An Enquiry on Physis–Nomos Debate: Sophists

Cosmos and History, 2023

The subject of sustainability subsumed by the environmental agenda has been widely approached without taking into account a rigorous examination of the concept of nature, and still being guided by a modern or even Christian epistemological matrix supported by an essentialist, anthropocentric and metaphysical sight. This paper seeks to expose some non-metaphysical theoretical alternatives, especially those derived from evolutionism, quantum mechanics, and chaos theory in which nature appears as a complex, moving, and unstable system that acts through creative and irreversible processes. Methodologically, it is intended to make a philosophical inquiry in order to criticize Christian and modern epistemologies, as well as the concept of nature that follows them, which contains both a creationist and an instrumental bias, to then propose some epistemological alternatives more in tune with the current stage of natural philosophy. As a result, it will be possible to observe that these more current theoretical conceptions require new terminology and conceptual structure to account for the experiences observed in this field which, ironically, come close to the ancient Greek concept of physis.

Philosophica, 2016

It is a puzzling fact that the Greek term for Nature ‘physis’ could be used to refer to (inter alia) i) reality as a whole, ii) the nature (essence) of something, iii) to individual material beings or materiality and iv) all things that are self-generating. In order to understand and tie together this wide array of possible meanings I will consider the thesis that ‘physis’ was in fact used as a concept of being, a term naming the fundamental property of all of reality in the early pre-Socratics, poets and scientists before 500 BCE. Investigating ‘physis’ in this way can give us a way of thinking about Nature as a dynamic and creative but material process that goes far beyond the classical understanding of Nature as the sum of things that self-generate or the modern mathematical understanding of Nature born with Galileo dominant to this day. Keywords: physis, ancient Greek philosophy, Timaeus, process, dynamic materialism

2012

BOUND as the endpoint of Jo's WANDERINGS (*PJ7812 847). It also appears in EURIPIDES, not only in HELEN, where it is the first word, but also in ANDROMACHE (Andr. 650), not to mention various fragments. JULIE BROWN Nod see GESTURE AND BODY LANGUAGE nomos and physis in Greek Tragedy (vo.toç, fnaç) Even if Hesiod's opposition between HYBRIS and dike in Works and Days (225-86) might be seen as a first approach to the physis-nomos polarity (nature versus law) insofar as it equates the former to the bestiality of animals and the latter to human culture (Guthrie 1969a: 55-6) which is rewarded by the gods (Op. 225-37), it is in the Hippocratic corpus that the concepts account for health and illness, respectively, for the first time (Heinimann 1945: 95-7). Archelaos, the pupil of ANAXAGORAS, who reportedly applied the terms in an ethical context (Al, 2 D-K; Heinimann 1945: 110-14; Pohlenz 1953: 432), might, however, have been the very first to use it explicitly as an antithesis. In any case, for the contrast between physis and nomos in tragedy, we will have to wait for SOPHISTS such as Antiphon (52-61 D-K), or Hippias (Plato, Prot. 337e), who may have

Phronesis, 2024

There is prima facie evidence that Theophrastus naturalized nous to the extent that he spoke of it in naturalizing terms. But our evidence also suggests that Theophrastus accepted the reasons Aristotle had for excluding nous from the reach of natural philosophy. We show that, far from revealing an inconsistency on Theophrastus' part, this apparent tension results from a consciously adopted strategy. Theophrastus is developing one aspect of Aristotle's account of nous he found underdeveloped and feared might be misunderstood, namely the infrangible organic unity of the whole human being, including its nous. That is why he insists that nous, although 'from outside,' is 'grown together' with us, why he speaks of it as a nature (phusis), and why he insists that thought is a motion (kinêsis). We show how these striking claims can be understood against the broader background of Theophrastus' natural philosophy.

