of the story and that a pure rational ethics is incomplete. Indeed, for Kant, impure ethics complement and actualize pure ethics in concrete social institutions, such as the "visible church" of religion in the example Eldridge provides (92). In providing an account of Kantian impure ethics, Eldridge's reading of Kant goes far beyond the three critiques and into Kant's anthropological texts, writings on religion, and of course his views on history, which, as Eldridge explains, is for Kant "a process of conflict-ridden but continuing transition … according to the claims of universal reason" (94). Kant's progressive, and decidedly positive, view of history is in stark contrast to Benjamin's in whom Eldridge locates the answer as to the pursuit of a moral image of the world. In other words, for Eldridge, where Kant develops an ideal towards which we must strive, it is in Benjamin that the means of pursuing this ideal can be found. More specifically, "[r]ather than being the product of reasonable, instrumental calculation," such as the Kantian pure ethics, for Benjamin, a meaningful relationship to history "can only be acquired through the cultivation of Anschaulichkeit" (104). Anschualichkeit is a concept that Eldridge reads Benjamin as borrowing from Friedrich Hölderlin, and is "a critical intuitive discernment of a possibility of action that is disclosed in an encounter with a material cultural object within the frame of social-historical life" which is to say that Anshualichkeit takes place in empirical material experience rather than as a product of abstract reasoning (104). Hölderlin is one of three German thinkers that Eldridge interprets as having specifically influenced Benjamin, the others being Kant and Johann Goethe. Eldridge goes on to credit Kant with providing Benjamin with the concept of critique, and Goethe with the notion of a daemonic nature respectively. Importantly, the Benjaminian Anschualichkeit, as intuitive attentiveness, can be produced by literature, which "is not only a beginning, middle and (tragic) end … but also the effort at attention on the part of a reflective subject, the author (as a model for the reader's attentions) likewise caught amid the strife of life" (130). Eldridge develops this notion of

A common claim is that the proper functioning of reason requires the suppression of feelings because feelings are a debilitating, merely subjective pathology that cloud and/or distort clear thinking. Frequently, as well, it is claimed that Enlightenment reason's suppression of feelings is exemplified by Kant. This paper proposes to the contrary that a more appropriate understanding of the role of feelings (not emotions, generally) for Kant's Critical Idealism, rather than being a pathological hindrance to reason, as well as an understanding of the centrality of the third Critique is served by examining Section VII of Mendelssohn's Morning Hours-Lectures on the Existence of God. The feelings of awe and respect are positive and ubiquitous to theoretical and practical reason as they, not by their content but by their function, motivate creativity and the assumption of moral accountability for the decisions driving, and the actions deriving from, such creativity. 1 These reflections were inspired in part by Birgit Recki's "Der Kanon der reinen Vernunft (A795/B823-A832/B859); '[…] nichts mehr, als zwei Glaubensartikel?'" in G.

In an intellectual landscape as diverse from a theological and philosophical perspective as the Enlightenment, Voltaire's writing defines an(other) "attempt" of reason to construct, apart from any divine revelation, a religious system with the mission of truthfulness and completeness. Thus established, Voltairean deism will openly abandon the Christocentrism of the Church and proceed to the complete rejection of the Holy Scriptures, establishing reason as the only valid theoretical foundation for man's relationship with God. In fact, Voltaire replaces the essential data of the Christian faith - deemed irrelevant at best - with a collection of rational deductions aiming at God, so that his theological discourse will inevitably lack an authentic spiritual dimension and a genuine openness to the transcendent. Given these considerations, the purpose of this study is to evaluate the major theological-philosophical tenets of Voltairean deism, assuming, as is natural, an orthodox analytical perspective.

This essay remarks upon a seeming paradox in the philosophical anthropology of Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821). He presents a traditional Platonic asymmetry of reason and the passions. This is put to the service of an Origenisticuniversalistic theology that revolves around questions of guilt, punishment and redemption and a theory of sacrifice. Maistre is far from being the irrationalist that many political theorists observe, even if he presents an antagonistic relationship between reason and passions, the rational self and its desires. The apparently grim and sanguinary Platonism of the Savoyard Count can be neatly compared with Kant and contrasted with Hume's sanguine, if not breezy, view of reason as a slave to the passions.

