Moral Philosophy

Why do people tend to care for upholding principles of justice? This study examined the association between individual differences in the affective, motivational and cognitive components of empathy, sensitivity to justice, and psychopathy in participants (N 265) who were also asked to rate the permissibility of everyday moral situations that pit personal benefit against moral standards of justice. Counter to common sense, emotional empathy was not associated with sensitivity to injustice for others. Rather, individual differences in cognitive empathy and empathic concern predicted sensitivity to justice for others, as well as the endorsement of moral rules. Psychopathy coldheartedness scores were inversely associated with motivation for justice. Moreover, hierarchical multiple linear regression analysis revealed that self-focused and other-focused orientations toward justice had opposing influences on the permissibility of moral judgments. High scores on psychopathy were associated ...

L'etica normativa esplora i fondamenti e i criteri che determinano ciò che è moralmente giusto. Le principali tradizioni della filosofia morale offrono risposte differenti a questa domanda, con modalità ovviamente diverse. Così, l’etica deontologica (in particolare nella versione kantiana) si incentra su principi universali e doveri morali che stabiliscono ciò che è giusto indipendentemente dalle conseguenze delle azioni. Il consequenzialismo (spesso declinato nella sua variante più nota, ovvero l’utilitarismo, secondo cui scopo dell’azione morale è di massimizzare l’utile generale) valuta la moralità in base alle conseguenze delle azioni. Anche se facendo riferimento a criteri distinti, tanto l’etica deontologica quando il consequenzialismo rispondono alla domanda “Cosa devo fare?” ponendo l'accento su scelte e azioni. L'etica delle virtù (nelle sue varie versioni: aristotelica, tomistica, humeana e nietzscheana) si pone invece la domanda centrale “Come devo essere?” e si concentra sul carattere dell'agente e sulle qualità morali che definiscono una persona virtuosa piuttosto che sulle azioni o sui principi in base ai quali si agisce. Ognuna di queste prospettive teoriche ha ovviamente punti di forza e punti di debolezza, che il convegno esplorerà. Verranno prese in considerazione anche prospettive teoriche che contestano la possibilità stessa di sviluppare un’etica normativa, nonché i presupposti metaetici delle diverse concezioni e le loro applicazioni nei diversi ambiti dell’etica pratica.

In this article, I am critical of decolonial theory’s negligence of the issues of nature and the environment. I work to remedy this problem by providing a decolonial analysis of the operative colonial conception nature. I argue that one of the reasons that efforts to curb human-caused environmental devastation have been ineffective is that the two popular approaches to environmentalist activism — the global warming and sustainability approaches — do not necessarily pose a challenge to the way in which we currently conceptualize nature, nor do they entail a robust ethical view. Then, I propose one potential avenue for developing an alternative, decolonial approach to nature, drawing from environmental philosopher Ricardo Rozzi’s notion of the biocultural perspective, which emphasizes the dynamic relationship between human ways of life and the diversity of non-human life. I conclude by analyzing two concrete instantiations of the biocultural perspective in a Latin American context.

Da qualche decennio è ormai diventato ricorrente l'utilizzo del termine Antropocene per indicare l'inizio di un'era geologica determinata dalle trasformazioni sostanziali dell'ambiente terrestre provocato dall'attività umana.
A prescindere dall'adeguatezza di questo termine, che è messa in discussione da molti geologi e specialisti, c'è un elemento che è stato fatto notare e che vale la pena approfondire. Più che l'attività umana in sé, è stato l'avvento e il dominio della forma città - avvenuto a partire dalla rivoluzione industriale - che ha provocato una trasformazione effettiva, soprattutto a causa della sempre maggiore necessità di energia da parte della macchina-città, che è divenuta sempre più centro produttivo e abitativo. L'adagio è ormai arcinoto: l'utilizzo dell'energia operato a partire dalle città della rivoluzione industriale fino alle odierne megalopoli si è accresciuto in maniera così esponenziale da diventare nel corso del tempo sempre più insostenibile.
È anche per arginare questa crescita insostenibile che emergono ultimamente proposte di ottimizzazione tecnologica che usano la parola d'ordine della costruzione di città smart. Ma anch'esse finiscono per farci tornare dentro la contraddizione che cerchiamo di risolvere: sappiamo che invece di diminuirne il fabbisogno l'avvento dell'intelligenza artificiale procurerà piuttosto un aumento del consumo di energia.
L'altro futuro auspicato è quello della ibridizzazione della città, portando dentro ciò che prima era fuori, abbattendo le proprie mura e quelli che erano i confini di separazione con la cosiddetta "natura". 
Urbanocene, dunque. Una messa in forma della società in città che può lentamente portare alla distruzione e di cui però non riusciamo a fare a meno, perché senza la forma della città anche la società - per come negli ultimi secoli si è costituita in una parte di mondo e si è imposta nelle altre parti – tornerebbe senza determinazione e senza forma.
Il pensiero filosofico – che è legato dal suo inizio a filo doppio con la città – che funzione può svolgere in questo ripensamento necessario a partire dalla messa in crisi della forma città che definiamo Urbanocene? Quali sono le concezioni di "cittadinanza" a cui far riferimento per una smart-city? Oppure, se dobbiamo pensare all'ingresso della natura nella città, che ruolo avranno gli animali e anche le piante?
Il seminario si propone di rispondere a partire da queste questioni in prospettiva interdisciplinare. I contributi presentati durante il seminario saranno poi pubblicati in un numero monografico della rivista Segni e comprensione.

