Macroeconomics

Web site: http://www.pitt.edu/˜jfeigen. The results here can be simply generalized to the entire hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) family of preferences. However, analytic results already exist for the most interesting representatives of the HARA class not covered here, i.e. constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) (Caballero (1990)) and quadratic utility, although the preference shocks have to be turned off (m t = 0) in the case of CARA utility.

Precautionary saving in response to uninsurable income risk can explain the stylized fact that aggregate saving increases with the crosssectional variation in income, but it is questionable how much of this variation can be ascribed to uninsurable risk and how much is, in fact, predictable. Borrowing constraints offer an alternative explanation for this observation that does not require consumers to be uncertain about their future income. This paper employs a three-cohort, overlapping generations model with quadratic utility and no capital to show that, if agents are patient enough, heterogeneity alone can account for more than half the decrease in the equilibrium interest rate caused by a borrowing constraint. The possibility of facing a binding borrowing constraint in the future induces saving, and this saving increases with the cross-sectional variation in income. However, another channel through which the interest rate decreases is the direct effect that currently constrained agents borrow less. For low discount factors, this direct effect dominates. If agents are patient enough, the two channels have roughly the same impact on the interest rate.

Contrary to the usual presumption that welfare is maximized if consumers behave rationally, we show in a two-period overlapping generations model that there always exists a consumption rule that can weakly improve upon the lifecycle/permanent-income rule in general equilibrium.

Many growth models assume that aggregate output is generated by a Cobb-Douglas production function. In this article we question the empirical relevance of this specification. We use a panel of 82 countries over a 28-year period to estimate a general constant-elasticity-of-substitution (CES) production function specification. We find that for the entire sample of countries we can reject the Cobb-Douglas specification. When we divide our sample of countries up into several subsamples, we find that physical capital and human capital adjusted labor are more substitutable in the richest group of countries and are less substitutable in the poorest group of countries than would be implied by a Cobb-Douglas specification.

We examine the role of central bank transparency when the private sector is modeled as adaptive learners. In our model, transparent policies enable the private sector to adopt correctly specified models of inflation and output while intransparent policies do not. In the former case, the private sector learns the rational expectations equilibrium while in the latter case it learns a restricted perceptions equilibrium. These possibilities arise regardless of whether the central bank operates under commitment or discretion. We provide conditions under which the policy loss from transparency is lower (higher) than under intransparency, allowing us to assess the value of transparency when agents are learning. JEL classification: D83; E52; E58.

This chapter surveys laboratory experiments addressing macroeconomic phenomena. The first part focuses on experimental tests of the microfoundations of macroeconomic models discussing laboratory studies of intertemporal consumption/savings decisions, time (in)consistency of preferences and rational expectations. Part two explores coordination problems of interest to macroeconomists and mechanisms for resolving these problems. Part three looks at experiments in specific macroeconomic sectors including monetary economics, labor economics, international economics as well-as large scale, multi-sector models that combine several sectors simultaneously.

We include learning in a standard equilibrium business cycle model with explicit growth. We use the model to study how the economy's agents could learn in real time about the important trend-changing events of the postwar era in the U.S., such as the productivity slowdown, increased labor force participation by women, and the "new economy" of the 1990s. We find that a large fraction of the observed variance of output relative to trend can be attributed to structural change in our model. However, we also find that the addition of learning and occasional structural breaks to the standard and widely-used growth model results in a balanced growth puzzle, as our approach cannot completely account for observed trends in U.S. aggregate consumption and investment. Finally, we argue that a model-consistent detrending approach, such as the one we suggest here, is necessary if the goal is to obtain an accurate assessment of an equilibrium business cycle model.

We construct a framework for measuring economic activity at high frequency, potentially in real time. We use a variety of stock and flow data observed at mixed frequencies (including very high frequencies), and we use a dynamic factor model that permits exact filtering. We illustrate the framework in a prototype empirical example and a simulation study calibrated to the example. frequencies, including quarterly (e.g., GDP), monthly (e.g., industrial production), weekly (e.g., employment), and continuously (e.g., asset prices), and we want to be able to incorporate all of them, to provide continuously-updated measurements.