This article seeks to examine the construction of the notion of Europe not from a West–East perspective but from a more complex geographical and conceptual vantage point, including the north and the south in relation to the West and East and, more specifically, from the point of view of the Ggreek orthodox and Russian worlds in the postnapoleonic era. Following the political, religious and intellectual activity of two expatriates and close friends, Alexander Sturdza and Konstantinos Oikonomos, it explores how the idea of Europe was visited and how these two intellectuals and politicians negotiated and renegotiated to what extent their respective communities (Russian and Greek) were part of Europe, with religion as the central axis and the notions of the Orthodox world and Orthodox East in the arsenal of both. The first decades of the nineteenth century brought Russia and the Greeks to the forefront of the European scene. First, Russia, in the wake of its military campaigns against N...

A celebratory essay, on S. T. Coleridge's 250th anniversary, of his theory of ideas interpreted in a cosmic sense. This essay explores Coleridge metaphysics of universal ideas and what he meant by 'the Ideas of Being, Form, Life, the Reason, the Law of Conscience, Freedom, Immortality, God!' ‗[T]he ideas of … eternity, … will, absolute truth, of the good, the true, the beautiful, the infinite'. For Coleridge, ‗an Idea … is not merely formal but dynamic', clarifying, in Greek, that ‗every Idea is a Power'. Ideas as powers evolve through energies, forces, and accidents to circle back up to the idea of ideas: lógos, which for Coleridge included Heraclitus's Logos, the constant intelligence behind the universal flux, and the Christian Word, which was in the beginning, and is with God, and is God. This ‗Logos, Idea Idearum', essentially the archetype or apex of all ideas, has been exalted, opposed, submerged, but never irrelevant.

Gottfried Gabriel’s concise introductory book aims, in his own words in the preface, “to offer a clear and at the same time problem-oriented presentation of Kant’s philosophy with a view to the architectonics of the complete work” (p. 9). To this end, the book is divided into twenty-one short chapters, which offer an overall picture of Kant’s philosophy, ranging from the central themes of epistemology, ethics, and aesthetics to the more peripheral ones of his philosophy of religion and philosophy of history. Despite this comprehensiveness, Gabriel’s presentation revolves especially around the three critiques (Critique of Pure Reason [KrV],
Critique of Practical Reason [KpV], and Critique of the Power of Judgment [KdU]) and how
they integrate with each other. The large number of other Kantian works cited throughout the book – pre-critical or otherwise – are mainly, although not exclusively, mentioned in reference to the critiques and the system they encompass. Our purpose is to offer a descriptive analysis of the book, focusing on the main doctrines of Kant – we will thus omit many of the standard comments regarding the connection of Kant to the 19th and 20th centuries.

Aproape toată omenirea se ghidează astăzi după o cultură a minții, care a dus-o la realizări științifice și tehnice extraordinare, dar și la mari pericole. Se știe că există deja pericolul ca oamenii să distrugă natura ori să se distrugă reciproc în războaie a-tot-nimicitoare. De aceea, cultura minții ar trebui îmbinată cu acea cultură a sufletului, care, de vreo două secole deja, a fost pierdută. Pentru că numai o cultură a sufletului îl poate ajuta pe om să știe viețui după principiul armoniei cu lumea sa, și nu exclusiv după un principiu al profitului obținut chiar cu prețul unor periculoase distrugeri. O astfel de cultură a sufletului în foarte puține locuri ale lumii se mai păstrează. Unul dintre locurile acestea este în România profundă, în România satelor care își mai respectă tradițiile, a satelor în care mai există acea omenie și acel bun simț, pe care oamenii le căpătau printr-o bună educație a sufletului, dată în primul rând de credință, dar și de relația lor nemijlocită cu natura. Printre alte consecințe grave, neglijarea totală a sufletului a dus și la ridicarea unor elite false la putere, a unor elite care nu sunt înrădăcinate în sufletul colectiv al celor pe care îi conduc, care nu-și simt responsabilitatea față de ei, care nu-și știu asculta decât mințile axate pe urmărirea jalnicelor lor profituri personale. Dar faptul că mai nou se încearcă în toată lumea, pe cele mai diferite căi, regăsirea unei culturi a sufletului, ne dă speranța că va urma o revenire la bunele relații ale oamenilor între ei și la un real respect al omului față de natură.

