19th and 20th-century European philosophy

Este trabajo se propone analizar la crítica de Walter Benjamin al escrito de habilitación de Heidegger, La doctrina de las categorías y del significado en Duns Escoto. Este objetivo se llevará a cabo a partir de un contraste entre el escrito de Heidegger y el ensayo que Benjamin escribe por la misma época titulado Sobre el lenguaje en cuanto tal y sobre el lenguaje del hombre. Asimismo, se estudiarán las razones que conducen a Benjamin a comentar críticamente la tesis de Heidegger desde dos perspectivas: el problema de la traducción y la recuperación heideggeriana del neokantismo. Atendiendo a la rehabilitación de la escolástica y de la fenomenología en los comienzos del siglo XX, se intentará reconstruir un debate implícito entre los autores hacia 1916 para dar cuenta de la distancia entre la concepción lógica del lenguaje de Heidegger y la concepción teológica del lenguaje de Benjamin.

In an attempt to legitimize traditionally understood metaphysics, I define it as a reference to the absolute horizon. The metaphysical (in a broader sense: philosophical) relation to the horizon is pure activity, oriented on the one hand toward its most primordial sources, and on the other toward its ultimate grounds. In this way, it not only refers to the absolute horizon but even brings it into presence. It is also the most fundamental form of relating to it: born in the space it opens—it originally recognizes and inhabits it.

According to Nancy, intelligibility of human existence (or singularity) takes the form of spacing, i.e., opening up of a meaningful situation where entities and singularities are ‘discretely’ gathered together, i.e., where they both limit and disclose one another as belonging to the same space. For Nancy, spacing presupposes sharing it with others since ‘singularities’ are nothing but communicable attempts at spacing the world; as such, spacing is “public or political” in nature because there is no universal law of singularities other than their free communication and their ability to gather a situation together. The main goal of this article is to look at the notion of antagonism from the standpoint of Nancy’s political philosophy; namely I will argue that the contingent world gives rise to antagonistic sharings, which cannot “essence” together but which can be shared only at the expense of one another. This would achieve two goals. First, the article will explicate a number of problematic assumptions that Nancy remains committed to, especially his one-sided emphasis on the importance of transformation. Second, it will develop his approach by accounting for the productive role that the ontic dimension of everyday politics plays in spacing without undermining the significance of the ontological difference around which his account is built. This will arrive at an account of an ecosystem of the “space[s] of meaning” with a fragile balance between differentiation and taking for granted. An ecosystem of sharing presupposes not only something that is to be shared but also the normative expectation regarding what is ought to be shared and what is not.

This translation is of an unpublished text by Bernard Stiegler. Indications in the text make clear that it was very probably written in 2017, which is to say, between the publication of Dans la disruption in 2016 and Qu’appelle- t-on panser? 1. L’immense régression in 2018. It is also clear that it is a fragment of a larger work, which currently remains unknown, but which may have been a draft of the first volume of Qu’appelle-t-on panser?, which was in a way doubly postponed by each of the first two volumes of that work which were published. Typographical errors (mostly transposed letters) have been silently corrected, and the parts that have been struck through are presented that way in the French original. Note also that the final, unenumerated section, “Absence of epoch and post-truth”, seems, in its initial couple of paragraphs, to be in the form of notes by the author to himself.

Hegel had a theory of the “event” long before Badiou. Across his works Hegel has much to say about history and the philosophy of history. But he also has a good deal to teach us about the “event” per se, or Begebenheit. In ways hitherto unknown, this term in Hegel puts before us the problem of thinking history philosophically—which philosophy you care to use in the face of events of every magnitude. Badiou’s “event” is examined briefly in this Hegelian context, as well as the distinction between theory and philosophy as such.

This paper critically examines the contemporary decline of education and the exaggerated perception of artificial intelligence (AI), contextualised through significant philosophical insights of the nineteenth century. It argues that the systematic erosion of critical thinking, cultural literacy, and aesthetic appreciation has produced a populace susceptible to manipulation and unable to discern genuine intellectual quality, thereby fostering the illusion of sophisticated AI.

La lectura catastrófica de la historia que hizo Benjamin, su estética de las ruinas, su visión del ángel de la historia y su análisis de la decadencia se inspiraron en el pesimismo del siglo XIX, por un lado, y en su sentido del lenguaje, por el otro. Es imposible entender su catastrófica interpreta-ción del progreso sin el fuerte aporte del romanticismo y el nietzscheanismo. Pero ¿nos ayuda la comprensión de Ben-jamin de la historia y la naturaleza, su inversión en la ter-minología romántica y nietzscheana, en la época del An-tropoceno? ¿Seguimos atrapados entre la decadencia y la totalidad lingüística? Sobre la base de los trabajos teóricos recientes mencionados anteriormente, los cuatro argumen-tos principales de este capítulo son tanto históricos como analíticos. En primer lugar, en línea con los tres textos mencionados anteriormente, sostengo que un componente clave de la retórica de la catástrofe del siglo XXI, incluido el Antropoceno, sigue una crítica romántica, posnietzs-cheana y benjaminiana del progreso.