Invited paper XIII International Ontology Congress Physics and Ontology, 2018

In contemporary science and philosophy, the orthodox view is to consider “reductive materialism” the only legitimate way of accounting for all things, past, present and future — for, that is, what some may call “theories of everything.” According to this view, all psychological phenomena, including mind, life, and consciousness, are also reducible to physics and chemistry. In his recent controversial but important book, Mind and Cosmos: Why the Materialist Neo-Darwinian Conception of Nature is Almost Certainly False (Oxford: OUP, 2012), Thomas Nagel argues against “reductive materialism” and reductionist interpretation of biological evolution. But Nagel is also an atheist, so he’ll have nothing to do with the theistic option and its contention that the intentionality of a purposive being is at work behind the present order of things. Nagel argues instead for a special kind of teleology that he calls “natural teleology” as the only valid explanation. The existence of teleological laws means that certain physical outcomes have a much higher probability than the laws of physics alone would allow because they are on a path toward certain results. What interests me with Nagel’s proposal is that we find a historical precedent for it at the origins of philosophy and science in what is called the discovery or invention of nature or physis. In this paper, I’ll argue that when we turn to the history of philosophy before Aristotle, we see that this natural teleology, to borrow Nagel’s expression, led some thinkers to affirm reductive materialism, which in turn generated, as a reaction to it, theism as a philosophical position, a theism grounded in arguments for the existence of God/gods. In other words, there were no arguments for the existence of God before a case was made for atheism. In this battle of Titans, the concept of nature or physis was at the centre of the controversy, and the political and social ramifications were as acute then as they are now. The aim of this paper is to introduce the philosophers and scientists participating in this congress on physis to the different parties in the original dispute and to their terms of reference. But my presentation here will also have something to say about the emergence of a new form of thinking, if not a new kind of Homo sapiens: the advent of Homo philosophicus, and the self-conscious reflexivity this being presupposes.

Epoché: A Journal for the History of Philosophy, 2023

Plato’s Protagoras is famous for Protagoras' defense of the public practice of sophistry and his great myth, which contains his account of the origins of political life, as well as for Hippias' rejection of the tyranny of nomos in the name of the natural kinship of the wise. What is perplexing is that Socrates makes no explicit response to these arguments. This essay argues that Socrates' indirect response is actually contained in his otherwise unmotivated interpretation of the poem of Simonides, where his description of "laconic philosophy" is in fact an indirect description of his own philosophical practice. While the sophists reject nomos without recognizing their own dependence on its stabilizing force, Socrates argues that genuine philosophers, recognizing at once the necessity as well as the defectiveness of nomos, must "unwillingly praise" convention and only present their criticisms indirectly. Socrates' interpretation of Simonides, then, points the way to his own understanding of the tension between, but also the interdependence of, nomos and physis.

Europeana, Numéro Spécial, Les philosophies environnementales européennes, dir. Jean-Philippe Pierron, 2015

Serge Moscovici has argued that the current epoch of history is defined above all by the “natural question”: the question of humanity’s relationship to nature. This article argues that European philosophy is torn between two quite different responses to this question. The first, expressed most notably by Bruno Latour, considers that the word and concept of “nature” is insurmountably problematic and must thus be discarded. The second, developed within systems theory by Edgar Morin and within phenomenology by Martin Heidegger, advocates a rediscovery and regeneration of the original Pre-Socratic interpretation of nature as physis. Drawing on and articulating the work of Morin and Heidegger, this article argues firstly that the appropriate response to the natural question is to consider nature as physis qua “self-disclosure” or “self-bringing-into-the-Open,” and secondly that the Open must be understood as an agora – a public space consisting of markets, parliaments, law courts, conferences… – into which “things” may in one way or another be brought. This interpretation of the Open as agora draws on Hannah Arendt, though it also – despite other fundamental differences – overlaps with the political philosophy of Bruno Latour.