As a founder of conservatism, Joseph de Maistre (1753-1821) made crucial contributions to historical thinking. Conceptualising history both as a conduit of human self-improvement and as a criterion of philosophical judgment, his conservatism was irretrievably historical. His theories of constitutions and of European government depended on a model of institutional development across time. His epistemology, historicised knowledge, and his sociology of violence posited that history arises out of the self. This paper reconstructs Maistre's historical thought by gathering together the five strands of it that he developed throughout his career, from his early essays on Rousseau to his posthumous mystical works. The aim is to describe the origins of a Francophone tradition of historical thought that crossed political boundaries easily and that has remained unexplored until now.

In the writings of the polymath and experimental scientist Georg Christoph Lichtenberg (1742-1799) one sometimes comes across startlingly modern observations on the phenomenology of scientific activity, for example on the relationship between experiment and hypothesis, on the role of contingence in scientific discoveries, or on the dialectic between the invention of the new and the arrangement of accumulated knowledge. In a record of his private notebooks, known as Sudelbücher ("Waste Books"), he casually notes what constitutes a pure demonstration experiment: Now that we know nature, even a child understands that an experiment is nothing more than a compliment paid to it. It is a mere ceremony. We know its answers beforehand. We ask nature for its consensus as the great lords ask the estates. 1 Demonstration experiments were common around the eighteenth century, not only for didactic purposes, but also in the many forms of spectacularization of science, which concerned in particular a then new and mysterious field of knowledge: electricity. The aforementioned definition, however, also brings with it an implicit distinction between a demonstration experiment and a proper experiment: in the former, phenomena we already know are just confirmed and displayed; in the second, something new, which we haven't discovered yet, comes forth. It was precisely this dialectic of expectability and surprise, typical of scientific activity, that engrossed Ludwik Fleck in the twentieth century. According to Fleck, valuable experiments are always

Analogical thoughtisakey concept in Herder'swork, providing acontinuous thread from his earlier writingsuptothe latest ones. Herder'saesthetics, his theory of knowledge,a nd his theory of mind rely on the thesis that human beingsa re the 'centre' of anyp ossible knowledge and onlyk now by means of an analogical relation between the world and themselves. Herder develops these ideas in amore systematic wayinhis Ideen (1784-1791), combininghis anthropologicalv iews with his philosophyo fn atural history and of the history of humankind to provide to these latter not onlyauniversal law, but also concreteness and usefulness. Fort his reason, the notion of 'type' as well as models, examples, analogies from the world of nature and the culturalworld are the basis of anyk nowledge which pursues the goal of enhancing humankind.

Le problème du système comme mode de construction de la pensée philosophique a trouvé dans la période de l’Idéalisme allemand l’un de ses points culminants dans l’histoire de la philosophie. Loin de se limiter à une question extrinsèque portant sur le choix d’une forme d’exposition qui resterait relativement indifférente au contenu de la doctrine elle-même, l’adoption ou le rejet de tel ou tel type de systématicité implique des décisions conceptuelles importantes touchant à des problèmes philosophiques qui sont au coeur des discussions de l’époque. C’est notamment la question de la complétude du système et de son rapport à une éventuelle extériorité qui sont mis en jeu dans ces discussions. Parmi les acteurs de cette controverse, Jacobi, Fichte et Hegel se sont ainsi affrontés, directement ou indirectement, sur la question spécifique du rapport entre système et vie, d’une part, entre système et absolu, d’autre part. Alors que Jacobi reproche à Fichte d’absorber la vie dans son systè...