This article focuses on a fundamental conceptual error often made in atheistic and agnostic criticism of God: The tendency to think of God as a human-like being. This approach is fueled by psychological expectations that God is a being who feels, gets angry, punishes, or forgives. However, these criticisms are not aimed directly at God Himself, but at the limited conceptions that people have formed in their minds. The article emphasizes the difference between the ontological reality of God and the epistemological models formed in human minds and argues that ignoring this difference makes philosophical discussions shallow and reductionist. At the same time, pantheistic approaches that attempt to reduce God to the nature of the universe are discussed as different forms of this humanistic modeling. The article shows that criticisms of the theistic model of God are often based on superficial contextual errors, disconnected from other elements of the system, such as free will, testing and the afterlife. Finally, it is emphasized that the attitude of asking God "how should you have created" is epistemologically contradictory and far from a rational basis.

The ongoing war in Gaza has generated extensive polemic among scholars and the general public. Some have described this conflict as a novel form of warfare. The deeply asymmetric character of this war and the vast number of Palestinian civilian casualties have prompted some analysts to described Gaza as a “new urban warfare.” Others have used similar descriptions such as “new war of attrition” or “Israel’s new wars,” while Kaldor argues that her theory of “new wars” is fully applicable to the violent conflict in Gaza...

Die zentrale Thernatik dieses Kapitels ist die Frage, wie Intentionen in Handlungen iibersetzt werden. Hypothesen iiber diese Obersetzungsprozesse werden gewonnen, indern zunachst die Funktion von Intentionen beim Realisieren von Wiinschen bestirnrnt wird. Dabei wird zwischen Zielintentionen oder Absichten ("Ich will den gewiinschten Endzustand X erreichen!") einerseits und Vorsatzen ("Ich will die Handlung Y ausfUhren, sobald die Situation Z vorliegt!") andererseits unterschieden. Vorsatze werden als im Dienst einer zugehorigen Zielintention stehend betrachtet. Sie legen fest, wann, wo und wie die Zielintention zu realisieren ist. SchlieBlich werden Studien referiert, die einen positiven Effekt von Vorsatzen auf das Verwirklichen von Zielen belegen, sowie weiterfiihrende Studien, die auf die Prozesse verweisen, die fUr diesen Effekt verantwortlich sind. Urn dern Leser einen leichteren Zugang zu der hier favorisierten Intentionstheorie zu geben, werden zunachst zwei gegensatzliche traditionelle Ansatze (Ach vs. Lewin) vorgestellt, sowie ein aktueller Ansatz, der vor allern in der Sozialpsychologie bekannt ist . Intentionen karnen urn die Jahrhundertwende in das Blickfeld psychologischer T~eorienbildung, als die Wiirzburger Schule begann, sich fUr die Analyse des Wl1lens zu interessieren. Der prorninenteste und wohl auch reprasentativste Vertreter der aufkornrnenden Willenspsychologie war NarziB Ach. Sein vorrangiges Forschungsziel zusammenfassend siehe Ach, 1935) war, das Wollen als eigenstandigen psychologischen Gegenstand zu etablieren und darnit seine Forderung zu unterstreichen, daB die Willenspsychologie ein e.igen~tandiger Zweig der Psychologie sein miisse. Ach betrachtete die Inten-tIOn, In einer konkreten Situation eine bestimmte Handlung auszufiihren, als