We build a directed search model of the labor market in which workers' transitions between unemployment, employment, and across employers are endogenous. We prove the existence, uniqueness and efficiency of a recursive equilibrium with the property that the distribution of workers across employment states does not affect the agents' values and strategies. Because of this property, we are able to compute the equilibrium outside the non-stochastic steady-state. We use a calibrated version of the model to measure the effect of productivity shocks on the US labor market. We find that productivity shocks generate procyclical fluctuations in the rate at which unemployed workers become employed and countercyclical fluctuations in the rate at which employed workers become unemployed. Moreover, we find that productivity shocks generate large countercyclical fluctuations in the number of vacancies opened for unemployed workers and even larger procyclical fluctuations in the number of vacancies created for employed workers. Overall, productivity shocks alone can account for 80 percent of unemployment volatility, 30 percent of vacancy volatility and for the nearly perfect negative correlation between unemployment and vacancies. JEL Codes: E24, E32, J64.

Notwithstanding its impressive contributions to empirical financial economics, there remains a significant gap in the volatility literature, namely its relative neglect of the connection between macroeconomic fundamentals and asset return volatility. We progress by analyzing a broad international cross section of stock markets covering approximately forty countries. We find a clear link between macroeconomic fundamentals and stock market volatilities, with volatile fundamentals translating into volatile stock markets.

We study economies with multiple assets that are valued both for their return and liquidity. Exchange occurs in decentralized markets with frictions making a medium of exchange essential. Some assets are better suited for this role because they are more liquid -more likely to be accepted in trade -even if they have a lower return. The reason assets are more or less likely to be accepted is modeled using informational frictions, or recognizability. While everyone understands e.g. what currency is and what it is worth, some might be less sure about other claims. In our model, agents who do not recognize assets do not accept them in trade. Recognizability is endogenized by letting agents invest in information, potentially generating multiple equilibria with different liquidity. We discuss implications for asset pricing and for monetary policy. In particular, we show explicitly that what may look like a cash-in-advance constraint is not invariant to policy interventions or other changes in the economic environment.

We study economies with multiple assets that are valued both for their return and liquidity. Exchange occurs in decentralized markets with frictions making a medium of exchange essential. Some assets are better suited for this role because they are more liquid -more likely to be accepted in trade -even if they have a lower return. The reason assets are more or less likely to be accepted is modeled using informational frictions, or recognizability. While everyone understands e.g. what currency is and what it is worth, some might be less sure about other claims. In our model, agents who do not recognize assets do not accept them in trade. Recognizability is endogenized by letting agents invest in information, potentially generating multiple equilibria with different liquidity. We discuss implications for asset pricing and for monetary policy. In particular, we show explicitly that what may look like a cash-in-advance constraint is not invariant to policy interventions or other changes in the economic environment.

time diaries and expenditure data for the United States for 1985 and 2003, I examine how income and time prices affect time and goods inputs into eating. Both inputs increase with income, and higher time prices reduce time inputs. Between 1985 and 2003 the goods intensity of eating increased, especially lower in the income distribution, and average time inputs dropped, particularly time spent shopping, preparing, and cleaning up after meals. The results are consistent with relatively difficult goods-time substitution in eating that becomes more difficult as household production expands.

Immediately after 1997 the Asian economies were viewed to be catastrophes of financial excess, corporate and political misgovernance, and diminishing returns to over-investment. But they are now freshly restored as the world's economic powerhouses, just as before the 1997 financial crises they were the growth miracles and poster children of a then-emerging consensus on managed economic development. From the perspective of global growth and income distribution, the economic successes of East and Southeast Asia are striking: Poverty alleviation in China alone has recently accounted for 100% of that for all of humanity. Even if still relatively small in size, the current contribution to world economic growth from East and Southeast Asia already matches that of economies many times larger. When the rest of the world economy has temporarily slowed, East and Southeast Asia have provided a stabilizing force in world business cycles. How have underlying fundamentals for economic growth changed since 1997? Is the current growth path sustainable; and if so, what has brought that about? What role has China's played in driving economic growth throughout East and Southeast Asia? Have patterns of trade changed towards greater global balance? This paper finds that in the main productivity growth has improved since 1997. Increasing inequality is no obstacle to poverty reduction provided economic growth is sufficiently rapid. Finally, international trade patterns have shifted towards greater exchange within just the region itself.

Theoretical predictions of the effect of TFP growth on employment are ambiguous, and depend on the extent to which new technology is embodied in new jobs. We estimate a model for employment, wages and investment with an annual panel for the United States, Japan and Europe and find that TFP growth increases employment. For the United States TFP growth explains the trend change in unemployment. We evaluate the model and find that creative destruction plays no part in aggregate unemployment dynamics. The model can explain up to half of the estimated impact of growth on unemployment.