" Folding Nature Back Upon Itself: Aristotle and the Rebirth of Physis, " confronts us with nature's receding presence and proposes to think through a rebirth of physis. Following Aristotle's concept of physis, this paper locates two axes along which such a rethinking of physis can take place. The first axis is vertical, and turns around the fundamental tension that each natural being faces in seeking to overcome its own matter in order to reach transcendence. The second axis is horizontal, and follows Aristotle's ideas that physis cannot unfold unless aided, stimulated, nurtured and enforced by external factors such as one's environment, food, art, technology, and politics. This paper argues that vertical transcendence needs to be rethought to accommodate earthy, individual natural flourishing. Horizontal transcendence (e.g. rethinking the collaboration between different species and the collaboration between art and nature) may allow physis the kind of vertical transcendence that leads to its rebirth. This has important implications for both restoration projects and de-­‐extinction projects: we need to acknowledge the role of human design for restoration and conservation projects, and envision humans no longer as external and superior to eco-­‐systems, but as part of them. Only within newly conceptualized social-­‐ecological systems can such a new vision of physis take flight. To go back to Aristotle and his understanding of nature is to take a pause, breathe deeply, and let go. Beyond rhetorical embellishment, this exercise in mindfulness indicates that we need more than theoretical musings to take up the task of understanding physis. Not only do we need to go back to the meaning and definition (logos) of physis, of which the Latin " natura " and our " nature " are such awkward and stultified translations, but we truly need a new embodied way of perceiving and feeling if we ever want to get close to the meaning of nature. Perhaps pausing and breathing is not enough to get us there, but it would seem a helpful beginning for a

An historical and post-structural examination of the philosophical debate of phusis (nature) versus nomos (convention) and its employment in two of Sophocles' Theban Plays which were written in late fifth-century Athens.

Leonid Zhmud. Physis in the Pythagorean Tradition. Philologia Classica 2018, 13(1), 50–68, 2018

This paper discusses the notion of physis in the fragments of the Pythagoreans Philolaus of Croton and Archytas of Tarentum. Building on the twentieth-century discussion of the two basic meanings of physis, ‘growth’ and ‘being’ (section 2), it argues that Philolaus was most probably the author of the first treatise entitled Περὶ φύσεως, as the first-century BC writer Diogenes of Magnesia testifies. The remaining evidence on Presocratic books entitled Περὶ φύσεως is late and unreliable (section 3). ἁ φύσις in Philolaus B 1 and 6 denotes ‘all that exists’; the Pythagorean speaks of physis in a generalized collective sense as of everything that came into being and exists in the world-order (section 4). As distinct from Philolaus, Archytas did not develop a doctrine of principles, and his epistemology was not constrained by metaphysical presuppositions. Archytas B 1 considers physis from both cosmological and epistemological points of views, as ‘the nature of the whole’ that is available to human cognition. Without setting any conditions or limitations to this process, as Philolaus did, he reinforces the latter’s declaration that “all the things that are known have number” (B 4) by making four Pythagorean mathēmata the principal cognitive tools for scientific enquiry into nature (section 5).

Thanos Zartaloudis' The Birth of Nomos is bold and breathtaking. The reading heretofore offered aims to advance a constructive reading and arrangement of the work, to further highlight some of its force and arguments, towards indicating, in particular, its significance vis-à-vis the effectuality that sustains and surrounds the word Law. In addition, following the book's indebtedness, in part, to the work and thought of Giorgio Agamben, we advance a reading that explores how this influence informs the research protocols employed in The Birth of Nomos, and, moreover, what are some of the many speculative projections which may be further pursued taking as their point of departure Zartaloudis' scholarship. To do so, we undertake a careful reading of certain parts of the book, positioning it towards both Zartaloudis earlier work, as well as Giorgio Agamben's oeuvre.

in: Sara Heinämaa, Miira Tuominen (eds), New Perspectives on Aristotelianism and its Critics (Brill), 2014

