Game Theory

We present a game theoretic model for the availability of product information in Internet markets, where buyers can search for multiple products in parallel. We use a multiple-circle variation of Salop's "unit circle" model of product differentiation where vendors are able to differentiate their products both horizontally (taste) and vertically (quality). We explore the conditions under which vendors make horizontal and vertical product information available to potential customers in equilibrium. We demonstrate that vendors will choose not to provide their full horizontal product information, and will rather leave the buyers with some probabilistic knowledge about their exact horizontal product locations. However, the vendors will release enough horizontal product information for their products to appear distinct from those of competitors. The sellers' incentives to disseminate vertical product information are shown to be fundamentally different: only the worst possible quality vendors will withhold information on vertical product parameters. Our results suggest an answer for the question that is the title of this paper: Is it the case that online vendors release product information primarily to advertise their product's superiority or to make clear that their products do not have close competing substitutes? We find that for high quality products the former is more important while the latter gains significance for lower quality products. We present empirical observations of nearly 2,000 products in the PC game industry that provide evidence in favor of the model's predictions.

Kabysh A. S., Golovko V. A. Model of coordination of agent behavior based on reinforced learningВ данной работе описывается модель для нахождения оптимального поведения многоагентной структуры через организацию в ней оптимальных взаимодействий между агентами. Модель включает две основные техники. Модель графов координации позволяет явно выразить зависимость между агентами, что позволяет разбить целевую функцию поведения в линейную сумму индивидуальных целевых функций. Модель оценки влияний позволяет оценить влияния других агентов на действия друг друга и в результате позволяет им координировать свои действия. В работе приведена реализация данной модели на основе обучения с подкреплением и экспериментальные результаты применения данной модели

We analyze a decentralized trading process in a basic labor market where heterogeneous firms and workers meet directly and randomly, and negotiate salaries with each other over time. Firms and workers may not have a complete picture of the entire market and can thus behave myopically in the process. Our main result establishes that, starting from an arbitrary initial market state, there exists a finite sequence of successive myopic (firm-worker) pair improvements, or bilateral trades, leading to a stable matching between firms and workers with a scheme of competitive salary offers. An important implication of this result is that a general random process where every possible bilateral trade is chosen with a positive probability converges with probability one to a competitive equilibrium of the market.

Importantly, the first two models are reward-based, the last two approaches are based on the assumption of decision-makers having internal models. All models are able to solve the NeuronGame, but exhibit different learning dynamics on the way. Although the parameters of all models were fitted such that model performance is as close as possible to human performance, there is a significant difference in fitting quality when trying to predict

The Nash equilibrium concept has previously been shown to be an important tool to understand human sensorimotor interactions, where different actors vie for minimizing their respective effort while engaging in a multi-agent motor task. However, it is not clear how such equilibria are reached. Here, we compare different reinforcement learning models to human behavior engaged in sensorimotor interactions with haptic feedback based on three classic games, including the prisoner's dilemma, and the symmetric and asymmetric matching pennies games. We find that a discrete analysis that reduces the continuous sensorimotor interaction to binary choices as in classical matrix games does not allow to distinguish between the different learning algorithms, but that a more detailed continuous analysis with continuous formulations of the learning algorithms and the gametheoretic solutions affords different predictions. In particular, we find that Q-learning with intrinsic costs that disfavor deviations from average behavior explains the observed data best, even though all learning algorithms equally converge to admissible Nash equilibrium solutions. We therefore conclude that it is important to study different learning algorithms for understanding sensorimotor interactions, as such behavior cannot be inferred from a game-theoretic analysis alone, that simply focuses on the Nash equilibrium concept, as different learning algorithms impose preferences on the set of possible equilibrium solutions due to the inherent learning dynamics. Nash equilibria are the central solution concept for understanding strategic interactions between different agents 1 . Crucially, unlike other maximum expected utility decision-making models 2-4 , the Nash equilibrium concept cannot assume a static environment that can be exploited to find the optimal action in a single sweep, but it rather defines a fixed point representing a combination of strategies that can be found by iteration, so that finally no agent has anything to gain by deviating from their equilibrium behavior. Here, a strategy is conceived as a probability distribution over actions, so that Nash equilibria are in general determined by combinations of probability distributions over actions (mixed Nash equilibria), and only in special cases by combinations of single actions (pure equilibria) . An example of the first kind is the popular rock-papers-scissors game which can be simplified to the matching pennies game with two action choices, where in either case the mixed Nash equilibrium requires players to randomize their choices uniformly. An example of the second kind is the prisoner's dilemma 6 where both players choose between cooperating and defecting without communication. The pure Nash equilibrium in this game requires both players to defect, because the payoffs are designed in a way that allow for a dominant strategy from the perspective of a single player, where it is always better to defect, no matter what the other player is doing. The Nash equilibrium concept has not only been broadly applied in economic modeling of interacting rational agents, companies and markets , but also to explain the dynamics of animal conflict , population dynamics including microbial growth , foraging behavior , the emergence of theory of mind , and even monkeys playing rock-papers-scissors . Recently, Nash equilibria have also been proposed as a concept to understand human sensorimotor interactions . In these studies human dyads are typically coupled haptically 30 and experience physical forces that can be regarded as payoffs in a sensorimotor game. By designing the force payoffs appropriately in dependence of subjects' actions, these sensorimotor games can be made to correspond to classic pen-and-paper games like the prisoner's dilemma with a single pure equilibrium, coordination games with