The members of any functioning modern society live their lives amid complex networks of overlapping institutions. Apart from the major political institutions of law and government, however, much normative political theory seems to regard this institutional fabric as largely a pragmatic convenience. This paper contests this assumption by reflecting on how institutions both constrain and enable spheres of effective action and responsibility. In this way a society's institutional fabric constitutes, in Samuel Scheffler's phrase, an infrastructure of responsibility. The paper discusses three key normative aspects of this infrastructure. First, institutions define roles and rules, alongside forms of sanction and encouragement, so as to realise limited forms of practical, normative agreement. Second, institutions allocate and adjudicate distinct responsibilities. This creates separate spheres of initiative, ensuring responsibilities are fulfilled and providing for structured disagreement and change. Third, because we move through a plurality of institutions and associations, we experience varying responsibilities and forms of recognition. Individual identities thus depend on several different forms of recognition, and are well placed to resist totalising or fundamentalist temptations. In sum, the paper argues that a liberal institutional fabric provides essential moral stability, though not an undesirable fixity. By containing the fragility and dangers of individual moral judgment, our institutional fabric allows such judgment to play a valuable role in human affairs.

This article argues that God-centered philosophical discussions, especially in atheist and agnostic circles, are largely irrational, lack conceptual integrity and contradict the basic principles of philosophy. The author emphasizes that the sine qua non condition for a philosophical discussion is that the concept in question, in this case God, must be assumed within its own definition, even if temporarily. Since the concept of God necessitates creativity, discussing a non-creator as God loses its meaning. Nevertheless, in atheist and agnostic discourses, God's existence is denied, but questions such as "why did he do this?" and "why is there pain?" are posed assuming that God exists, which leads to a serious logical contradiction. It is also stated that arguments such as the "argument from evil" essentially involve emotional and reductionist responses and an anthropocentric judgment against the absoluteness of God. Agnostics' use of atheist arguments by abandoning their epistemological position contradicts their position and goes beyond rational consistency. The main theme of the article is that interpretation, criticism and syllogism, which are the main functions of philosophy, are valid only on changeable phenomena, and that making speculative judgments on ontological constants serves not philosophy but sophistry.

Sumario: I. Introducción.-II. Los delitos de omisión propia en la dogmática penal. Un lacónico análisis del tipo penal de apropiación indebida de tributos.-III. La solución exculpante: ¿afirmación de un injusto penal inexigible?-IV. Breves reflexiones.-V. Bibliografía. I. Introducción El delito de apropiación indebida de tributos está consignado en el art. 4° del Régimen Penal Tributario-cf. ley 27.430-, y castiga penalmente "[a]l agente de retención o de percepción de tributos nacionales, provinciales o de la Ciudad Autónoma de Buenos Aires, que no depositare, total o parcialmente, dentro de los treinta [30] días corridos de vencido el plazo de ingreso, el tributo retenido o percibido, siempre que el monto no ingresado, superare la suma de cien mil pesos ($100.000) por cada mes".

Techno-Fascism: The Heart Against Silicon Evil explores the emergence of a new form of authoritarianism born from the fusion of unchecked technological advancement and moral disconnection. The essay traces this phenomenon from the atomic age to the present rise of artificial intelligence, neuro-surveillance, and cybernetic control systems. It warns of a world where reason operates without empathy, and progress serves domination rather than life. Through the metaphor of “masks without faces,” the author argues that the true danger lies not in machines themselves but in the human minds that create them without heart. The piece calls for a conscious rebalancing of intellect and compassion, proposing that only a union of mind and heart can prevent a civilization from turning its own tools against itself.

Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence, published in 1974, produced nothing less than a profound in contemporary philosophical thought. Pursuing the breakthrough made in the work of 1961, Totality and Infinity, but by interrupting its phenomenological movement, Levinas deploys and describes an ethical subjectivity already awoken to the responsibility for the Other, a vulnerable subjectivity, a subjectivity “more passive than all passivity”, persecuted, haunted and elected to the point of substitution for the Other. From which “place”, and towards which heading and ethico-political orientation, are we to think this “substitution” and this “expiation” at the heart of the infinitely responsible subjectivity for the Other and for the death of the Other? Which are the risks and the chances of this hyperbolical ethics, engaged by a responsibility without conditions for the Other? Can it furnish the space – and if so, how to determine such a space – for a political or a sociality, a manner of rethinking, or even, reconfigure our democratic institutions?   
In engaging a thinking towards the alterity of the Other irreducible to the classical modalities of intersubjectivity or recognition, Levinas deploys a wholly other disposition towards Being and ethical duty, truth and justice, singularity and universality, and in this sense redefines what we could call humanism, and thereby, rethinks anew the possibility of the Good after the irremediable breaks and caesurae of our History and indeed after what the philosopher names “useless suffering” has put into abyss the human rational ideal of moral benevolence or the reconciliatory tendency of the historical becoming of humanity. In effect, Levinas indicates how and why substitution for the Other – infinite response of responsibility for the Other always preceding the call of the Other – will have torn us away from Being and the different modalities of Being-together and thus marks, both in the face of History and before the alterity of the Other, responsibility cannot be circumscribed within the established limits of a social contract or normative morality, but must “infinitize” itself and translates itself as “infinition” for the Other. Before freedom, the ethical subjectivity thus finds itself emptied of its own substance and, substituting itself for the Other, remains already engaged beyond its autonomy in what Levinas calls its “disinterestedness,” its “exception” and “election” – let us also say its “escape” from the perseverance of its existence in Being towards an unprecedented opening, in spite of itself, towards its irreplaceable responsibility. Here, in this “space”, all the structures of appearing are overturned and the intentional order of the “world”, of our “lived experience” or of the “horizon” of intentionality from which phenomenality can be understood and in which intersubjectivity can be constituted as sameness are disrupted. Levinas’ hyperbolic ethics thus commits us to rethinking subjectivity as “absolute expiation” for the Other and draws us into an otherwise than being, irreducible to a “being otherwise”, and where the relationship with the Other interrupts subjectivity whilst inspiring it to an expiration without return for the Other.
Our conference will return to Levinas’ Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence and will seek to understand how its “extravagant hypothesis” can initiate a transformation or a transmutation of philosophical thought and ethical action within our contemporaneity. Our questions cannot not be posed today and in the wake of Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence where Levinas considers extra-ordinary possibilities for the Human and in the name of an ethics entirely inhabited by a certain promise, even messianicity. How can or may we restore meaning to this demanding promise today? What can it mean and how can we translate this hyperbolic meaning of ethics, this messianicity, in our era powerfully undermined by the proliferation of a devastating nihilism and geopolitical desolation? What can ethics still do in the face of the often perilous extensions and propagations of the technological enframing of the human?
“As soon as now!” wrote Levinas. We could also, by continuing, say: “as soon as now” for an “otherwise from now on”. Returning then to Otherwise than Being, or Beyond Essence, rereading it after the 50 years of its publication and studying it again and from the novelty that this work still presents for us today whilst engaging a beyond of violence, of war, of the reduction of the Other that still rages today in the four corners of our world – such will be the horizon and the purpose of our conference.

In «Logoi.ph», XI, 26, 2025, pp. 87-98, ISSN: 2420-9775

The essay aims to articulate a reflection starting from the reading of three stories by Kafka, Before the Law, A Message from the Emperor and Similes, preferring the concept of ‘absolute sense’ as a compass. The aim will be to show on the one hand the implicit dynamics structuring Kafka’s poetics and on the other the representation in aesthetic form of the ontology of reality and human life, converging on the exhibition of the unavailability of absolute sense as decisive factor of existence. In this way, Kafka could suggest the removal of the idea of a resolutive sense (for example the ‘Gesetz’ to which the man from the countryside would like to access) as a well-founded prelude to redemption.

It is the famous first thesis of Anscombe's 'Modern Moral Philosophy' that we should lay aside moral philosophy-indeed 'banish ethics totally from our minds'! (p. 38, paragraph 36)-'until we have an adequate philosophy of psychology'. 2 By a 'philosophy of psychology' I understand Anscombe to mean grammatical investigations into various psychological concepts that hold the key to ethics. Anscombe herself instances 'action', 'intention', 'pleasure', 'wanting' ('more will probably turn up if we start with these'). Without such an understanding, she thinks we will simply go astray. In Intention she addresses herself to this task, at least as regards 'intention', 'action' and 'wanting'. Indeed of the four concepts mentioned in 'Modern Moral Philosophy', it is only the concept 'pleasure' that is left 'in its obscurity; it needs a whole enquiry to itself (Intention 40.4, P-77). In this paper I explore the question whether Anscombe's desire to keep ethics out of the 'logical features of practical reasoning' (38.1, p. 72) doesn't lead her to cut those features down too far; whether, that is, there is not more to human action and practical rationality at the grammatical level than she seems inclined to concede. And I wish to connect this with her suspicion and criticism of Aristotle's concept of preferential choice (prohairesis). In Intention section 5 Anscombe asks: 1 I should like to thank Philippa Foot, Pamela Hieronymi, Anselm Miiller, Seana Shiffrin, and Julie Tannenbaum for their helpful comments, and the Royal Institute of Philosophy and Professor O'Hear for inviting me to contribute to this series of lectures in honour of Professor Elizabeth Anscombe. References to Intention (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1957) are to the second edition (1963), and are by section number, and then paragraph number (e.g. '17.2'). References to Anscombe's papers are to the Collected Papers,

