A 27-country test of communicating the scientific consensus on climate change

Environmental Communication

That climate change has been accelerated by human activity is supported by a near-universal consensus of climate scientists. In this paper, we review many of the studies that have been done on the impact of communicating the scientific consensus to the general public. We discuss ongoing debates about these studies, but more importantly, we highlight complementary areas that we believe should define future research. We emphasize how a focus on processing motivations, context, and message variations may help resolve some of the debates about when scientific consensus messaging works. We then discuss ways to expand this research agenda by examining support for a broader range of outcomes across a wider range of populations, particularly those most vulnerable to the immediate impacts of climate change. Our goal is to provide a blueprint for expanding the work on climate change communication for scientific consensus messaging and beyond.

Public Affairs Quarterly, 2017

Several empirical studies purportedly demonstrate the existence of a scientific consensus on climate change. Such studies have been pursued as a response to concerns that private industries and think tanks have "manufactured" public doubt and derailed regulatory policies. While there is overwhelming evidence for anthropogenic global warming, studies aiming to empirically establish the existence of consensus rely on several problematic assumptions about the nature of consensus and the role of consensus in policy making. Even more worrisome, reinforcing such assumptions in public may actually undermine, rather than increase, trust in climate science.

Global Environmental Change, 2011

Questions about climate change elicit some of the widest political divisions of any items on recent US surveys. Severe polarization affects even basic questions about the reality of anthropogenic climate change (ACC), or whether most scientists agree that humans are changing Earth's climate. Statements about scientific consensus have been contentious among social scientists, with some arguing for consensus awareness as a " gateway cognition " that leads to greater public acceptance of ACC, but others characterizing consensus messaging (deliberate communication about the level of scientific agreement) as a counterproductive tactic that exacerbates polarization. A series of statewide surveys, with nationwide benchmarks, repeated questions about the reality of ACC and scientific consensus many times over 2010 to 2016. These data permit tests for change in beliefs and polarization. ACC and consensus beliefs have similar trends and individual background predictors. Both rose gradually by about ten points over 2010– 2016, showing no abrupt shifts that might correspond to events such as scientific reports, leadership statements or weather. Growing awareness of the scientific consensus, whether from deliberate messaging or the cumulative impact of many studies and publicly-engaged scientists, provides the most plausible explanation for this rise in both series. In state-level data, the gap between liberal and conservative views on the reality of ACC did not widen over this period, while the liberal–conservative gap regarding existence of a scientific consensus narrowed.

willer.berkeley.edu

2011

Although a majority of US citizens think that the president and Congress should address global warming, only a minority think it should be a high priority 1 . Previous research has shown that four key beliefs about climate change-that it is real, human caused, serious and solvable-are important predictors of support for climate policies 2 . Other research has shown that organized opponents of climate legislation have sought to undermine public support by instilling the belief that there is widespread disagreement among climate scientists about these points 3 -a view shown to be widely held by the public 1 . Here we examine if this misperception is consequential. We show that the misperception is strongly associated with reduced levels of policy support and injunctive beliefs (that is, beliefs that action should be taken to mitigate global warming). The relationship is mediated by the four previously identified key beliefs about climate change, especially people's certainty that global warming is occurring. In short, people who believe that scientists disagree on global warming tend to feel less certain that global warming is occurring, and show less support for climate policy. This suggests the potential importance of correcting the widely held public misperception about lack of scientific agreement on global warming.

Given the well-documented campaign in the USA to deny the reality and seriousness of anthropogenic climate change (a major goal of which is to " manufacture uncertainty " in the minds of policy-makers and the general public), we examine the influence that perception of the scientific agreement on global warming has on the public's beliefs about global warming and support for government action to reduce emissions. A recent study by Ding et al. (Nat Clim Chang 1:462–466, 2011) using nationally representative survey data from 2010 finds that misperception of scientific agreement among climate scientists is associated with lower levels of support for climate policy and beliefs that action should be taken to deal with global warming. Our study replicates and extends Ding et al. (Nat Clim Chang 1:462–466, 2011) using nationally representative survey data from March 2012. We generally confirm their findings, suggesting that the crucial role of perceived scientific agreement on views of global warming and support for climate policy is robust. Further, we show that political orientation has a significant influence on perceived scientific agreement, global warming beliefs, and support for government action to reduce emissions. Our results suggest the importance of improving public perception of the scientific agreement on global warming, but in ways that do not trigger or aggravate ideological or partisan divisions.

Social Science Quarterly, 2021

Objective: A significant portion ofthe American public does not accept the current overwhelming scientific consensus about the anthropogenic causality of climate change. This issue has been politicized and is now highly partisan. Because the military is the most trusted public institution in the United States, and the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is the government agency with primary oversight of climate policy, we test whether source cues from these entities, as well as threat frames centered on either national security or the economy, influence the willingness of people to believe climate change is human-caused. Methods: We conduct a post-test controlled experiment to test the comparative effects of varying both source cue and frame. Results: We find that the U.S. Military source cue generally produced a weaker belief that climate change is human-caused, for both Democrats and Republicans, while the EPA had a more positive influence. Conclusion: The results suggest the limitations of national security framing and point to the importance of neutral, nonpartisan source cues, especially in appeals directed at Republicans.

Global Environmental Change, 2009

2. Climate change communication: the research literature Research into climate change communication has broadened significantly in recent years and now deals substantively with interdisciplinary scientific communication, the scientist/

A clear, growing consensus indicates an urgent need for humans to reduce the burgeoning effects of global climate change ("global warming" or GW). Apt public instruction seems central to achieving critical behavioral changes, but some researchers suggest that U.S. climate attitudes are doomed to cognitive stasis (i.e., that little will be gained by educating the public). Herein are four studies that counter the stasis view. Our laboratory has previously reported findings that (1) virtually no Americans know the basic climate change mechanism, yet it (2) is quickly learned (in a few minutes, e.g., with a 400-word text), which (3) increases climate change acceptance. Below, Studies 1 and 4 replicate and extend these results to demonstrate (a) efficacy with an online presentation and broader populations and (b) retention up to a month after learning the mechanism. Studies 2-4 explore roles for germane numerical information using estimation with feedback. Study 2 shows that (d) misleading, cherry-picked, statistics can decrease climate change acceptance (and shake metacognition), while Studies 3 and 4 show that (e) surprising scientific information must be presented with care for it to foster beliefs in line with climate science's consensus. In sum, contrary to unnecessarily pessimistic (and correlational) "stasis" arguments, highly germane science information can clearly change the public's understandings and opinions.