In recent years, SDN technology has been applied to several networks such as wide area network (WAN). IT provides many benefits, such as: enhancing data transfer, promoting Application performance and reducing deployment costs. Software Defined-WAN networks lack studies and references. This paper introduced a system for SD-WAN network using PH/PH/C queues. It concentrates on the study of algebraic estimates the probability distribution of the system states. The Matrix-Geometric solution procedure of a phase type distribution queue with first-come first-served discipline is used.

The possible leveraging of high deployment costs, and the possibility to increase revenue have also introduced the concept of network sharing between different operators. On the other hand, the realization of a user-centric paradigm in future heterogeneous wireless networks, which implies free and automatic choice among different available wireless and mobile access networks, will revolutionize future wireless networks. For this innovative concept to materialize a paradigm shift is required from a long-term contractual based service delivery to a shortterm contractual and dynamic service delivery. In this paper we formulate and compare the network-centric resource allocation and and user-centric network selection problems in a multi-operator scenario using two different flavors of game theory, namely bargaining games (for network-centric resource sharing) and multi-attribute auctions (for user-centric interface selection). We also compare the contributed solutions to one another to investigate their performance in terms of efficient resource allocation, call blocking probability, and user satisfaction. 1

In 5G, a new technology has been proposed to enable the operation of LTE in the unlicensed spectrum known as LTE-Unlicensed (LTE-U). In LTE-U, the pertaining licensed spectrum of LTE augments the unlicensed spectrum to meet the demands of cellular users, and to boost the spectrum efficiency. LTE-U is supposed to be the more spectrum efficient as compared to the Wi-Fi system due to its centralized MAC. This paper gives a performance analysis to compare the spectrum efficiency of both the coexisting LTE-U and Wi-Fi networks. Network models for both Wi-Fi and LTE-U are presented and simulations are performed in order to analyze the results.

We consider three popular affirmative action policies in school choice: quota-based, priority-based, and reserve-based affirmative actions. The Boston mechanism (BM) is responsive to the latter two policies in that a stronger priority-based or reserve-based affirmative action makes some minority student better off. However, a stronger quotabased affirmative action may yield a Pareto inferior outcome for the minority under the BM . These positive results disappear once we look for a stronger welfare consequence on the minority or focus on BM equilibrium outcomes.

In game theory, the notion of a player's beliefs about the game players' beliefs about other players' beliefs arises naturally. In this paper, we present a non-self-referential paradox in epistemic game theory which shows that completely modeling players' epistemic beliefs and assumptions is impossible. Furthermore, we introduce an interactive temporal assumption logic to give an appropriate formalization of the new paradox. Formalizing the new paradox in this logic shows that there is no complete interactive temporal assumption model.

In this paper we derive analytic expressions for the value of European Put and Call options when the stock process follows an exponential Lévy-Stable process. It is shown that the generalised Black-Scholes operator for the Lévy-Stable case can be obtained as an asymptotic approximation of a process where the random variable follows a Damped-Lévy process. Finally, it is also shown that option prices under the Lévy-Stable case generate the volatility smile encountered in the financial markets when the Black-Scholes framework is employed.

