James D. Hamilton
580 California St., Suite 400
San Francisco, CA, 94104
Causes and Consequences of the Oil Shock of 2007-08
2009, Social Science Research Network
https://doi.org/10.2139/SSRN.2583456visibility
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Abstract
I am grateful to Alan Blinder, David Romer, Lutz Kilian, conference participants, and an anonymous referee for helpful comments on an earlier draft of this paper, and to Davide Bertoli for supplying the Blanchard-Galí data and code. The views expressed herein are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research. NBER working papers are circulated for discussion and comment purposes. They have not been peerreviewed or been subject to the review by the NBER Board of Directors that accompanies official NBER publications.
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