We study the response of domestic unemployment rates to shocks in total factor productivity for economies with high capital mobility and low labour mobility. We show that rapid capital movements across national borders, like those experienced by developed nations in the last twenty years, substantially amplify the impact on the domestic unemployment rate of domestic fluctuations in total factor productivity relative to what would have happened in a closed economy, shorten the duration of the responses and raise the variability of employment. Capital flows increase the riskiness of labour income and reduce the riskiness of capital income.

This paper uses the Panel Study of Income Dynamics to provide some of the first direct evidence that wealth is systematically higher for consumers with predictably greater income uncertainty. However, the apparent pattern of precautionary wealth is not consistent with a standard parameterization of the life cycle model in which consumers are patient enough to begin saving for retirement early in life: wealth is estimated to be far less sensitive to uncertainty than implied by that model. Instead, our results suggest that over most of their working lifetime, consumers behave in accordance with the "buffer-stock" models of saving described in or , in which consumers hold wealth principally to insulate consumption against near-term fluctuations in income.

We consider the open economy consequences of U.S. monetary policy, extending the identification approach of Romer and Romer [2004] and adapting it for use with asset prices. Intended policy changes are orthogonalized against the economy's expected future path, which captures any effects from open economy variables. Estimated from a set of bilateral VARs, the dynamic responses of the exchange rate, foreign interest rate, and foreign output are consistent with recent work that identifies U.S. policy via futures market changes and a priori impulse response bounds. We compare the two approaches, finding important commonalities. We also outline some advantages of our approach. JEL Classification: E52, F31, F41 Keywords: open economy monetary policy identification, exchange rate adjustment, interest rate pass-through † This paper supersedes Nuffield College Working Papers 2005-w18 and 2006-w04. The authors acknowledge financial support from British Academy post-doctoral fellowships. We would like to thank

Many emerging market countries have suffered financial crises. One view blames soft pegs for these crises. Adherents to that view suggest that countries move to corner solutions--hard pegs or floating exchange rates. We analyze the behavior of exchange rates, reserves, and interest rates to assess whether there is evidence that country practice is moving toward corner solutions. We focus on whether countries that claim they are floating are indeed doing so. We find that countries that say they allow their exchange rate to float mostly do not--there seems to be an epidemic case of "fear of floating." -*The authors wish to thank

Two assertions about exchange rate regimes circulate with some frequency in policy circles. The first, the hypothesis of the excluded middle, holds that authorities must either choose perfectly floating exchange rates (preferably anchored by an inflation target for the central bank) or a hard (preferably irrevocable) peg. The second, seemingly unrelated, argues that the inability of emerging market economies to exercise monetary independence owes to the severe mistrust that they are perceived with by global investors because of the economic failures of prior governments. This paper argues that the theories of the excluded middle and original sin are twin and related fallacies that are contrary to theory and evidence. This paper will provide a model in which the government can choose policies consistent with either a pure float anchored by a constant money stock or a pure peg but, under certain circumstances, fail to find exchange rate stability at either corner. The problem is that the potential for regime change implies that the current government's successors may behave less admirably, which will weigh on investors' current behavior. The difficulties imparted by this expectation channel in an otherwise standard model of optimizing agents endowed with rational expectations shows both why looking back to explain credibility problems is looking the wrong way and why the excluded middle is, in fact, so crowded.

We develop a novel system of re-classifying historical exchange rate regimes. One difference between our study and previous classification efforts is that we employ an extensive data base on market-determined parallel exchange rates. Our "natural" classification algorithm leads to a stark reassessment of the post-war history of exchange rate arrangements. When the official categorization is a form of peg, roughly half the time our classification reveals the true underlying monetary regime to be something radically different, often a variant of a float. Conversely, when official classification is floating, our scheme routinely suggests that the reality was a form of de facto peg. Our new classification scheme points to a complete rethinking of economic performance under alternative exchange rate regimes. Indeed, the breakup of Bretton Woods had a far less dramatic impact on most exchange rate regimes than is popularly believed. Also, contrary to an influential empirical literature, our evidence suggests that exchange rate arraignments may be quite important for growth, trade and inflation. Our newly compiled monthly data set on market-determined exchange rates goes back to 1946 for 153 countries.