Xunzi (荀子) is a naturalist ethicist. For him, morality comes from neither the divine nor pure reason. Central to his moral philosophy is the concept of ritual propriety (lĭ 禮).1 Rules of ritual propriety are established in order to regulate human activities so that society can accommodate appropriate human feelings and desires with limited resources. But what kind of feelings and desires are appropriate? For Xunzi, these are determined both on natural grounds and on social grounds. They are determined on
natural grounds as human biological and psychological needs have a natural basis. Natural grounds alone, however, are not adequate, as our inborn natural tendency is toward selfish satisfaction and leads to competition and chaos. There must also be social grounds for determining the appropriate types and amounts of feelings and desires. The social grounds are predicated on limited resources and on the need to satisfy other people’s feelings and desires. These social considerations require people to adjust their feelings and desires according to their respective social stations and to feasible levels of goods that can become available so they can be satisfied without causing chaos. When people are accustomed to rules of ritual propriety, they can internalize it and become
morally cultivated persons. A society that is regulated effectively by ritual propriety and filled with moral cultivated people is a good society.

This paper intends to trace the genealogy of Derrida’s notion of auto-immunity, which has been elaborated since Specters of Marx (1993) and Politics of Friendship (1994). The analysis aims to highlight a more ancient origin of its development, found in the “logic of supplement”, outlined since Of Grammatology (1967) and Life Death (1975-1976). As will be discussed, the paradigm of auto-immunity is linked to a theoretical-political context of rediscovery of Marxism and enhancement of its messianic promise of unconditional hospitality. Within this framework, the recent publication of the unpublished seminars Répondre – du secret (1991-1992) and Hospitality vol.1-2 (1995-1996) allows us to read both the themes of secret and hospitality in the light of the previous phenomenological and scientific “a-logic of autoimmunological”, now extended to ethical, religious and political dimensions. It is only starting from the secret of autoimmune hospitality that Derrida can propose the concept of “autoimmune democracy” in Rogues (2003) and in Philosophy in a Time of Terror (2003). It is still very useful today to understand contemporary political challenges.

This publication is devoted to a critical analysis of the article by G.M. Ippolitov and T.V. Filatov, recently published in the journal Klio: “Once more about history as a science. Reflections – invitation to discussion”. The author believes that this article does not provide solid evidence of the full value of history as a scientific discipline and completely unsatisfactorily resolves (or rather, does not resolve at all) the question of the subject of science in general and history in particular. The author offers his interpretation of this concept with specific examples and evidence. Similarly, the functions, methods and categories of science are considered, with a projection on history. It is concluded that the latter is a full-fledged scientific discipline, although its data are widely used by unscrupulous scientists for various falsifications and manipulations.

ABSTRACT:
............................................................................................................................................................................................................................................................JPMorgan Chase Bank argues that David Arthur Morton’s imminent eviction onto the streets — where he faces serious risk of death or injury — does not constitute an emergency. The bank offers this position despite the fact that Washington State “judges” have refused to respond to Morton’s charges that the political branches have enacted laws creating financial incentives for the judiciary to enforce mortgage-backed securities as if they were valid promissory notes secured by traditional mortgages.