Este breve escrito se propone analizar la crisis nuclear en Corea del Norte, tomando como marco la Teoría de los Juegos. Para ello, en primer lugar, se analizarán los dos “jugadores” principales en esta crisis - Estados Unidos y Corea del Norte – así como sus objetivos, intereses y motivaciones en juego. Luego, se esbozarán unas líneas respecto a la probable evolución de esta crisis en el futuro cercano, teniendo en consideración los intereses en juego, las “movidas” disponibles, y la racionalidad de los actores.Departamento de Seguridad Internacional y Defensa.Instituto de Relaciones Internacionale

We consider the problem of dividing one unit of an infinitely divisible object among a finite number of agents. We provide a characterization of all single-peaked domains on which the uniform rule is the unique division rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and equal treatment of equals (ETE). We also provide a class of division rules satisfying these properties on the remaining single-peaked domains. Next, we consider non single-peaked domains and provide a characterization of all such domains on which the uniform rule satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness, and ETE. We also show that under some mild richness conditions the uniform rule is the unique rule satisfying the mentioned properties on these domains. Finally, we provide a class of division rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and ETE on the remaining non single-peaked domains. We conclude the paper by providing a wide range of applications to justify the usefulness of our results.

We consider the problem of dividing one unit of an infinitely divisible object amongst some agents. First, we provide all single-peaked domains where a division rule satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness, and equal treatment of equals if and only if it is the uniform rule. Our characterisation depends on the number of agents. We also provide a class of division rules satisfying these properties on the domains on which the said characterization does not hold. Second, we consider domains that are not necessarily single-peaked and provide a characterization of maximal non-single-peaked domains on which a division rule satisfies efficiency, strategy-proofness, and equal treatment of equals if and only if it is the uniform rule. Third, we consider the case where the shares of the agents are bounded and provide a characterisation of the division rules on single-peaked domains satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and equal treatment of equals. Finally, we drop the requirement of e...

This paper examines consumers’ awareness, knowledge, and perception of credibility of various types of environmental friendly products currently used by businesses, based on a survey of consumers in the U.S. Midwest region. Using a contingent valuation model, the willingness to pay for environmental friendly products is determined. The differences in consumers’ awareness, knowledge, and perception of credibility of various environmental friendly products across consumers with different demographic characteristics (i.e., income, education, occupation, ethnicity, etc.) and psychographic characteristics (i.e., environmental concerns, etc.) are examined.

We consider a quantity-setting duopoly model, and we study the decision to move first or second, by assuming that the firms produce homogeneous goods and that there is some demand uncertainty. The competitive phase consists of two periods, and in either period, the firms can make a production decision that is irreversible. As far as the firms are allowed to choose (non-cooperatively) the period they make the decision, we study the circumstances that favour sequential rather than simultaneous decisions.

We study the effects of product differentiation in a Stackelberg model with demand uncertainty for the first mover. We do an ex-ante and ex-post analysis of the profits of the leader and of the follower firms in terms of product differentiation and of the demand uncertainty. We show that even with small uncertainty about the demand, the follower firm can achieve greater profits than the leader, if their products are sufficiently differentiated. We also compute the probability of the second firm having higher profit than the leading firm, subsequently showing the advantages and disadvantages of being either the leader or the follower firm.

It is shown that the median voter theorem for committee-decisions holds over a full unimodal preference domain whenever (i) the underlying median interval space satis…es interval antiexchange and (ii) unimodality is de…ned with respect to the incidence-geometry of the relevant outcome space or network. Thus, in particular, the interval spaces canonically induced by trees do support the median voter theorem on their own full unimodal preference domains. Conversely, validity of the median voter theorem on the full unimodal preference domain of a certain median interval space on a discrete outcome space requires that the graph canonically induced by that interval space be precisely a tree. JEL Classi…cation : D71

A voting protocol is said to be strongly participatory if for any player i and any strategy profile either the outcome is i's preferred one or i has a strategy which would ensure her a better outcome, and VNMstrategy proof if at any preference profile the set of sincere strategies of each player is a VNM-stable set. It is shown that the proportional lottery (PL) modular voting protocol is both strongly participatory and VNMstrategy proof.