This essay seeks to explore how a free relationship can be developed through consideration of the different understandings of the essence of technology that Heidegger presents in 'A Question Concerning Technology'. This paper was written for King's College London.

Derrida's deconstruction is closely related to Heidegger's programme of Destruktion, philosophy of difference and formulation of the claim of transcending metaphysics. In spite of the similarities and differences of Destruktion and deconstruction, Heidegger's thinking proves to be unavoidable for Derrida. Nevertheless Derrida's deconstruction can be interpreted as the deconstruction of the Heideggerian Destruktion. This study will outline the central points of the philosophy of Destruktion and deconstruction.

This article tries to analyze the concept of experience in Walter Benjamin's work. We propose to go on a journey returning by the same way that went on. That is to say, disentangling the conceptual warp from the last writings of Benjamin in "On concepts of History" to his article of 1916. This proposition is not intended to be original but it simply tries to put in act Benjamin's words "first indicate which layers have been gone over to get to that from which the findings proceed". 2

This chapter introduces the problematic governing and shaping the collection Subjective Agency and Poststructuralism—namely, the question of the relationship between subjective agency and poststructuralism—and provides an overview of the contributing chapters to demonstrate their coherence.

COLOQUIO DE TREILLES: FILOSOFÍA DE LA AURORA TEmAS FILOSóFICOS y RECONSTRUCCIóN gENéTICA EN AURORA DE F. NIETzSChE Congreso celebrado en Tourtour (Francia), del 19 al 24 de septiembre de 2003, organizado por La Fondation des Treilles. <www.hypernietzsche.org/events/treilles2> Resumen de las ponencias D'Iorio, Paolo (Paris/münchen): «Introducción a los trabajos». Como continuación del primer coloquio sobre Nietzsche organizado en 2001 en La Fondation de Treilles que trataba sobre Cosas humanas, demasiado humanas, en 2003 nos hemos dedicado al análisis del segundo libro de la trilogía del espíritu libre, Aurora. Pensamientos sobre los prejuicios morales. El coloquio «Filosofía de la Aurora» ha tenido entonces como objetivo la estructura y la génesis de esta obra de Nietzsche, para extraer de ello una serie de consideraciones históricas y de interpretaciones filosóficas que han intentado responder a tres cuestiones: el

Talk given on December 17, 2024, as part of the Talk Series "Etica della letteratura" organized by Professor Nicolini at the Literature and Philosophy Department (DILEF) of the University of Florence.
This talk reexamines the concept of Stimmung in its transition from a Romantic internal, immaterial category to a material and external phenomenon in the works of Hugo von Hofmannsthal and Hermann Bahr. By tracing the historical evolution of Stimmung - from its Romantic roots as a subjective state to its reinterpretation through theories of the nerves and atmospheric materiality - the talk highlights how Hofmannsthal and Bahr advanced a novel poetics that re-materialized Stimmung. This proves that they were the first in modern Europe to propose an atmospheric paradigm that reconceptualizes human experience as fundamentally intertwined with the physical world, challenging traditional Western dichotomies between self and environment.

«Nuestras libertades se definen a la vez gracias al Estado y contra él». Lo decía Raymond Aron en su última conferencia en el Collège de France hace casi cincuenta años, en 1978. Una contradicción sólo aparente que permite entender el delicado equilibrio en que se mueve la mentalidad liberal, en permanente tensión entre extremos que se oponen mutuamente pero que tienen en la existencia del otro su propia condición. Efectivamente, durante siglos hemos concebido nuestras libertades como una resistencia frente a los abusos de un poder que, dejado a su propia inercia, tendería de forma natural al despotismo. Y sin embargo, al mismo tiempo esperamos del Estado que garantice esas libertades, ya que privadas de protección jurídica no pasarían de ser una mera declaración formal. La convicción de lo delicado de este difícil equilibrio forma parte de la tradición liberal occidental.