di Alberto Comparini . AC: se provassimo a tracciare un'evoluzione del tuo pensiero, intellettuale e accademico, a partire dalla tua tesi di dottorato (Funktionswandel und Rezeption, 1972) fino a Prose of the World. Diderot, Goya, Lichtenberg, and Mozart and an End of Enlightenment (2021), uno dei concetti chiave che torna, direttamente e indirettamente, è quello di Stimmung. Inizierei, dunque, da questo aspetto: che ruolo ha avuto la Stimmung nel tuo percorso biografico? Sepp: non ricordo di aver usato esplicitamente la parola Stimmung nella mia tesi di dottorato. Se si esclude il fatto che quel lavoro trattava di testi medievali (principalmente in francese e in lingua castigliana), e che la cultura medievale continua ad essere un'ispirazione per il mio pensiero, oggi mi sento abbastanza distante da quel libro, e sfortunatamente non riesco a considerarlo come «origine» del mio lavoro. Quindi la risposta puramente fattuale alla tua domanda è che la «Stimmung», come concetto e come dimensione dell'esperienza estetica, divenne per me una preoccupazione e un vero e proprio fascino molto più avanti. È successo dopo il 2005, credo, quando il mio amico Henning Ritter (in quel momento l'editore del supplemento settimanale «Geisteswissenschaften» del giornale «Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung») mi incoraggiò a partecipare all'esperimento di fare un lavoro concettuale (o filosofico?) innovativo, in forma di testi brevi e saggistici. Così ho scritto una decina di brevi articoli sulle Stimmungen in testi letterari di diverse lingue e periodi storici -e quei pochi saggi sarebbero diventati la base per il mio libro sulla Stimmung. Retrospettivamente, tuttavia, sono tentato di dire che la Stimmung (in qualche modo avant la lettre o avant le mot) aveva avuto un ruolo nel mio lavoro In 1926. Living on the Edge of Time (pubblicato nel 1997 per Harvard University Press), il libro che considero più determinante per il mio lavoro -e che considero anche come la soglia che ho dovuto attraversare per arrivare a definire la dimensione di «Presenza» per la quale non avevo ancora concetti teorico-filosofici adatti o ben definiti. Oggi posso vedere che In 1926 c'era un tentativo di descrivere l'identità storica di un particolare anno come Stimmung. Ora, se oggi (e dopo il libro Stimmungen lesen. Über eine verdekte Wirklichkeit der Literatur del 2011) mi propongo ancora di capire questa parola come riferita agli stati innescati negli individui dalle diverse modalità del tocco più leggero possibile che il nostro ambiente materiale può avere sui nostri corpi, ciò significa che la Stimmung appartiene a quei fenomeni culturali che ho cercato di portare alla ribalta attraverso il concetto di «Presenza». Ciò detto, penso che le Stimmungen abbiano sempre avuto un ruolo esistenziale particolarmente rilevante nella mia vita (anche indipendentemente dal mio lavoro intellettuale),

This paper belongs to a larger series exploring the philosophical tensions and symbolic convergence between ancient revelation and modern quantum cognition. The author, approaches the discourse from a unique intersection of Islamic theology, political exile, and computational thought.

In Food, Justice, and Animals: Feeding the World Respectfully, I sketch a food system in which people have access to animal-based foods and animals' rights are respected. I present this as an ideal theoretic vision in the liberal tradition of political philosophy. In this article, I respond to the commentaries provided in this symposium by Bardon, Bernardi, and Gentile; Pellegrino; Bailey; Fischer; Chiang and Sebo; and Williams. I group my responses around the three themes identified by Bailey in his introduction: public reason, political constituencies, and markets.

Is development in higher education like a friendly poker game where development officers are allowed, by convention, to "bluff" foundations and potential donors? Or is it more like a business relationship where the development officers straightforwardly exchange goods, services, and goodwill on behalf of the institution in return for the donors' dollars? Maybe it is like the lawyer-client relationship, in which the development officer has a fiduciary responsibility to the donor. Which of these metaphors we choose for the donor-development officer relationship tells us something about the conventions of the relationship. What counts as deception depends in part on what kinds of expectations participants have of one another and what professional duties are implicit within the relationship. Not many people would claim that it is justifiable to deceive a potential donor, but just what should count as deception is not clear. The problem with deception is not that development officers say, "Yes, I think in this case it 's OK to lie, cheat, and steal." Rather, in

15. yy Osmanlı ulemasının önde gelen isimlerinden biri olan Tokatlı Molla Lutfi (ö.900/1495), II. Bayezid’in huzurunda alimlerle yapmış olduğu tartışmayı padişahın emriyle kaleme alarak Seyyid Şerîf Cürcânî’nin (ö. 816) hikmetin (felsefe) “mevzûsuna” dair ileri sürdüğü argümanları çeşitli yönlerden eleştirir ve ilimlerin konusu hakkında bir tartışma başlatır. Cürcânî’nin temel eserlerinden yaptıkları alıntıları değerlendirmek suretiyle bir ilmin birden çok mevzûsu olabilir mi, ilimlerin konularında zikredilen haysiyet kaydı nedir, meselelerin iştiraki ilimlerin birbirinden ayrışmasında ne derece önemlidir gibi sorulara cevap vermeye çalışır.  Molla Lutfi’nin es-Seb‘u’ş-şidâd adını verdiği bu risalesi, kendisinden önceki düşünce geleneğini sorgulaması, ortaya koymuş olduğu çözüm önerileri ile yeni bir tartışma zeminini başlatması açısından önemlidir.