A voting protocol is said to be strongly participatory if for any player i and any strategy profile either the outcome is i's preferred one or i has a strategy which would ensure her a better outcome, and VNMstrategy proof if at any preference profile the set of sincere strategies of each player is a VNM-stable set. It is shown that the proportional lottery (PL) modular voting protocol is both strongly participatory and VNMstrategy proof.

In this paper a government form is modeled as an effectivity function scheme (EFS) i.e. a parameterized family of effectivity functions having admissible (strong) weight-profiles as the relevant parameters. Working in a 2-jurisdiction outcome space we show that the existence of umpires is consistent with strong core-stability of a neo-parliamentary or mixed semi-presidential government form provided that the majority formation rule is collegial.

It is shown that concept lattices can be attached in a natural way to any voting protocol. The concept lattices of some voting protocols that are solvable with respect to some prominnent solution concepts and outcome-efficient are studied: it is proved that they typically amount to chains.

I introduce and study new derivative securities which I call game options (or Israeli options to put them in line with American, European, Asian, Russian etc. ones). These are contracts which enable both their buyer and seller to stop them at any time and then the buyer can exercise the right to buy (call option) or to sell (put option) a specified security for certain agreed price. If the contract is terminated by the seller he must pay certain penalty to the buyer. A more general case of game contingent claims is considered. The analysis is based on the theory of optimal stopping games (Dynkin's games). Game options can be sold cheaper than usual American options and their introduction could diversify financial markets.

A number of video games involve moral narratives or require the players to make moral decisions. Research from psychologists has helped to understand the effects that video game content can have on how individuals think, feel and behave. Recent research has examined the role of morality in video games, yet there are many inconsistencies in the findings that could be due to the use of commercial video games for research purposes, which contain biases such as familiarity with the game and favorite characters. By developing a bespoke game designed specifically for the purpose of exploring morality, these potential biases can be reduced. Before designing the game, morality in existing video games is critically analyzed, using theories from moral psychology. From this, a game was developed to measure behavioral outcomes through which moral decisions are made; with the aim to address biases that are inherent in commercial games. Then, the resultant game was used to investigate how participants make moral choices in video games. Much-publicized concerns have been raised in the past about the moral content of video games, such as the Grand Theft Auto series (GTA; Rockstar, 1997Rockstar, -2015)), which includes content and activities such as nudity, prostitution, guns, drug dealing and driving recklessly. Kocurek (2012) draws a parallel between GTA and Death Race (Exidy, 1976), an earlier game that raised considerable controversy, as they are both based on similar acts of violence and moral violations (such as running over pedestrians and damaging other vehicles). Furthermore, Kocurek (2012) explains that the reason Death Race received this controversy is due to the type of violent content it contained. Violent content which is related to war is more socially and culturally acceptable as it is a part of history, whereas violence towards innocent people, such as running over pedestrians, would be outside the social and cultural norms . It is important to note that Bowman (2016a) reports on how even early media and technology, including telephones and comic books, have caused controversy. However, one of the reasons for the specific controversy around video games is that, unlike other forms of media such as films, video games are more interactive and include a behavioral component. Bowman (2016a) highlights that it is the interactivity and the simulations of these behavioral acts that render video games controversial, particularly due to the violent content such as, notably, acts of murder. As video games have advanced as a medium, so have the graphical depictions and possibilities within them, creating this way additional concern over the content and the behaviors carried out in these virtual worlds. Games move beyond other media by not simply showcasing moral violations, but also providing players with the opportunities to both encounter morality and respond to it. Jesse Schell, a pivotal game designer, described how video game design needs to evolve to allow for the prospect of the medium to produce the equivalent of Shakespearean work, a notable example of literature . GTA has been suggested to be focusing more on moral themes within the gameplay . In this spirit, and in reflection of the increased maturity of moral themes in video games for the following part of this chapter we look to discuss the research, specifically related to the measuring of moral considerations of the players through designing and creating a bespoke video game. Thomas ( ) notes that, compared with other media, there is a different level of involvement, agency and interactivity in videogames. Agency is the feeling produced from the player's perception of the level of control or choice they have in a video game . For example, this highlights the difference between watching someone killed onscreen (i.e. a character being killed) and the individual taking action by pressing a button to kill the character. Thus, many video games provide the player the opportunity to make decisions and have in-game behavioral outcomes. These behavioral outcomes are a fundamental part of the video game experience. Agency is therefore not only unique to the medium of video games, but also directly related to the understanding of in-game behaviors. Other researchers have suggested that interactivity, as per above, but also presence too, are fundamental parts of video games and are aspects of what makes video games different from other forms of media . Interactivity has been defined as the degree to which the users (i.e. the players) can change and control the 'form' and 'content' within the environment (i.e. the game; Steuer, 1992). Other definitions have distinguished between the interaction produced by the player (i.e. interactivity as process) and the system/game (i.e. interactivity as product; . highlight the many definitions of interactivity, but similarly suggest it is the relationship between the game and player, as well as the choices the players make within the