Philosophical attempts atreforming ontology have moved from delimiting large universal substances  or  totalities  toward  mapping  formal  modelsthrough  time.  Most  of  these endeavors establish irreducible difference as their primary assumption. Alain Badiou’s ontological  proposal  is  doubtless  one  of  the  most polemical.  Known  for  hisinitialformulation  concerning  ontology  beingmathematics,  Badiou  brought significant adjustments to his claim in 2018. In this paper, we argue that this sizeable overhauling was enabled by the multilayered conditional logic structuring his philosophical system. We contend that without such a logic, no philosophical proposal on radical difference and its material emergence can be taken as a real possibility. The ontology maps a radically formal, event-conditioned  theory,  distributed  throughsubject-types.  The  theory  ofconditions provides the parametersbywhich to validate this claim

What does Martin Heidegger say about sex or gender? According to most accounts, including Derrida’s influential essay “Geschlecht: Sexual Difference, Ontological Difference,” Heidegger makes a marginal reference to sex in a 1928 Marburg lecture later translated as The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (GA 26). However, an earlier allusion to sexual difference appears in a 1923 Freiburg lecture, translated as Ontology—the Hermeneutics of Facticity (GA 63) where he explains why he uses the term “Dasein” instead of “man” in his existential analytic. “Man” carries his own historical baggage, representing a living being endowed with reason, as well as a pregiven understanding of what it means to be a person. This latter definition has its roots in a Judeo-Christian tradition where “man” is created in the image of God as the first born of many “brethren.” In a perplexing move, Heidegger then cites biblical passages to highlight the sexed emergence of man in Genesis as he poses the question, “Problem: What is woman?” (GA 63, 22/18). This chapter untangles what it means for Heidegger to ask such a question, particularly as he leaves it unanswered and seemingly negligible in his pursuit of a hermeneutics of facticity.

Heidegger states, “Hermeneutics is itself not a philosophy. It wishes only to place an object which has hitherto fallen into forgetfulness before today’s philosophers for their ‘well-disposed consideration’” (GA 63, 20/16). I place the object of sex/gender  facticity before today’s philosophers, situating the “Problem: What is woman?” within the context of Heidegger’s larger ontological project, namely to rediscover the question of being. Captured in the eponymous title Ontology—the Hermeneutics of Facticity is the insight that the study of being (ontology) can only be carried out as an interpretive non-objectifying process (hermeneutics) of our existence at a particular time in history (facticity). What does it mean to exist as a certain sex or gender during a particular time? How are sex and gender related to the question of being and the ontological difference? How are we defining sex and gender and to which term does Heidegger refer? Throughout this chapter, I will examine a few instances where Heidegger reckons with the sex/gender question. By posing the inquiry, “Problem: What is Woman?” within the parameters of Heidegger’s larger ontological project, I suggest that sex and gender must be fluid categories insofar as such properties describe the “whatness” of our existence rather than the “how” of our world-forming. That is, Dasein is neutral with respect to these categories as such attributes only show up after a time reckoning with an original position of care-lessness. I also suggest that Heidegger privileges sex/gender facticity in undergirding such neutrality as he contests Christian origin stories of the flesh (GA 63) and evolutionary theories associated with the Lebensphilosophie of his time (GA 26).  Finally, I conclude by demonstrating how Heidegger’s distinction between Körper and Leib further upholds sex and gender fluidity.

In this work, and in line with the attention international researchers have
devoted to Heidegger’s major works to contribute to the elucidation of his
teachings, we intend to establish a hypothesis based on Heidegger’s secondary literature in his thought—following his speeches, presentations,
lectures, letters, notes, interviews, etc. Thus, the hypothesis of this work aims to prove the foundation of Heidegger’s teachings on the Metaphysical Foundations of the Modern Age—specifically, by posing questions on the Essence of Modern Age Science, the Essence of Action in the Modern Age, and the Essence of Technic in the Modern Age. In this context, this essay explores the main phenomena of modernity emphasized by Heidegger in his secondary works to demonstrate the Metaphysical Foundations of the Modern Age and thereby prove the Metaphysical Foundation of the Modern Age’s essence of Modern Age science, the essence of action in the Modern Age, and the essence of technic in the Modern Age. The ultimate goal is to synthesize fragments from various Heideggerian works of secondary literature to point out, in one place, what Heidegger taught at a higher level in his major works: how the Modern Age, in all its fundamental phenomena and in the entirety of its richness/deficiencies, delivers its foundations within Modern Age Metaphysics.

1945-ös hazaérkezését követően Lukács György a magyar szellemi és kulturális élet egyik meghatározó alakjává vált – nemcsak filozófusi, hanem a kultúrpolitikát befolyásoló minőségében is. 1945-ben a hatvanéves Lukács számára egy aktív alkotói korszak következett: egyetemi tanár lesz, folyóiratot alapít, cikkei mellett műveinek magyar nyelvű (újra)kiadása is folyamatos. A filozófiatörténet-írás számára Lukácsnak ez a korszaka mégis vakfoltnak számít: filozófusi tevékenysége és hatása leginkább tanítványi körének és kortársainak visszaemlékezéseiből, anekdotákból ismerhető meg – vagy túlzottan negatív, vagy túlzottan pozitív fényben feltüntetve Lukács szerepvállalását. Felmerül továbbá egy másik dilemma is, miszerint filozófiai teljesítményként értékelhetjük-e Lukács 1945-1955-ig terjedő gondolkodói tevékenységét. Ezt az időszakot Lukács életművében javarészt az irodalmi és irodalompolitikai kérdések uralták, így szükségesnek látszik a rekonstrukció során az irodalomtörténeti kitekintés is. Már ebből a rövid felvezetőből is kitűnhet, hogy Lukács hazaérkezésétől 1955-ig tartó korszakának rekonstrukciója még a magyar filozófiatörténet-írás egyik elmaradt feladata. A tanulmány arra tesz kísérletet, hogy ennek a periódusnak a töréspontjait felvázolja, és Lukács filozófusi, kultúrpolitikai szerepvállalását rekonstruálja a magyar filozófiatörténet tükrében.

