"They did not want him back"

Svenska Dagbladet, 2020

Buxus Edition, 2020

Documentation obtained by the authors from the archive of the Swedish Military Intelligence Service (MUST) shows that in 1943, Swedish intelligence officers entered into a secret intelligence sharing agreement with high ranking members of the Hungarian General Staff regarding Communist and Soviet espionage operations. The documentation shows that a part of the communications between Swedish and Hungarian intelligence operatives was carried out via the Hungarian Legation in Stockholm. The contacts reveal that by the autumn of 1943, Swedish intelligence representatives were ready to broaden their efforts to monitor and possibly help curtail the Soviet Union's growing sphere of influence, not only in the neighboring Baltic states and Finland, but also in Central and Eastern Europe, including Hungary. Swedish involvement in such activities was especially sensitive because as of June 28, 1941, Sweden officially represented Soviet interests in Hungary and other Axis countries. The material adds several new facets to the history of Hungary's attempts to exit the war in the years 1943-1945. The newly released information also raises fundamental questions about the background of Raoul Wallenberg's humanitarian mission to Budapest in July 1944 to assist Hungary's Jews, his connection to Swedish and Anglo-American intelligence operations, as well as the official Swedish handling of Wallenberg's disappearance in 1945 and subsequent years. The documentation obtained from the MUST archive is a strong indication that additional relevant information remains to be discovered in Swedish intelligence collections and other international archives, especially those in Russia, the U.S., Hungary, and Great Britain.

Medium

A review of documentation released in 2019 from the Raoul Wallenberg case file in the Swedish Ministry of Foreign Affairs shows growing indications that Swedish and Russian officials agreed to withhold information from the general public and researchers at key moments during the official inquiry of Wallenberg’s fate (1991–2000).

www.rwi-70.de; https://www.riksdagen.se/sv/dokument-lagar/dokument/interpellation/raoul-wallenbergs-ode-och-sveriges-behov-av_H810690, 2021

Part I: The Swedish government's profound passivity in the Wallenberg case 1945-1947 Why did Swedish officials so readily accept as early as the end of 1945 that Raoul Wallenberg was dead and could not be saved? Part II: Stalin's offer to Sweden in April 1946: A missed opportunity to solve Raoul Wallenberg's disappearance

Raoul Wallenberg and his company fulfilled an important role in the Swedish official "Economic Defense Readiness" program (Rikskommissionen för Ekonomisk Försvarsberedskap). The fact that the Swedish military and its respective intelligence services oversaw this program may explain the claims that Wallenberg functioned as an agent of Swedish intelligence during World War II. Many details of Raoul Wallenberg's life, especially regarding his personal and professional background, remain unknown. Over the years, the information has been blended out by journalists, historians and researchers, as they distilled the essence of the Wallenberg story into its current, rather generalized form. Some of the lost facets of the story may not only help to explain the official handling of the case by Swedish and Russian authorities over the years, but may also provide helpful clues for the future investigation of Wallenberg's fate.

During this session, the crucial question Why did Swedish officials so readily accept as early as the end of 1945 that Raoul Wallenberg was dead and could not be saved? was discussed, in particular, in connection with new archival documents that became available. The main points were: 1) What happened to Raoul Wallenberg in the crucial summer of 1947? 2) Why did the Soviet leader Josef Stalin order Raoul Wallenberg's detention and why did he never release him? 3) Viewed from the Swedish perspective, why were the efforts on Wallenberg’s behalf so passive? The authors suggest new steps of the investigation of the Raoul Wallenberg case that should be taken in Sweden and Russia.

RWI-70, 2022

Was one of Sweden’s top diplomats a Soviet asset? Why we need to know the truth about Sverker Åstrőm ++ Raoul Wallenberg’s family requests documentation from Russian archives ++ New Insights from the Raoul Wallenberg case file, Part III: The Swedish Foreign Ministry cannot account for various key memoranda from 2012 ++ Ambassador Hans Magnusson and Dr. Vadim Birstein discuss the interviews with former MGB employees from the 1990s ++ The troubling fallout from the Swedish elections ++ A disappointing report by the official Swedish government commission regarding Dawit Isaak and Gui Minhai ++ A Swedish radio documentary about Raoul Wallenberg ++ The Raoul Wallenberg symposium in Santa Fe ++ Launch of the Raoul Wallenberg Center, a new digital museum ++ A new book chronicles the long lasting effects of an unsolved disappearance during the Cold War ++ Marvin Makinen and Trevor Reed on the brutal conditions Brittney Griner will face in a Russian penal colony ++