Addressing the intricate socio-techno-environmental dimension of noesis within the current climate of social and urban challenges necessitates a transdisciplinary approach. In pursuit of this objective, NWM incorporates contributions that delve into sense-making processes involved in the individuation of humans, technologies, and their affective environments. These contributions offer diverse perspectives that critically examine the production of sense and its heterogeneous potentials for transindividuation. Key questions include: What transductive relations emerge in the entanglements between technology, affects, and the production of our (offloaded) memories and desires? How do these relations shape the sensible apprehension of our lives and the lives of our milieus? In what ways can they be expressed beyond the conventional, Western, ocularcentric, and annotational fixations of generic sciences? What new senses are required to navigate the complexity of the present? And, collectively and technologically, how do we sense the effects of our actions? Drawing inspiration from Gregory Bateson, how can we cultivate a different sensory perspective to foster a transformative mode of thinking?

NWM provides a platform for thinkers who boldly traverse disciplinary boundaries, encompassing a diverse range of fields. These include, but are not limited to, affect and affordance theories, architecture, art and cultural studies, philosophy and philosophy of technology, (digital) media studies, feminist theories, film theory, social sciences, and literature.

The study examines the relationship betweenmoral judgments of a business situation with ethicalcontent and personal religiousness. The findingssuggest that ethical interest and behaviour arerelated to religiousness. However, only the ethicalphilosophy of contractualism was found to be relatedto religiousness, while moral equity and relativismwere not.

Todo hombre por naturaleza desea estar en las mejores condiciones posibles", esta afirmación, es, simplemente evidente, e imbatible en un sentido contrafactico, no sería sensato proponerse hacer la contra esta proposición descrita. Debe entenderse como una intuición ontológica y antropológica de fondo. A diferencia de un mero hedonismo, esta frase apunta a una concepción compleja del bienestar: no se trata solo de placer, ni de éxito material, sino de un ideal que abarca plenitud, equilibrio, virtud y sentido. Esta tendencia no es una invención cultural, sino una inclinación estructural del ser humano: un eros dirigido hacia un estado óptimo, que llamaremos condición ampliada del ser. No obstante, esta tendencia no garantiza su cumplimiento. De hecho, en muchos casos, se produce un quiebre entre el deseo de mejorar y la práctica concreta de autonegación o autosabotaje, una tensión que será central en este marco, vamos a abordar la rigidez de la premisa propuesta.

This paper identifies an intermediate position in Leibniz’s moral thought between
deontological and sentimentalist morality. Whereas in his early writings obligations
towards others are derived from obedience to God, Leibniz later comes to conceive
of “charity” towards others as a state of mind that arises spontaneously in
those whose intellect can identify convergences between different interests (“perceiving
harmony”) and imagining feelings and judgments of other agents (“putting
oneself in the other’s place”). On this basis, Leibniz would be able to outline
an “ethics of recognition” (rather than a kind of “ethics of law”) which has original
characteristics and clearly anticipates the later philosophies of “dialogue” or
discourse, although never emancipated from the theological dimension and rather
proposed as an interpretation of evangelical precepts. In the last part of the essay,
the author also examines the limits of this approach, based on the attempt to
universalize a model of relationship that is originally and typically interpersonal.

In the debate about the moral standing of artificial intelligence, the question of whether or not technical artefacts have some form of intentionality that would allow them to be considered part of the moral world (or excluded from it) plays a crucial role. The problem of intentionality in fact constitutes a cornerstone in the construction of the notion of moral agency, as demonstrated, among other things, by the fact that technological objects have so far been excluded from the field of ethics because they lack intentionality. In contrast to this exclusion, there is now a trend in the opposite direction, which increasingly attributes some form of intentionality and moral status to AI systems. This paper addresses the clarification of the notion of technological intentionality in artificial intelligence, and especially in generative AI. To this end, it analyses a number of paradigmatic positions in this debate, highlighting their merits and shortcomings. Finally, it proposes replacing the notion of intentionality with the notion of preter-intentionality, which better expresses-according to the thesis put forward-the human-artificial intelligence relationship.