The report focuses on the history of the Italian version of «Logos» Journal. We consider the evolution of the Journal, gives an overview of the main directions of its activity, described the concept of its main participants. Particular importance is attached to the «Russian track» in the history of the Italian «Logos». First of all, we tell about an article by the Italian Law scholar Giuseppe lo Verde, titled “The Philosophy of the Trinity by Serge Bulgakov” (La filosofia dellaTrinità di S. Bulgakow). Lo Verde discusses a very complex and important topic in Bulgakov’s thought — his Trinitarian Ontology. If by 1938 the philosophy of fr. S. Bulgakov was actually not understood by his Russian contemporaries, because of the so called  “controversy about Sophia” (Sophiology), then for European reader the Trinitarian Ontology of Russian philosopher turned out to prove relevant. Bulgakov was the only Russian thinker discussed in a separate article in an Italian Philosophical publication of a long-standing tradition and а broad international renown.

This paper explores the surprising resonance between Martin Heidegger’s situated ontology—focused on practical immer-
sion in shared worlds—and artificial intelligence (AI) systems that transcend formal constraints through data-driven learn-
ing. Heidegger's understanding of truth and thinking as emerging through contextual engagement parallels how machine
learning algorithms rely on real-world interactions to develop advanced functions. The analysis advocates integrating
Heideggerian perspectives with John Dewey’s consequentialist ethical orientation, emphasizing that responsibility must
be sensitive to the evolving societal impacts of actions rather than fixed by a priori principles. This pragmatic approach
calls for policy frameworks as adaptable to societal changes as the AI systems they govern. To illustrate this, the paper
develops a reinforcement learning model that balances utilitarian and deontological ethical considerations in promoting
social participation through AI. This model demonstrates how philosophical concepts can be integrated into algorithm
design and assessment, resulting in participatory, transparent, and inquiry-driven policy frameworks attuned to the situ-
ational impacts of AI systems rather than rigid constraints.

Gorontdlo Sk e Un bersitY 'ft1is tescotch ttus cuttit't au1 to kj1o|| tthather (:all(hantite Sn utegic Reorling (CSR) te&nk|1la cdn irPr.)Ne sL de ts reodins to'ryreh"sion itt Noraive rexr' The pap lation ol th,r tcs'atlt it o ln.tents in secohd gtu(le of I d! Sl\41 Nt"'ti I Kobito This resaarch used Pttposite SdnPItug '1 lokins the so,nple that it 3o 'r*t"'r' ' *'"i'i g''a" oI IPA') The ncltod-t.hdt is'r'::t tn t! rcs&rth is Qxasi-exqti|l'ntal desig| bv \ing rre1e;t dnd Pon-kn D'sign Meonwhil' in colLedins the da tu, t he lt'ritet userl the inst t ut'tent (nltltipLe choice' tcsl Jfherc'ls' i8 ondlyting the datd the r' it et scd nomatiry tc( ahd t-tun Thc rcs lt;1 lhis rcscatch sha.rs Lhat the applic.ti.on oJ Onhhorutiv 5a.r.!, R.nJ;,s CSIi cni rt i{latti'an Nth tat\'t t a'tt4'an| h tn:-fu"dtit L,l,'',i,','ri,"a u),,,,," sttti\ticdr dnaty"$ that stnrt t i,tr ^ tarltl rtnn t,,. rhclut.!a ol t,,,,,'lwns !),33 nn(t r,,,ttd 2,t)'1 hc*'t"t;""t'U^in-201viththedasreeaffi(aron:(n't):(30-t) :29 dt rhe le,ctsigtlili.anca o:0,a5 L is rl;icatad thdt thc hvpoLhesis ol this rcseatth.is acceptahle It cdn be sectl the avtase 'y' prc kn resutt rtte 6t'07% anLI in past test g; 13% He ce teaching rca.ting bf ttsing CSR tethnn4e can unproft thc stude ts coDlprche^ion i' rcading urruti'e tert Ke)avords: C'Sn Nd/rarN e Texl' ltaatling Conprchc t1s ion N IRODUCTION Rcadi g ski,,is a unique u':'.