With regard to Johann Gottfried Herder's Treatise on the Origin of Language and his Ideas towards a Philosophy of the History of Mankind recent studies have stressed his crucial role in the prehistory of ecological thought emerging in German Romanticism and Idealism around 1800. In his Ideas Herder sought to explain the diversification of cultures as part of the history of nature by means of his theory of climate which allowed to correlate the abundance of organic forms to the variety of cultures since both are developing in accordance with particular environments (cf. Axer). Moreover, he also developed a "proto-ecocritical perspective" (Rigby, "Nature" 33) in his previous Treatise on the Origin of Language: As Kate Rigby points out, "Herder traces the origins of language to an act of non-appropriative attentive listening to the animal other, perceived, moreover, as an alter ego, a 'thou'", and, thus, gives a "dialogical account of the origins of language" which "implies a mode of ethical comportment proper to the ongoing process of becoming human that is of profound ecological, biosemiotic and religious significance: it is 'an appeal to let the world breathe and resound, and to dialogue with it'" (37). Against that background, I will focus on one of Herder's very latest works, namely on Kalligone, published in 1800, that has been left unattended in this context so far. However, this treatise on aesthetics is of utmost importance to the prehistory of ecological thought since it introduces remarkable aspects of that "proto-ecocritical perspective" into the contemporary discourse of philosophical aesthetics, more precisely, into the discussion on natural beauty as it was brought up anew by Immanuel Kant's Critique of Judgment from 1790. Herder's Kalligone (meaning "The Birth of Beauty") is a three-volume polemic, a kind of response quite harshly criticizing the Critique of Judgment in form of a loose dialogue, quoting and commenting on Kant's central arguments in order to reject them, prove them wrong and outline another aesthetic theory in the course of that backtalk. Even though to both, Kant and Herder, natural beauty is of paradigmatic significance to explain what beauty is and how aesthetic judging works, their arguments and outcomes, however, differ radically. Objecting to Kant's transcendental approach, Herder accounts for aesthetic experience both ontologically and theologically, brought to you by CORE View metadata, citation and similar papers at core.ac.uk

Kant famously claims that we have all freely chosen evil. This paper offers a novel account of the muchdebated justification for this claim. I reconstruct Kant's argument from his affirmation that we all have a pricewe can all succumb to temptation. I argue that this follows a priori from a theoretical principle of the Critique of Pure Reason, namely that all empirical powers have a finite, changeable degree, an intensive magnitude. Because of this, our reason can always be overpowered by sensible inclinations. Kant moreover holds that this necessary feature of our moral psychology should not have been the case: We ought to instead be like the divine human being, for whom the moral law yields a greater incentive than any possible temptation. On Kant's view, we are thus responsible for having a price, and the synthetic a priori fact that we do proves that we each made an initial choice of evil.

Abstract. The neutral monism suggested by Constantin Rădulescu-Motru was a theoretical frame intended to match the general idea of Kant's apriorism with the results reached by physics and psychology at the beginning of the 20th Keywords: transcendental aesthetic; consciousness in general; empirical consciousness; psychophysical parallelism; phenomenal ontology; scientistic ontology;

La migration de l'hypotexte, suite à son adaptation ou sa réécriture, conduit inéluctablement à des modifications diégétiques et structurelles, dont l'impact sur la composition originelle est perceptible à différents niveaux. La généricité, les exigences formelles, les spécificités langagières… marquent de leur sceau l'œuvre adaptée ou réécrite. S'ajoutent également à ces facteurs les objectifs et les visions esthétiques (intentionnelles) de l'auteur de l'hypertexte. Certes la migration du texte au sein du même genre (ou mode, selon les taxonomies) réduit les conséquences, mais ne peut en aucun cas les éviter. Les plus faciles à percevoir touchent la diégèse et le récit. Mais d'autres, moins visibles, mais aussi importantes quant à l'esthétique et au sens de l'hypertexte se produisent également. La focalisation et l'énonciation en sont des exemples récurrents. Cet article se penchera sur ces deux exemples à travers l'analyse de quelques ex...

This article re-examines Herder's status as one of the founders of nationalism in the light of both older and more recent literature. The article focuses specifically on Herder's position with regard to the classical nationalist thesis that state and nationality should be coterminous. It argues that a close reading of Herder's oft cited and most explicit statement apparently lending support to this thesis has been misunderstood. The existing literature underestimates Herder's concern regarding the question of governance. For Herder there can be no case for statehood without just governance. As earlier drafts of his work confirm, Herder was deeply critical of the states he knew and denounced their overly bureaucratic and despotic character. He thought that nations could and should exist without being states. Depending on the circumstances, however, states might fulfil temporary functions to strengthen and preserve the national character, that most essential attribute ...

This book is published by Liberty Fund, Inc., a foundation established to encourage study of the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals. The cuneiform inscription that serves as our logo and as the design motif for our endpapers is the earliest-known written appearance of the word "freedom" (amagi ), or "liberty." It is taken from a clay document written about 2300 b.c. in the Sumerian city-state of Lagash. Introduction, note on the present edition, annotations, bibliography, index,

Draft of an introduction to the thinking of a little-known Romanian process philosopher, scheduled for publication in the Annals of the "Dunarea de Jos" University (Galati, Romania), 2010, before the philosophy series of the Annals ceased to appear.  Published later in the online journal Argo.