For evaluating breast cancer screening programs it is important to know something about tumour growth rates and the sensitivity of the screening, and also their risk factors. Relevant variables, such as tumour size, are typically only observable at time of diagnosis. How can one estimate tumour growth when the size of each tumour is only measured once? There exists information in dierences between tumours found at screening and tumours found clinically. Stochastic models of cancer development and detection can therefore be constructed, which yield the distribution of observable variables at diagnosis. In many studies multi-state Markov models have been used in which the tumour passes through dierent states. The approach used here is to model tumour growth with a continuous function. Likelihood theory is used to nd estimates for the risk factor parameters.

The work on this thesis started in January 2009, but the real step forward occurred in March, during the course in Rational Choice, at the Department of Political Science at the University of Oslo. Professor Jon Hovi, the thesis supervisor, was one of the lecturers, and I use this opportunity to thank him for a superb introduction to game theory. Also, I wish to express my deepest appreciation for his advice on this thesis, which greatly improved the quality of my arguments. I have indeed felt privileged to have Jon Hovi as a supervisor. I also wish to thank the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI) and its Department of Security and Conflict Management for providing me with a scholarship and a workplace from August 2009. I thank NUPI experts for assistance, particularly Helge Lurås, Stina Torjesen and Trine Holo, as well as all participants at the internal seminar for useful comments. In this regard, Ståle Ulriksen deserves special thanks. For helping me arrange the interviews I thank Laila Bokhari and Vegard Hansen (NUPI), and Chris Prebensen (the Norwegian Atlantic Committee). I also owe a debt of gratitude to all the interviewees. In addition, I especially wish to thank: Kristian Helland-Hansen for thorough comments on the initial project; Karin Dokken for moral support; Mark Lucarrelli for advice on history, and Solvei Skogstad for reading and commenting parts of the manuscript. Thanks also to Hazel Henriksen for librarian assistance and Vojkan Milovanovic for his help with the layout. Last, but not least, I want to thank my family: Mama, Tata, Marija, and particularly Torbjørn for their love and support. Thank you Torbjørn for inspiring my interest in Afghanistan, for the good discussions, and encouragement throughout my studies. Responsibility for any errors is entirely my own. Word count: 26566 (all included).

A way to simulate the basic interactions between two individuals with different opinions, in the context of strategic game theory, is proposed. Various games are considered, which produce different kinds of opinion formation dynamics. First, by assuming that all individuals (players) are equals, we obtain the bounded confidence model of continuous opinion dynamics proposed by Deffuant et al. In such a model a tolerance threshold is defined, such that individuals with difference in opinion larger than the threshold can not interact. Then, we consider that the individuals have different inclinations to change opinion and different abilities in convincing the others. In this way, we obtain the socalled "Stubborn individuals and Orators" (SO) model, a generalization of the Deffuant et al. model, in which the threshold tolerance is different for every couple of individuals. We explore, by numerical simulations, the dynamics of the SO model, and we propose further generalizations that can be implemented.

A way to simulate the basic interactions between two individuals with different opinions, in the context of strategic game theory, is proposed. Various games are considered, which produce different kinds of opinion formation dynamics. First, by assuming that all individuals (players) are equals, we obtain the bounded confidence model of continuous opinion dynamics proposed by Deffuant et al. In such a model a tolerance threshold is defined, such that individuals with difference in opinion larger than the threshold can not interact. Then, we consider that the individuals have different inclinations to change opinion and different abilities in convincing the others. In this way, we obtain the so-called "Stubborn individuals and Orators" (SO) model, a generalization of the Deffuant et al. model, in which the threshold tolerance is different for every couple of individuals. We explore, by numerical simulations, the dynamics of the SO model, and we propose further generalizatio...