Is the primary function of an educator to elucidate and convey their own knowledge? French philosopher Jacques Rancière demonstrates that an incidental experiment by Joseph Jacotot presents an alternative paradigm: the ignorant schoolmaster. In his work The Ignorant Schoolmaster: Five Lessons in Intellectual Emancipation [Le maître ignorant: cinq leçons sur l'émancipation intellectuelle], Rancière posits that the ignorant schoolmaster is equally, if not more, capable of instructing students compared to the knowledgeable educator. Rancière examines two educational methodologies: the conventional approach of the knowledgeable educator who explicates and imparts knowledge, and the experimental approach of the ignorant schoolmaster who refrains from explanation and primarily focuses on verifying attentiveness. By providing a brief analysis of these two methodologies, this article aims to demonstrate how Rancière’s work can be utilized to construct a model for articulating the implicit theoretical principles in educational practices. This model is predicated on the following premise: by taking either a successful or a problematic educational practice as an example, one can articulate the theoretical principles inherent within it. The article hopes to facilitate a shift in focus from practices to principles, thereby offering a novel perspective on educational practices and enabling its theoretical explication.........

[In Dutch: Bestaat de kernactiviteit van de meester erin om zijn eigen kennis uit te leggen en over te dragen? De Franse filosoof Jacques Rancière laat zien dat een gelegenheidsexperiment van Joseph Jacotot ons een ander voorbeeld aanreikt: de onwetende meester. In zijn boek De onwetende meester: vijf lessen over intellectuele emancipatie (Le maître ignorant: Cinq leçons sur l'émancipation intellectuelle) stelt hij dat de onwetende meester evengoed of zelfs beter in staat is leerlingen iets te leren dan de wetende meester. Rancière neemt in feite twee onderwijspraktijken als voorbeeld: de traditionele praktijk van de wetende meester die uitleg geeft en kennis overdraagt en de experimentele praktijk van de onwetende meester die geen uitleg geeft maar vooral gericht is op de verificatie van aandacht. In dit artikel wil ik op basis van een korte analyse van deze twee praktijken laten zien hoe we uit Rancière’s boek een model kunnen afleiden voor het articuleren van de theoretische principes die impliciet in onderwijspraktijken werkzaam zijn. Dit model is gestoeld op het volgende uitgangspunt: door een succesvolle of juist problematische onderwijspraktijk als voorbeeld te nemen kunnen we de theoretische principes articuleren die erin werkzaam zijn. Dit schept de mogelijkheid om de focus van de van de praktijken naar de principes te verleggen. Hierdoor wordt de onderwijspraktijk op een nieuwe manier inzichtelijk en kunnen we haar theoretisch expliciteren.]

This course sets forth your independent research in intercultural philosophy. If you have some basic knowledge in European continental philosophy and Chinese philosophy and are looking forward to learning the implications of the intercultural dialogue between these big traditions, the course demonstrates how intercultural philosophy can be applied as a powerful way of philosophizing with real case studies. In the course you will acquire the necessary tool kits for initiating your own research in the field.

In Neo-Existentialism Markus Gabriel argues that much contemporary theorizing about the mind is incoherent because it overlooks one of the conditions of its own intelligibility, namely our reflexive understanding of ourselves as distinct from objects and (other) animals. He agrees with Kant and Hegel that the very idea of a naturalistic theory of ourselves as “minds” rests on a category mistake. I agree, but I reject the rationalism that Gabriel takes from the idealist tradition and enlists in support of his argument. I defend in its stead a more traditional form of existentialism according to which existence should be understood as fundamentally recalcitrant to reason. I conclude by observing that if idealism rests on the thesis that the words “thought” and “intelligibility” refer to nothing peculiar to human understanding, but just mean things being some way or other, then it is a mere terminological maneuver, not a philosophical innovation.

Historical Archaeology is a young field of research also in Paraguay. So far, investigations have focused on Jesuit missions, on urban archaeology in the centre of Asunción and contemporary Historical Archaeology on the Chaco War. This article presents a project that marks the beginning of research on utopian settlements in Paraguay. The focus is on Nueva Germania, a German emigrant colony of the late 19th century founded in 1887 by Bernhard Förster, a radical anti-Semite, and his wife Elisabeth Nietzsche, the sister of the philosopher Friedrich Nietzsche. Together with a group of like-minded people (mainly from Saxony), the couple wanted to realise their dream of a “new Germany” in Paraguay. Even though Nueva Germania still exists today, the dream of the utopian settlement was shattered after only a few years.
In this article we try to show how Förster’s utopian ideology is reflected in the geography of the settlement. In the planning of the settlement and the allocation of the plots of land, it becomes clear that the German immigrant families were deliberately settled as far away from each other as possible. This strategy of isolation corresponded to Bernhard Förster’s personal ideal of a life in seclusion. His idea of society stemmed from his Germanic ideology, which he had constructed himself.