Aristotle's natural teleology which has long been blamed for hindering the birth and development of modem science, has recently excited interest due to its perceived modemitt What is being disputed is the degree of its modemity, whether it is just a surface feature or if it reaches deeper into Aristotle's thought The main acknowledged sign of this modemity concems those teleological principles which govem the life and structure of organisms, considered both individually and specifically: the so-called intemal or immanent teleology) Broadly, this amounts to the thesis that the goal aimed at by organisms is their own good, that is, a good which coincides with their being and functioning and not with some other entity's being and functioning. In this respect, Aristotle's theory does not display any hint of anthropocentrism or theocentrism: the good is an individual thing or, at most, a specific one. Moreover, the process whereby organisms strive after their own good is now thought to have nothing to do with vitalism or animism. For-it is claimed-the final cause is not a mysterious force operating outside or against the laws of matter, for instance by backward causation or by anthropomorphic intentions. Therefore, differently from how it has been portrayed for centuries and consequently criticised, Aristotle's teleol ogy is neither opposed nor altemative to materialism and mechanistic expla nation. On the contrary, the final, material and efficient causes are perfectly compatible: they are co-operating causal factors. For most scholars the story ends here. 2 There is nothing more to Aristotle's theory than this intemal teleology. It is neither anthropocentric nor theocentric, 1 This paper was delivered in November 2007 at the 'Aristotelianism and the Critique of Modernity' conference held at the Helsinki Collegium for Advanced Studies and subse quently submitted to the editors of this volume. Therefore, it does not take into account the works that have been published on its and on related topics since then. I am vesy grateful to all the conference participants, to the conference organizers and to the anonysnous referee of the volume for their helpful comments and suggestions. 2 The literature where this interpretation is put forward and defended is extremely rich and sophisticated. For some of its first examples, see Nuesbaum 1978, Gotthelf 1987. For some of L its latest, see Johnson 2005, Bodnár 2005. © KONINICLIJKE B5ILL NV, LEIDEN, 2515 urn le.11s3/s78see42s2s82_ee3

Philosophia, 2019

The noema is one of the most daring and controversial concept of the Husserlian theory of intentionality. It was first introduced by Husserl in 1912, within some research manuscripts, but was only fully developed in Ideen. In this paper I claim that the noema is an ambiguous notion, the result of a theoretical operation, the epoché, whose aim is contradictory. In an effort to keep open the epoché, and therefore maintain distance with respect to every transcendent object, Husserl is forced to multiply intentional objects and complicate the notions of sense and noema. Given that, I propose to overcome the paradoxes of noema through the language of game theory. Game theory offers a very fruitful descriptive model that allows us to save the original Husserlian approach without the contradictions of the epoché. For this reason, I propose to reinterpret intentionality as social game, and the noema as Nash equilibrium. By replying to possible objections, I will show that this approach gives us many theoretical advantages. The general aim of the paper is a global reformulation of the phenomenalogical method.

Exceptions.eu, 2019

"This study is, in one sense, about two words, or rather a family (or two) of words. By its nature, it is inevitably a fragmented juxtaposition (rather than a mapping) of the uses of the words nómos and nomós and the family of words to which they belong, subject to a number of evidentiary and other limitations. In another respect, this study is about the idea of the words nómos/nomós: that is, about their uses, which cannot be separated from the word(s) and vice versa. We can call this method, if it is one, a genealogy, if we agree that words do not have 'core' meanings, but rather uses (and that these uses cannot be distinguished from the existence in which they are experienced)." With these words, Thanos Zartaloudis (University of Kent & Architectural Association) condenses the scope of his latest book The Birth of Nomos (EUP, 2019). It is not common, in these days, to come across a book possessing the structural breath and analytic rigour of Zartaloudis' labour. By mixing with rare precision linguistic, historical, philological and philosophical analyses and evidence, he narrates, we could aptly say, the epic story of one of the decisive terms of what we conventionally call 'Western culture'. Through a critical-analytical and direct engagement with ancient Greek literary sources, along with the examination of the linguistic and philological traditions of interpretation, The Birth of Nomosadvances a "genealogy" of the word(s) nomos that rethinks anew its established (and arguably too easy) identification with a rather modern understanding of "law".

Nemesius of Emesa qualified as both a philosopher and a theologian during the end of the 5th century AD. It is clear that he can be placed in both categories from his treatise De Natura Hominis (“On the Nature of Man”), which is the only book he wrote that has been preserved as well as nearly the only way to attest to his existence. The purpose of this paper is to attempt to prove, based on a fragment taken from the first section of his book, that Nemesius justifies the Christian view of man by exploring the significance of Aristotle’s concept of unique property (to idion). This way, the Christian Platonizing speculation on the essence of man becomes secondary, speculation which has been looked into on the highest level by Origen. Moreover, it shall be demonstrated that despite its doxographic style, the treatise On the Nature of Man contributes to the explanation of human nature through incorporation inside a larger subject matter of Greek philosophy: the problem of using general terms for explaining the individual life experience of man. For a better understanding of the rise of this problem in Greek philosophy, the paper allots the first two sections to Homeric and Heraclitus’ views of human nature.