Numerous studies have demonstrated that parasites with complex life-cycles can cause phenotypic modifications in their hosts that lead to an increased rate of transmission, and suggest that these modifications are the result of parasitic adaptations to manipulate the host. Little attention is paid, however, to separating the possibility of adaptive host manipulation from incidental (if fortuitous) side-effects of infection. In this study we combine statistical and analytical tools to interpret the impact of the macroparasite Ligula intestinalis L. (Cestoda, Pseudophyllidea) on the behaviour of its intermediate fish host (the roach, Rutilus rutilus L.), using field data on a natural system. Two distinct sets of generalized linear models agree that both the presence and the intensity of infection contribute to a modified behavioural response in the host. This was illustrated by a preference for the lake-edge in infected fish during autumn. Furthermore, the effect of parasites upon the...

Many multi-agent systems seek to reconcile two apparently inconsistent constraints. The system's overall objective is defined at a global level. However, the agents have only local information available to them in selecting their actions. Such systems are presently more art than science. They often exhibit regularities (such as exponential convergence) that we do not understand, and we do not know how to improve their functioning in a disciplined manner. In this paper, we develop a simple statistical model for such systems that can enhance both our intuitions about their functioning and our ability to engineer them, and apply it to three systems that have been constructed.

Abstract: Strategy Logic (SL, for short) has been recently introduced by Mogavero, Murano, and Vardi as a useful formalism for reasoning explicitly about strategies, as first-order objects, in multi-agent concurrent games. This logic turns to be very powerful, subsuming all major previously studied modal logics for strategic reasoning, including ATL, ATL*, and the like. Unfortunately, due to its expressiveness, SL has a non-elementarily decidable model-checking problem and a highly undecidable satisfiability problem, specifically, $\ Sigma_ { ...

This article contributes to the game-theoretic analysis of tourism supply chains. We start with a baseline model including three types of agents: (a) one theme park, (b) multiple accommodation providers, and (c) multiple tour operators. We investigate the strategic dynamics (i.e., collaboration and competition) embedded in a market with two different tourism supply chains, and then we extend our model to an infinitehorizon repeated game arguing that agents would face the same decision problem in each week of every holiday season in each year. We show how agents in a tourism supply chain end up with higher profits in any given period of a repeated game compared with their profits in the static version of the game.

Strategic partnership between incumbents (corporation) and start-ups are receiving increased attention from several prospects. Incumbents possess resources that start-ups aspire for, while start-ups have agility and novel ideas that incumbent’s value. Collaboration between two brings immense opportunities for each other when it is harnessed properly. Start-ups benefit incumbents with innovation of emerging technologies whereas partnership with corporations offer start-ups a good opportunity with exploring options for developing their business. Startups are considered as full of risk appetite for the prospect of changing industry by creating something new but oftentimes have roadblocks due to lack of resources. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to investigate how strategic partnership with incumbent enhances value for startups. This paper demonstrates extensive explanation from previous research and theories to base the foundation of research objective. For theoretical framework, r...

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This note is concerned with a modeling question arising from the mean field games theory. We show how to model mean field games involving a major player which has a strategic advantage, while only allowing closed loop markovian strategies for all the players. We illustrate this property through three examples. Résumé. Cette note porte sur une problématique de modélisation issue de la théorie des jeux à champ moyen. On montre comment il est possible de modéliser des jeux à champ moyen avec un agent majoritaire qui a un avantage stratégique, tout en restant dans un cas où on ne considère que des stratégies markoviennes en boucles fermées pour tous les joueurs. Nous illustrons ce fait autour de trois exemples.

We introduce a new type of agent whom we refer to as a "problem solver" (PS). The PS interacts with conventional players and wishes to respond optimally to their moves. The PS has only partial information about the moves of the other players. Unlike a regular player, the PS does not "put himself in the shoes" of other players and does not form beliefs about their moves. Rather, he treats the data as a logic puzzle: he calculates the set of possible configurations of moves that are consistent with the data he observes and responds to it. We insert such a problem solver into a simple model of competition for attention and analyze its equilibria. We demonstrate a novel feature of equilibrium in the model, whereby even though the PS always succeeds in his task, he may be uncertain that he will do so.