Historische Archäologie ist auch in Paraguay ein junges Forschungsfeld. Bislang fanden Untersuchungen zu Jesuitenmissionen statt, Stadtkerngrabungen im Zentrum von Asunción und zeitgeschichtliche Archäologie zum Chaco-Krieg. Der Beitrag stellt ein Projekt vor, das den Anfang zur Erforschung von utopischen Siedlungen in Paraguay markiert. Im Fokus steht Nueva Germania, eine deutsche Auswandererkolonie des späten 19. Jahrhunderts, die von Bernhard Förster, einem radikalen Antisemiten, und seiner Frau Elisabeth Nietzsche, der Schwester des Philosophen Friedrich Nietzsche, 1887 gegründet wurde. Gemeinsam mit einer Gruppe Gleichgesinnter (vorwiegend aus Sachsen) wollten sie in Paraguay ihren Traum eines „neuen Deutschlands“ verwirklichen. Auch wenn Nueva Germania heute noch existiert, platzte der Traum der utopischen Siedlung bereits nach wenigen Jahren. Im Beitrag versuchen wir aufzuzeigen, wie sich die utopische Ideologie Försters in der Siedlungsgeographie abzeichnet. In der Planung der Siedlung und der Vergabe der Grundstücke wird deutlich, dass die einwandernden deutschen Familien gezielt möglichst weit voneinander entfernt angesiedelt wurden. Diese Strategie der Isolierung entsprach Bernhard Försters persönlichem Ideal eines Lebens in Abgeschiedenheit. Seine geplante Gesellschaftsform von Nueva Germania entsprang seiner Germanenideologie, die er sich selbst zurechtgelegt hatte.

У овом раду настојаћемо показати, ослањајући се на радове Јована Зизјуласа и православну духовну традицију, да је појам личности
оригинални хришћански појам ране Цркве, по ком се као нужан услов постојања људске личности претпоставља Лични Тројични Бог. Покушаћемо
утврдити шта јесте тако појмљена личност, је ли она неко бивствујуће
или начин бивствовања? На ово питање даћемо одговор оквирним назначавањем конституције њене онтолошке структуре, поглавито у односима
појмова слободе, љубави и заједнице. У напору што адекватније артикулације појма личности, показаћемо да је за извршење таквог задатка врло
плодоносна примена неких Хајдегерових онтолошких појмова и резултата
из Бивствовања и времена. За крај, показаћемо какве теолошке и предфилозофске представе претпоставља овај изворни појам личности, те какве
консеквенце повлачи по питању осмишљавања људског живота.

This work aims to understand the main features and the reasons for the anti-pantheistic controversy developed by Rosmini in his writings, inserted in the broader context of a widespread debate shared by various Italian philosophers in the first half of the 19th century. We will focus particularly on “Germanic pantheism” ascribed by Rosmini to Kantian philosophy and its development, especially to Schelling and Hegel. Rosmini accused these systems of “pantheism” showing their incompatibility with his triadic ontology. We will therefore investigate what Rosmini means by “pantheism”, the philosophical reasons for its criticism and refusal as well as the possible theological, moral, and political factors that intertwine with it. Finally, the question will allow us to broaden the theological and historical-political context in which his critical engagement with German philosophy develops.

This work critically examines Husserl's engagement with Kant's concept of discursivity, positioning it not as a mere continuation or critique of Kantian thought, but as a complex reworking of the Kantian synthesis within a phenomenological framework. It explores how Husserl reinterprets synthesis—particularly pre-predicative synthesis—in response to Kant’s a priori structuring of cognition through categories, aiming to address the limitations of Kant’s sequential model of cognitive processes. By integrating temporal continuity and intentional coherence, Husserl challenges Kant’s treatment of time as a purely formal intuition and seeks to establish a deeper synthesis grounded in lived temporality. Drawing from Neokantian influences such as Natorp and Riehl, Husserl extends the Kantian project by shifting the foundation of synthesis from an external, categorial framework to the intrinsic dynamics of consciousness itself. This approach reframes synthesis as a passive, immanent process, grounded in Gesetzlichkeit, that supports cognitive unity without recourse to external categorial imposition. Ultimately, this analysis shows that Husserl’s phenomenology provides a transcendental inquiry that reveals the foundational, temporal, and lawful conditions of consciousness necessary for constitutive coherence, thereby advancing Kantian epistemology into a radically redefined phenomenological terrain.

"Ces essais sur la religion chez les intellectuels, l'intérêt des philosophes pour la politique, la philosophie de l'existence et l'existentialisme français, Heidegger "le renard", ou encore l'antistalinisme américain, témoignent de la réflexion que, toute sa vie, Hannah Arendt a menée sur les questions du politique, de la modernité et de la condition humaine.