Bank interest spreads, defined as the difference between lending and deposit rates, average about 30 percentage points in Brazil. This figure is ten times larger than the average in industrial countries and three times larger than the Latin American average. This paper analyzes the causes and macroeconomic consequences of these extraordinarily high spreads. Regarding the causes, I argue that the high spreads can largely be accounted for by a credit program that requires banks to allocate a significant portion of their loans to selected high-risk, high-cost borrowers at below-market interest rates. Banks offset their losses in the selected market by charging a disproportionately higher spread in the nonselected market. I construct a general equilibrium model tailored to evaluate the positive and normative consequences of this policy on the Brazilian economy. I find that the pure cross-subsidy between bank borrowers accounts for about a half of the spread levels. I also find that eliminating this policy distortion would raise GDP by 8 percent and almost double the bank credit in the long-run.

The degree of creditor protection and the cost of resolving bankruptcy are two central issues in the ongoing debate about bankruptcy law reforms in several countries. In order to analyze whether creditor protection and liquidation costs affect lending decisions and economic growth, I incorporate what I call bankruptcy technology in a standard overlappinggenerations model of capital accumulation. The bankruptcy technology is parsimoniously summarized by two parameters describing the cost of bankruptcy and the creditor protection. I find that a simultaneous reduction in bankruptcy costs and an improvement in creditor protection have a significant impact on growth. This impact is larger than the effect of only reducing bankruptcy costs, or of only increasing creditor protection. The paper's main normative lesson is that countries reforming their bankruptcy laws should not only relax the constraints to a rapid resolution of insolvency but also improve creditor rights.

Expresso a minha sincera gratidão a todos que, direta ou indiretamente, tornaram possível a realização deste trabalho. Em especial: À minha esposa Jô, que esteve sempre ao meu lado com paciência e compreensão infinitas, mesmo nos momentos em que fiquei totalmente absorvido por esta pesquisa. À minha irmã Judite e seu esposo José e às minhas irmãs Neusa e Neide, pelo apoio incondicional.

This paper tests between the standard "random matching function" approach and "stock-flow" matching while controlling for temporal aggregation bias. Consistent with previous empirical work, the random matching function fits the matching data reasonably well. But match flows are more highly correlated with vacancy inflows than is consistent with the random matching approach. Instead the data support stock-flow matching, where unemployed workers match directly with suitable new vacancies as such vacancies come on to the market.

The Hecksher-Ohlin Vanek model we have studied in the previous chapter allows for many goods and factors, but for much of that discussion we maintained the assumption of factor prices equalization. This theorem was proved in chapter 1 only for the case of two goods and two factors (and no factor intensity reversals). This raises the question: when there are many goods and factors, will factor price equalization continue to hold? More generally, what happens to the other theorems we discussed in chapter 1 -the Stolper-Samuelson and Rybczynski theorems? Is there some generalization of these to the many good and many factor case? These are the questions we address in this chapter.

This paper tests whether manufacturing exporters pay more to educated workers in an e¤ort to ascertain whether the productivity of human capital is raised by exports. Using a panel of matched employer-employee data from Morocco, we …nd no evidence that the education wage premium is higher in exporting sectors and …rms. Although exporters pay more on average, much of the wage di¤erential can be explained by the fact that exporters have a larger workforce and more capital. Educated workers who start working for an exporter do not experience a larger wage increase relative to their previous job. We …nd a mild positive association between exports, technology, and product quality, part of which is due di¤erences in …rm size. We discuss why our results di¤er from those obtained using di¤erent countries and methodologies.

This paper tests the efficiency of insurance markets in the Pakistan Punjab by examining how crop choices are affected by the presence of price and yield risk. We estimate reduced-form and structural models of crop choices. Although we cannot reject the hypothesis that village members efficiently share risk among themselves, production choices are shown to depend on risk. Existing risk sharing and selfinsurance mechanisms thus imperfectly protect Punjab farmers against village-level shocks. Results also indicate that households respond to consumption price risk, thereby suggesting that empirical and theoretical work on risk should avoid putting an exclusive emphasis on yield and output price risk.

This paper analyses the effects of risk on the holding of inventories and liquid assets by manufacturing firms. Using a panel data set for Zimbabwe which includes firmspecific measures of contractual risk, we show that contractual risk has a major effect on the holding of stocks of inputs and, to a lesser extent, the constitution of cash reserves. This is consistent with the role of inventories as a hedge against stockout risk. By contrast, we find that firms facing more inter-annual market risk hold less inventories. This suggests that African manufacturers prefer adapting to long-term market fluctuations as they materialize rather than building up inventories. This interpretation is consistent with the finding that high market risk firms also have a low capacity utilization rate.