How to Read Military Drill Like a Drill Master presents a comprehensive curriculum designed to teach cadets, instructors, and military educators how to analyze and interpret U.S. military drill manuals with the precision of a seasoned drill master. Rooted in inter-service doctrine, this course integrates best practices from the Army, Marine Corps, Navy, Air Force, and Coast Guard to create a unified instructional framework. The curriculum emphasizes manual literacy, instructional technique, ceremonial context, and voice command execution through in-person, online, and hybrid formats. Drawing from official sources such as TC 3-21.5, MCO 5060.20, and DAFPAM 34-1203, students learn to read, understand, and teach drill movements and ceremonies across joint-service environments. This paper outlines the pedagogical philosophy, modular lesson plans, assessment strategies, and institutional pathways for adoption. Intended as both a doctrinal guide and teaching resource, this work expands the role of the drill master beyond rote repetition—transforming them into interpreters of regulation, facilitators of tradition, and leaders of precision. With its emphasis on academic rigor and practical application, the course serves as a modern standard for drill education in cadet programs, service academies, and military leadership institutions.

Transmedia storytelling embodies how we interact with and engage in a continuously expanding story across media. In this dissertation, I argue that transmedia storytelling can be better understood through the concept of player agency within game studies, specifically how players choose to navigate these narratives across storyworlds and characters in BioWare’s Mass Effect series. I examine how players must piece together and engage Mass Effect’s storyworld and its characters across media like a puzzle game. This transmedial puzzle can be effectively understood by applying concepts of ludology, including player agency, choice, and interactive engagement, to Mass Effect’s game-centric transmedia story. Video games can offer the most precise parallel to transmedia stories as player-focused experiences that rely on agency to work within and across media. I explore Mass Effect’s transmedia story through a transmedial application of concepts from game studies (ludology). Transmedial ludology, or the practice of understanding and examining transmedia stories as games, offers a critical perspective on how players engage storyworlds and characters that center on player agency. Mass Effect offers choices on how players decide to experience the potential arcs of the series, creating their unique experiences on various paths through and between media.

We present a new logic of explicit and implicit distributed belief with a formal semantics exploiting the notion of belief base. A coalition's distributed belief of explicit type corresponds to a piece of information contained in the collective belief base of the coalition, which is obtained by pooling together the individual belief bases of its members. A coalition's distributed belief of implicit type corresponds to a piece of information that is derivable from the collective belief base of the coalition. We study axiomatic aspects of our logic as well as complexity of model checking. As distributed belief can be inconsistent (contrary to distributed knowledge), we also study a consistency-preserving variant of distributed belief inspired by the literature on belief merging.

An allocation is in the partnered core if it admits no asymmetric dependencies between players and groups of players. The partnered core of a game was introduced in R.eny, and . In this paper, in the context of a model with arbítrary consumption sets, we introduce the partnered core of an economy and establish that no unbounded arbitragea condition limiting gains from trade within groups and diversity of preferences -is sufficient for the nonemptiness of the partnered core. Under a condition of "extreme desirability" (including strict conve,xity as a special case), no unbounded arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for nonemptiness of the partnered oore. We also establish that with strict conve~city of preferences, the Bennett and Zame (1988) result that a competitive payoff is partnered extends to situations with arbitrary consumption sets. ~ïom and the above results it follows that with strict convexity, no unbounded arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for existence of a partnered competitive equílibrium and nonemptiness of the partnered core. 'Thir. la~pcr in a revi~nl vcn:p~u uf AnU~auuu~lR~ivcrsity, Ikluvtment of Gcunumics and Ernnomic llistory W.P. 279.94. Although it is based on results in an enrlier versiun of that paper, this version subsumes Page and Wooders ( 1993). The authors are grateful to Erik Balder and Elaine Bennett fot óelpful comments and to the University of Tilburg for hospitslity and suplwrt during part of the period in which this paper was written. Wooders also gratefully acknowledges the aupport of the S.S.H.R.C. and the hoepitality and support of the Autónoma University and the University of Alabama.