Structuralism has typically been approached in a monolithic fashion, and read as a ‘unified’ concept rather than as a polyvalent idea and/or from a dialectical point of view.  One might say that it has been conceived as an ‘essence’, and elaborated primarily as a ‘signified’ in contrast to a ‘floating signifier’ requiring context for its intelligibility. This study, a collection of papers on a theme, presents a heterogeneous approach  to structural analysis as it came to be defined in France. In addition to a background discussion of Bourbaki, and the metonym of mathematical ‘structure’, that is generally overlooked in many monographs, I investigate six ‘projects’ of an anthropological nature. This is undertaken to set the stage for a ‘convergence’ of a Sartrean-based social theory, pivoting autour the 'group-in-fusion' with Girardian mimetic theory, an alternative conceptual approach to agency.  The centerpiece of this ‘meta-level’ enterprise entails a reformulation of the subject-object dichotomy, or the agent-event distinction in favor of a triadic form.  The genesis of French structuralism, rooted as it appears to be in mathematics, linguistics, and phenomenology is complex and mirrored in the genealogy of the word ‘structure’ itself.  Structuralism was constitutive within the evolution of French ethnography, an enterprise in the decipherment of the 'real' which, the papers pertaining to Sartre, Bourdieu, and Girard below elucidate.  While this study is primarily descriptive, an effort has been made to ascend to a level of formal intelligibility in order to explore structuralism's paradigmatic shift from the analysis of superstructure (semiosis) and dispositions (habitus) to an ontology of agency in collective contexts, involving a starting point on a synchronic axis as the basis for posing the meaning of history question along a diachronic axis.

Les histoires de la philosophie de l’existence ont proposé au XXe siècle un récit relativement homogène du lien entre Kant et Kierkegaard à travers la critique de la déduction de l’existence à partir de l’essence. Cet essai propose d’en étoffer l’intrigue en repartant de la distinction kantienne entre existence réelle et existence catégorielle laquelle est formellement reprise par Kierkegaard comme la distinction entre le Soi réel et l’idéalité du Christ.

The paper clarifies some prominent aspects of Rudolf Eucken's Philosophy of Life that, despite its vast influence in the late nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, is nowadays mostly forgotten. More specifically, I will reconstruct Eucken's philosophical diagnosis of the spiritual crisis affecting European and Western civilization in relation to the concepts of culture, history, and worldview. First, I will offer an analysis of the spiritual crisis in its two core aspects: as a crisis of culture and as a crisis of the historical present stemming from the unprecedented polarization of vying worldviews. Second, I will identify the defining traits of Eucken's original and systematic concept of Weltanschauung through a detailed comparison with Ernst Haeckel's naturalistic worldview, an early version of scientific reductionism. Third, I will show how the problem of clashing worldviews both configures and responds to the present crisis and how such a problem hinges on a latent process of falsification of life. In doing so, I will shed light on Eucken's belonging to Lebensphilosophie by elucidating the relation between philosophy and life as well as the task of philosophy vis-à-vis the present crisis.

Hamlet’s character has been the benchmark against which a large part of the European philosophy has had to measure. Various authors, such as Pavel Florenskij, Lev S. Vygotskij, and Carl Schmitt, have seen in Hamlet the contradiction inherent to an unresolved epochal transition, characterized by the endless pain of an interim. My article explores the possibility of interpreting Hamlet’s time in this light, in relation to Walter Benjamin’s ideas on the German Trauerspiel. Unlike Florenskij, who reads Hamlet in a tragic manner, I
follow Benjamin’s thesis that places Hamlet as the end of the modern Trauerspiel. Within this framework, the nature of modern consciousness and its relationship with truth is revealed, highlighting how Hamlet embodies the aporetic traits of modern politics, in contrast to Carl Schmitt’s premodern visión.

Critical of empirical forms of anthropology which have missed the singularity of beings, this paper defines the conditions for the observation of a human being. It would be then up to existential anthropology to do this work. To observe in detail a human being and to understand its existential grammar, the author considers necessary to return to the lexical field of the contour, the consistency, the stability. In a heuristic way, the paper solicits two unexpected supports: a drawing of Marcel Duchamp representing a cyclist and the notion of ball, proposed by Parmenides, that he associates to the one of volume of being. The paper then becomes a reflection on the movement in cycles to think an existential anthropology of the being human riveted to itself. The result is a move away from the foundations of existentialism, which, in different ways, value a being in the process of wrenching away from itself, in disequilibrium or as a "mystery" that cannot be looked at.

This article tackles a thorny issue within the reception of Badiou's philosophy, i.e., the question of the role of the "social" within the ontological framework it outlines. Acknowledging that the question of the social is underdeveloped in Badiou's system, the paper argues that there are resources in it to develop a social ontology, and attempos to flesh it out through an original and sustained reading of Badiou's key formula on the distinction between democratic materialism and materialist dialectic: "there are only bodies and languages, except that there are truths".