Does capital-embodied technological change play an important role in shaping labor market inequalities? This paper addresses the question in a model with vintage capital and search-matching frictions where costly capital investment leads to heterogeneity in productivity among vacancies in equilibrium. The paper Þrst demonstrates analytically 1) how technology growth affects equilibrium wage inequality, income shares and unemployment, and 2) how its impact depends on the presence of labor market institutions (welfare beneÞts, Þring taxes). Next, it applies the model to a quantitative evaluation of vintage capital as an origin of wage inequality: through labor market frictions, a 10-year age differential in capital translates into a 4% wage gap among exante equal workers. Finally, the model allows a U.S.-continental Europe comparison: a common embodied technological acceleration interacted with different labor market institutions can explain a substantial part of the differential rise in unemployment and capital share and some of the differential dynamics in wage inequality.

Does capital-embodied technological change play an important role in shaping labor market inequalities? This paper addresses the question in a model with vintage capital and search-matching frictions where costly capital investment leads to heterogeneity in productivity among vacancies in equilibrium. The paper Þrst demonstrates analytically 1) how technology growth affects equilibrium wage inequality, income shares and unemployment, and 2) how its impact depends on the presence of labor market institutions (welfare beneÞts, Þring taxes). Next, it applies the model to a quantitative evaluation of vintage capital as an origin of wage inequality: through labor market frictions, a 10-year age differential in capital translates into a 4% wage gap among exante equal workers. Finally, the model allows a U.S.-continental Europe comparison: a common embodied technological acceleration interacted with different labor market institutions can explain a substantial part of the differential rise in unemployment and capital share and some of the differential dynamics in wage inequality.

This paper offers an original survey of the Malaysian crisis and the effects of the consequent imposition of capital controls by authorities in September 1998 and of their subsequent relaxation in February and September 1999. We identify Malaysia’s unique strengths and weaknesses before the crisis, appreciate the differential timing and nature of the Malaysian crisis vis-à-vis the other neighbouring crisis countries, and distinguish carefully between the restrictive and incentive components of the imposed controls. Against this backdrop, we analyse both the “level” (first-order) effects and the “volatility” (second-order) effects of controls on key macroeconomic, banking and financial market variables. On the level effects, we found the Malaysian recovery (starting late 1998) to be at least as quick, strong and lasting as that of the other crisis countries, and discovered important channels of influence from controls to interest rates (which were lowered) and stock markets (which recovered dramatically). These results on the effectiveness of controls are consistent with earlier studies by Edison & Reinhart (2001) and Kaplan & Rodrik (2001). However, due to the longer time period used here, a stronger restatement of their conclusions is now possible. We study the secondorder effects of controls by introducing a Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM)-based portfolio choice model and show how controls, especially when they work as an asymmetric tax on short-term investment, reduce both the volume of speculative flows and the associated interest rate volatility. To test these theoretical results, we set up a standard Generalized Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity (GARCH) model of interest rate and stock market volatility where capital control dummies are introduced in the variance equation. Our model is an improvement over earlier studies in two ways: a more sophisticated capital control dummy was used to take account of the relaxation of controls in February 1999; and we dealt with the problem of endogeneity in the mean equation by using regressors that are not Granger-caused by the regressand (Malaysian interest rate and stock returns). The model shows that controls did limit interest rate volatility in line with the theoretical prior, but worsened stock market volatility. The latter result lends credence to the view that controls shifted the burden of adjustment from quantity to prices.

Differing expectations about who should get what benefits from digging the wealth out of the ground are causing serious tensions in the Copperbelt region of Northern Zambia. Multinational copper-mining companies, the Zambian Government, workers and local communities all desperately want recently privatised copper mines to succeed, and for the region to return to its golden age as one of the most developed parts of Africa. Yet all have different beliefs about how to make it happen, and what rights and responsibilities should attach to private companies, the state and citizens.

After decades of decline, the price of copper has been rising at unprecedented levels since 2003.  The value of Zambia’s copper exports more than doubled between 2005 and 2006, reaching US$2.78 billion.  Government and the mining companies claim that all are benefiting from this boom on the Copperbelt. And yet in September 2006 Copperbelt voters roundly rejected current policies, electing to every urban seat in the region MPs representing the Patriotic Front (PF), a party that ran on a platform of deporting foreign investors that exploit the workforce, increasing corporate taxes and limiting foreign ownership of mines. This report aims to contribute to the discussion about the costs and benefits of privatisation and what might be done by Government, companies and donors to secure greater benefits for Zambia, and especially for those working in and living near the mines.