The automated will: Nonconscious activation and pursuit of behavioral goals

Social Cognition, 2009

Arguing from the nature of goal pursuit and from the economy of mental resources this paper suggests that automatic goal pursuit, much like its controlled counterpart, may be flexible. Two studies that employ goal priming procedures examine this hypothesis using the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (Study 1) and a variation of the Iowa Gambling Task (Study 2). Implications of the results for our understanding of the dichotomy between automatic and controlled processes in general, and for our conception of automatic goal pursuit in particular, are discussed.

Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 2006

Nonconsciously activated goals and consciously set goals produce the same outcomes by engaging similar psychological processes ( . However, nonconscious and conscious goal pursuit may have diVerent eVects on subsequent aVect if goal pursuit aVords an explanation, as nonconscious goal pursuit occurs in an explanatory vacuum (i.e. cannot be readily attributed to the respective goal intention). We compared self-reported aVect after nonconscious versus conscious goal pursuit that either violated or conformed to a prevailing social norm. When goal-directed behavior did not require an explanation (was norm-conforming), aVective experiences did not diVer after nonconscious and conscious goal pursuit. However, when goal-directed behavior required an explanation (was norm-violating), nonconscious goal pursuit induced more negative aVect than conscious goal pursuit.

1994

The control of goal-directed, instrumental actions by primary motivational states, such as hunger and thirst, is mediated by two processes . The first is engaged by the Pavlovian association between contextual or discriminative stimuli and the outcome or reinforcer presented during instrumental training . Such stimuli exert a motivational influence on instrumental performance that depends upon the relevance of the associated outcome to the current motivational state of the agent . Moreover, the motivational effects of these stimuli operate in the absence of prior experience with the outcome under the relevant motivational state . The second, instrumental, process is mediated by knowledge of the contingency between the action and its outcome and controls the value assigned to this outcome . In contrast to the Pavlovian process, motivational states do not influence the instrumental process directly ; rather, the agent has to learn about the value of an outcome in a given motivational state by exposure to it while in that state . This incentive learning is similar in certain respects to the acquisition of "cathexes" envisaged by .

2009

The present research explored the nature of automatic associations formed between short-term motives (temptations) and the overriding goals with which they interfere. Five experimental studies, encompassing several self-regulatory domains, found that temptations tend to activate such higher priority goals, whereas the latter tend to inhibit the temptations. These activation patterns occurred outside of participants' conscious awareness and did not appear to tax their mental resources. Moreover, they varied as a function of subjective goal importance and were more pronounced for successful versus unsuccessful self-regulators in a given domain. Finally, priming by temptation stimuli was found not only to influence the activation of overriding goals but also to affect goal-congruent behavioral choices.

Frontiers in Psychology, 2013

It is becoming increasingly mainstream to claim that conscious will is an illusion. This assertion is based on a host of findings that indicate conscious will does not share an efficient-cause relationship with actions. As an alternative, the present paper will propose that conscious will is not about causing actions, but rather, about constraining action systems toward producing outcomes. In addition, it will be proposed that we generate and sustain multiple outcomes simultaneously because the multi-scale dynamics by which we do so are, themselves, self-sustaining. Finally, it will be proposed that self-sustaining dynamics entail meaning (i.e., conscious content) because they naturally and necessarily constitute embodiments of context.

Current research in social psychology, 2007

Journal of Marketing Research, 2016

People can be aware (conscious) or unaware (unconscious) of an active goal when making a choice. Being aware of a goal enables people to use conscious strategies to identify attributes that are relevant to goal pursuit and to assess the efficacy of the attributes of each choice alternative. For most people, this process encourages the choice of the most goal-consistent alternative. For some people, this process encourages the consideration of trade-offs, activates a competing goal, and encourages the choice of a goal-inconsistent alternative. With unconscious goal pursuit, people cannot devote resources to assessing the efficacy of the attributes of each alternative; therefore, they match the accessible goal to the attributes of the available alternatives. As a result, the unconscious selects an alternative with attributes that are consistent with the goal and not necessarily the alternative that is most efficacious for the goal. The authors investigate these processes by manipulati...

Psychological Inquiry, 1990

Self Control in Society, Mind, and Brain, 2010

Kurt Lewin, goal attainment is not yet secured solely by forming strong committo highly desirable and feasible goals. There is alwaysthe subsequent issue of implementing a set. and one wonders what people can do to enhance their chances of being successful at this second of goal pursuit. A promising answer seems to be the following: People may plan out in advance they want to solve the problems of goal implementation. But what are these problems? TIlere are at four problems that stand out. These problems include getting started with goal striving, staying on oalling a halt, and [lot overextending oneself. We will describe research showing that making if-" .•..• "",H plans (Le., form implementation intentions) OI). how to deal with these problems indeed facilitates .• •ove,.,u.", the crucial problems of goal implementation. Thereafter, we will ask whether implementation intentions foster goal attainment even under conditions that are commonly viewed as not amenable .:loself-regulation attempts, such as succeeding on an intelligence test or overcoming spider phobia. > Finally, we will report research showing that implementation intentions can even foster goal-striving in ':those sampies (e.g., children with ADHD) that are known to suffer from impaired action control.