The idea that technology can help us achieve our individual and collective aims, a concept deeply rooted in the European ‘Enlightenment.’ This view of things, however, can also be called the ‘Faustian idea’ (or bargain) according to such authors as Oswald Spengler.
Has technology become a worldview, the Weltanschauung of the most ‘progressive’ age, of ‘Enlightenment’s Enlightenment,’ or is it still just a ‘useful tool’ to help make people’ lives easier? Perhaps it would be naïve to give a simple answer to this complex question.

In seeking the sense of scripture, " writes Spinoza in chapter seven of his Theological-Political Treatise, "we must take care especially not to be blinded by our own reasoning" (TTP VII 100).1 He advises against conflating the meaning of a text with "the truth of things, " and recommends that we reconstruct a text's meaning "only from its use of the language or from reasoning which accepts no other foundation than Scripture itself " (TTP VII 100). Discussions of Spinoza's hermeneutics typically center on his metaphysics, often with a focus on the potential tension between his critical hermeneutics and his reading of miracles (Schechter 2018; Nadler 2013; Harvey 2013). Spinoza's critical hermeneutics is identified with the position that no text, not even the Bible, should be interpreted with reference to the supernatural (Rudavsky 2001; Steenbakkers 2010; Schechter 2018). The interpretation of Scripture does not even differ from the method of interpreting nature, but is "wholly consonant with it" (TTP VII 98). Texts have a history; they are transmitted and interpreted in certain ways. The challenge of the interpreter is to evidence, historically and textually, her interpretation independently of any particular dogma and reconstruct its true meaning. This methodology, in turn, is supposed to be on a par with geometry (Rudavsky 2001). Spinoza's political philosophy-seen as key to the entire tradition of modern European philosophical thought-has been interpreted in relative independence with respect to his hermeneutics. This, indeed,

In 1977, David Bowie, during a self-imposed drug rehabilitation in West Berlin, recorded two of the most influential and critically acclaimed albums of his career, Low and Heroes. Among the many instrumental tracks that stood out, Sense of Doubt from Heroes is the most portentous. Isolated by the Cold War between the West and East and divided by the wall, the sense of alienation and anxiety that permeated the city at that time, and his existential crisis, surged into Sense of Doubt. Vistas of subterranean sounds clash and collide between the dark, sinister, and blazing white light oscillating between the foreground and background, creating an ominous reverberation of alienation that never ends. In the context of the given assignment that revolves around the theme of 'endings,' I intend to create a discourse by weaving Sense of Doubt through the philosophical theories of Deleuze and Guattari's "Geophillosophy" focusing on Deterritorialization and Reterritorialization and the concept of the rhizome from, A Thousand and one Plateaus, Capitalism, and Schizophrenia; Ernst Jünger's detachment of pain in On Pain and Georges Didi Huberman concepts of the visible and the invisible in, Survival of the Fireflies.

【Abstract】 Heidegger's "The Origin of the Work of Art" is an important document on ontological aesthetics and an inseparable component of his later thought. However, due to ideological differences, Chinese academia has seriously misunderstood it. Given this, the author, per the text, provides a positive interpretation of some topics, such as the ontological significance of the origin, the problem of objectification, the identification of thing properties, and the truth and beauty of artworks, in order to correct the misunderstanding and authentically grasp Heidegger's thought. 【Key words】Art work, origin, objectification, object nature, truth and beauty, textual interpretation

L'objectif de ce cours est d'explorer le concept de "corps" à travers l'histoire de la philosophie. Quelles relations entre l'âme et le corps ? Peut-on penser sans le corps ? Comment appréhender le corps, au croisement entre biologie et biographie ? Fondement du vécu, le corps a pourtant longtemps été méprisé par la philosophie : véritable « tombeau » de l'âme (sōma sēma, Platon), lieu phare du pêché (Augustin d'Hippone, Thomas d'Aquin) et des égarements épistémologiques (Descartes, Hume), il serait l'ennemi juré de la philosophie-chargée de nous apprendre à mourir, seul moyen de mériter la vérité (définie comme intelligible et immuable). Abject (abjectus, abicere, ab signifiant répulsion et jectus rejeter), le corps est le rejeton par excellence de la pensée : immanent, opaque, changeant, il semble incompatible avec l'abstraction nette du concept-lequel est exteriorisé par le langage extatique. « je me suis demandé assez souvent si, tout compte fait, la philosophie jusqu'alors n'aurait pas été uniquement une exégèse du corps et un malentendu à propos du corps » soulignait à juste titre Nietzsche dans son Gai Savoir. Étranger au langage, récalcitrant au concept, le corps serait illisible, ce qui ne se définit pas mais qui s'éprouve en infligeant une souffrance, celle de sa lecture. Le cours interroge donc d'abord les raisons et les formes relatives au refoulement du corps dans l'histoire de la pensée occidentale (Platon, Tertullien, saint Augustin, Descartes, Nietzsche…) pour ensuite s'intéresser à la figure du corps vivant (Husserl, Merleau-Ponty…).