The paper aims to investigate so-called digital normativity understood as the binding force exerted on our lives by the predictions and standards produced by intelligent systems. In order to investigate such normative force in the moral field, we make use of the postphenomenological reflections of D. Ihde and P.P. Verbeek. In particular, starting from the definition of artificial intelligence in the terms of quasi-other proposed by Ihde and the function of technological mediation highlighted by Verbeek, we propose to define the normative force exerted by intelligent systems in the terms of quasi-normativity. By this expression we intend to highlight the peculiar status of the normative demands raised by such systems. In fact, according to the proposed thesis, such instances, although not morally neutral, cannot be considered normative in the strong sense, since this kind of strong normativity requires human approval. In this direction of inquiry, we suggest rethinking as the (hybrid) origin of moral normativity the human-technology interaction.

This submission offers a comprehensive operational framework for ethical AI, anchored in universal moral principles and operationalised through advanced methodologies such as Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL), Multi-Objective Optimisation (MOO), and Symbolic Reasoning. Our framework aligns with the core values established by UNESCO, which prioritise protecting human life, the pursuit of truth, and the respect for individual freedom.

The framework showcases a variety of applications, including:

Ethical AI in Diplomacy: We explore how AI can facilitate diplomatic relations and negotiations, enhance refugee policy decision-making, and optimise international trade agreements while ensuring adherence to ethical standards.

AI-Human Co-Development for Governance: The concept of AI-human co-development (AICHMW) emphasises collaborative governance models that promote peace, sustainability, and democratic engagement, allowing for inclusive participation in decision-making processes.

Educational Integration through Literature: The Aviidil youth book series is an engaging tool for integrating AI ethics into educational curricula. These narratives illustrate complex ethical dilemmas related to artificial intelligence in a format accessible to younger audiences.

Moral Crisis Simulations: We delve into simulations designed to tackle critical moral crises, such as climate change, nuclear proliferation, and social inclusion. These simulations provide a platform for stakeholders to engage in ethical reasoning and collaborative problem-solving.
The project faced several key challenges, notably in the translation of abstract ethical principles into a format that machines could understand and execute. This required navigating the intricate task of aligning conflicting values during real-time decision-making processes, while also ensuring that diverse cultural contexts were adequately represented and respected. To tackle these issues effectively, we designed a comprehensive ethical framework that integrates several advanced methodologies. This framework prominently features data-driven learning techniques, specifically Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) for understanding human preferences, optimization strategies such as Multi-Objective Optimization (MOO) to balance competing objectives, and the principles of symbolic logic to enforce stringent moral constraints.

Another significant hurdle was engaging stakeholders from both technical and non-technical backgrounds. We addressed this challenge through the establishment of AICHMW—a collaborative workflow that brings together a diverse group of participants, including educators who provide pedagogical insights, diplomats who understand global ethical standards, developers who can implement technical solutions, and youth who represent the perspectives of future generations.

Furthermore, to effectively communicate themes of AI ethics to young audiences and the broader global community, we resorted to innovative mediums such as fictional narratives exemplified by the Aviidil series, alongside interactive experiences like the gamified simulation called Tariff Titans. These creative approaches not only helped demystify the complexities of AI ethics but also encouraged active participation, thereby ensuring that AI technologies are developed in harmony with fundamental human values and collective societal aspirations.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the influence of moral philosophy on the ethical beliefs of auditors. The paper argues that an individual's moral philosophy is the key factor in how one views ethical issues and largely determines the ethical choices one makes. The paper also seeks to discover the influence of personal values on the reasoning processes associated with ethics and to explore whether the personal value preferences of auditors, as a manifestation of their moral philosophy, influence their ethical beliefs and (presumably) their subsequent actions.Design/methodology/approachThe authors designed a survey instrument to assess the value preferences, moral philosophies, and reactions of practicing auditors to judgment dilemmas. They then employed structural equation modeling to examine the sensitivity of auditors to the competence and integrity of clients with the aim of gaining insight into the ethical beliefs of auditors in general.FindingsThese result...

In this essay, I argue that contractualism, even when it is actually used to construe our moral duties towards non-human animals, does not do so naturally. We can infer from our experiences with companion animals that we owe moral duties towards them because of special relationships we are in with them. We can further abstract that we owe general moral duties to non-human animals because they are the kinds of beings that we can have relationships with, and because of the capacities that make possible this relational capacity. This type of approach better explains our duties towards non-human animals and other non-rational beings than does the trustee account that Scanlon leaves room for in his contractualism. This relational account of moral duty will only apply to non-human animals with the requisite capacities, but this includes common companion animals.