Utility theories for the de¯nitions of cooperative games and associated solution concepts are discussed. A game with side payments needs the assumptions of transferable utility and side payments. We discuss the axioms for the transferable utility assumption and also the role of side payments for various solution concepts. We also discuss games without side payments, which do not require the assumptions of transferable utility and side payments. We see how some solution concepts depend upon these assumptions.

We develop a strategic model of network interdiction in a non-cooperative game of flow. An adversary, endowed with a bounded quantity of bads, chooses a flow specifying a plan for carrying bads through a network from a base to a target. Simultaneously, an agency chooses a blockage specifying a plan for blocking the transport of bads through arcs in the network. The bads carried to the target cause a target loss while the blocked arcs cause a network loss. The adversary earns and the agency loses from both target loss and network loss. The adversary incurs the expense of carrying bads. In this model we study Nash equilibria and find a power law relation between the probability and the extent of the target loss. Our model contributes to the literature of game theory by introducing non-cooperative behavior into a Kalai-Zemel (cooperative) game of flow. Our research also advances models and results on network interdiction.

This paper studies a decentralized job market model where firms (academic departments) propose sequentially a (unique) position to some workers (Ph.D. candidates). Successful candidates then decide whether to accept the offers, and departments whose positions remain unfilled propose to other candidates. We distinguish between several cases, depending on whether agents' actions are simultaneous and/or irreversible (if a worker accepts an offer he is immediately matched, and both the worker and the firm to which she is matched go out of the market). For all these cases, we provide a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium outcomes and the Subgame Perfect equilibria. While the set of Nash equilibria outcomes contain all individually rational matchings, it turns out that in most cases considered all subgame perfect equilibria yield a unique outcome, the worker-optimal matching.

This paper studies a decentralized job market model where firms (academic departments) propose sequentially a (unique) position to some workers (Ph.D. candidates). Successful candidates then decide whether to accept the offers, and departments whose positions remain unfilled propose to other candidates. We distinguish between several cases, depending on whether agents' actions are simultaneous and/or irreversible (if a worker accepts an offer he is immediately matched, and both the worker and the firm to which she is matched go out of the market). For all these cases, we provide a complete characterization of the Nash equilibrium outcomes and the Subgame Perfect equilibria. While the set of Nash equilibria outcomes contain all individually rational matchings, it turns out that in most cases considered all subgame perfect equilibria yield a unique outcome, the worker-optimal matching.

In this paper, we analyze some values and power indices from a different point of view that are well-defined in the social context where the goods are public. In particular, we consider the Public Good index , the Public Good value , the Public Help index , the König and Bräuninger index (1998) also called the Zipke index , and the Rae index (1969). The aims of this paper are: to propose an extension of the Public Help index to cooperative games; to introduce a new power index with its extension to a game value; and to provide some characterizations of the new index and values.

An allocation is in the partnered core if it admits no asymmetric dependencies between players and groups of players. The partnered core of a game was introduced in R.eny, and . In this paper, in the context of a model with arbítrary consumption sets, we introduce the partnered core of an economy and establish that no unbounded arbitragea condition limiting gains from trade within groups and diversity of preferences -is sufficient for the nonemptiness of the partnered core. Under a condition of "extreme desirability" (including strict conve,xity as a special case), no unbounded arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for nonemptiness of the partnered oore. We also establish that with strict conve~city of preferences, the Bennett and Zame (1988) result that a competitive payoff is partnered extends to situations with arbitrary consumption sets. ~ïom and the above results it follows that with strict convexity, no unbounded arbitrage is necessary and sufficient for existence of a partnered competitive equílibrium and nonemptiness of the partnered core. 'Thir. la~pcr in a revi~nl vcn:p~u uf AnU~auuu~lR~ivcrsity, Ikluvtment of Gcunumics and Ernnomic llistory W.P. 279.94. Although it is based on results in an enrlier versiun of that paper, this version subsumes Page and Wooders ( 1993). The authors are grateful to Erik Balder and Elaine Bennett fot óelpful comments and to the University of Tilburg for hospitslity and suplwrt during part of the period in which this paper was written. Wooders also gratefully acknowledges the aupport of the S.S.H.R.C. and the hoepitality and support of the Autónoma University and the University of Alabama.