This chapter argues that, on Kant’s account, aesthetic pleasure is an exercise of rational agency insofar as, when proper, (1) it involves consciousness of its ground (the reasons for having it) and thus of itself as properly responsive to its object, and (2) actually feeling this pleasure involves its endorsement as an attitude to have. I claim that seeing this clearly requires that we divest ourselves of the following dilemma: either pleasures are the noncognitive, passive ways through which we are affected by objects or they are cognitive states by virtue of the theoretical beliefs or practical desires they involve. On my reading of Kant, this dilemma is false. Aesthetic pleasure is neither passive, nor theoretically or practically cognitive, and yet, it is an exercise of rational agency by virtue of belonging to a domain of rationality that is largely overlooked in the history of philosophy: aesthetic rationality.

Kant's CJ, creation and appreciation of fine art are tied to the concept of free play and to a particular kind of freedom. The relationship of poetry and play deserves closer attention because it throws light on what Kaulbach calls "aesthetic freedom", as opposed to "intellectual" or "moral freedom" 1 , expressed by subjecting our choices and actions to moral law and precepts we prescribe to ourselves. Aesthetic freedom is realized by creation of and response to a work of fine art. The former forms the matter of a "creation aesthetic", the latter of a "reception aesthetic". 2 In production of an artwork, the artist unites conscious design with unconscious regularity of natural processes to achieve a singular imaginative representation of ideas. The result seems as if it were a product of nature, despite our recognition that it is product of the artist's intention. As such, the work of art and our response to it form a counterpart to the experience of the beautiful and sublime in natural phenomena, which give the appearance of being products of intentional design, though we recognize them to have been produced by necessary processes according to universal natural laws. The fortuitous purposiveness of the work of art resonates with the harmonious functioning of our sensitive, imaginative and intellectual powers, bringing them into free play with one another. The pleasurable experience of playful purposiveness which this unexpected harmonisation affords serves not only to strengthen and "enliven" our faculties, and further their cooperation, but also forms the basis for aesthetic judgment. To the extent that these relationships are governed by natural causality, the idea of aesthetic freedom remains problematic. Kant's concepts of genius and freedom of the imagination offer some clarification. His idea of an intellectus archetypus provides an analogy and possible solution. Kant attributes to poetry the highest rank among the fine arts. 3 His sparse indications point to poetry's ability to elicit the highest pleasure, and to embody the highest degree of aesthetic

IOSIPOS MOESIODAX – AN 18th CENTURY SCHOLAR  AND HIS VIEW ON KNOWLEDGE. The article presents the life and work of Josip Moesiodax (1725–1800), a professor at the Princely Academies in Bucharest and Iasi in the latter part of the 18th century. Representative of the Enlightenment, Moesiodax encouraged the natural sciences and regarded the Neo-Aristotelianism that prevailed in the Balkan scholarship as the main source of stagnation of knowledge in the Ottoman Empire. He argued for the replacement of the Aristotelian metaphysics with mathematics as a basic discipline in school as well as for the simplification of scientific terminology. He is the author of Apology (1781) and Pedagogy (1779), two significant works of that age.

KEYWORDS : Neo-Aristotelianism; Princely Academies of Bucharest and Iasi; experimental science; Enlightenment; Iosipos Moesiodax

Friedrich Schlegel and Roland Barthes's shared preference for the fragment as a form of writing is closely related to their diverging interests in the category of the whole. While Schlegel uses fragmentary forms to evoke the idea of a comprehensive wholeness, which contrasts the contemporary experience of differentiating discourses of knowledge and a growing gap between the culture of experts and the world we live in, Barthes regards such an all-integrating wholeness only as monstrous. Writing under different historical conditions, the French poststructuralist is interested in using the form of the fragment to break up the idea of supposedly homogeneous wholes, such as the bourgeois subject, history, or the work of art. In this context, it has not yet been recognized enough how much both authors understand their writing as a vivid communication and dynamic interaction with the reader: by means of the fragment, both aim at creating evental reading effects that interrupt the continuum of time and involve the recipient in a surprising way. The result of the sudden perception of unexpected connections, according to Schlegel, is "Witz"; of the sudden perception of breaks, colliding codes or the new, according to Barthes, it is "jouissance." The present essay links Schlegel and Barthes's theories of the fragment with their aesthetics of eventality, and shows how the fragmentation of the text is connected with a fragmentation of time.